International Policy Coordination in a Dynamic Macroeconomic Model

International Policy Coordination in a Dynamic Macroeconomic Model PDF Author: Jeffrey Sachs
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economic policy
Languages : en
Pages : 25

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Book Description
This paper illustrates the role for macroeconomic policy coordination when interdependent economies are pursuing disinflationary policies. Under flexible exchangerates, policy makers have an incentive to reduce inflation by pursuing contractionary policies that yield a currency appreciation. In a Nash, perfect foresight equilibrium, policy authorities in the model pursue contractionary policies to achieve currency appreciation, but these attempts cancel out, with the result that all countries end up pursuing excessively contractionary policies (relative to asymmetric Pareto optimum). The paper presents these resultsin a two-country, infinite-horizon difference game

International Policy Coordination in a Dynamic Macroeconomic Model

International Policy Coordination in a Dynamic Macroeconomic Model PDF Author: Jeffrey Sachs
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economic policy
Languages : en
Pages : 25

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Book Description
This paper illustrates the role for macroeconomic policy coordination when interdependent economies are pursuing disinflationary policies. Under flexible exchangerates, policy makers have an incentive to reduce inflation by pursuing contractionary policies that yield a currency appreciation. In a Nash, perfect foresight equilibrium, policy authorities in the model pursue contractionary policies to achieve currency appreciation, but these attempts cancel out, with the result that all countries end up pursuing excessively contractionary policies (relative to asymmetric Pareto optimum). The paper presents these resultsin a two-country, infinite-horizon difference game

International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models

International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models PDF Author: Gilles Oudiz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economic policy
Languages : en
Pages : 86

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Book Description
Recent analyses of the gains to policy coordination have focussed on the strategic aspects of macroeconomic policy making in a static setting. A major theme is that noncooperative policy making is likely to be Pareto inefficient because of the presence of beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This paper extends the analysis to a dynamic setting, thereby introducing three important points of realism to the static game. First, the payoffs to beggar-thy-neighbor policies look very different in one-period and multiperiod games, and thus so do the gains to coordination. Second, we show that policy coordination may reduce economic welfare if governments are nyopic in their policy making, as is sometimes claimed. Third, governments act under a fundamental constraint that they cannot bind the actions of later governments, and we investigate how this constraint alters the gains to policy coordination.

International Economic Policy Coordination

International Economic Policy Coordination PDF Author: Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)
Publisher: CUP Archive
ISBN: 9780521337809
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 408

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Book Description
This volume presents some of the best current research on international economic policy coordination.

Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination

Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination PDF Author: David A. Currie
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 052144196X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 441

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Book Description
In this book David Currie and Paul Levine address a broad range of issues concerning the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in open economies. Adopting neo-Keynesian models for which monetary and fiscal policy have short-term real effects, they analyse active stabilisation policies in both a single- and multi-country context. Questions addressed include: the merits of simple policy rules, policy design in the face of uncertainty and international policy coordination. A central feature of the book is the treatment of credibility and the effect of a policy-maker's reputation for sticking to announced policies. These considerations are integrated with coordination issues to produce a unique synthesis. The volume develops optimal control methods and dynamic game theory to handle relationships between governments and a conscious rational private sector and produces a unified, coherent approach to the subject. This book will be of interest to students and teachers of open economy macroeconomics and to professional economists interested in using macroeconomic models to design policy.

International Macroeconomic Modelling for Policy Decisions

International Macroeconomic Modelling for Policy Decisions PDF Author: P. Artus
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9400943474
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 268

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Book Description
This book is based on an international conference organised by the Applied Econo metric Association (AEA) on International Macroeconomic Modelling which was held in Brussels at the Commission of the European Communities in December 1983. On behalf of the Applied Econometric Association, we would like to extend our thanks to all participants and contributors. This conference would not have been possible without the cooperation and support of the Commission of the European Economic Communities and of its Directorate General for Economics and Financial Affairs (DGII) staff, in particular M. Emerson, A. Dramais, and also H. Serbat of the Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Our thanks go also to J.P. Ancot for his constructive comments concerning the structure of this book. We are grateful to M. Russo, R. Maldague and Y. Ullmo for opening the con ference with their stimulating review and comments on the use of international macroeconomic models; and to R. Bird, A.M. Costa, A. Crockett, H. Guitton, J.C. Milleron, J. Paelinck, J. Waelbroeck for chairing the scientific sessions. P. Artus F. Gagey O. Guvenen vi INTRODUCTION The main focus of this book is to present recent developments in the construction and use of international macroeconometric models. Four main aspects are selected: (i) analysis of trade linkages and exchange rate determination; (ii) modelling and simulating the international economy; (iii) international policy coordination; (iv) the use of international macroeconomic models.

The Benefits of International Policy Coordination Revisited

The Benefits of International Policy Coordination Revisited PDF Author: Mr.Jaromir Benes
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475551894
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 53

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Book Description
This paper uses two of the IMF’s DSGE models to simulate the benefits of international fiscal and macroprudential policy coordination. The key argument is that these two policies are similar in that, unlike monetary policy, they have long-run effects on the level of GDP that need to be traded off with short-run effects on the volatility of GDP. Furthermore, the short-run effects are potentially much larger than those of conventional monetary policy, especially in the presence of nonlinearities such as the zero interest rate floor, minimum capital adequacy regulations, and lending risk that depends in a convex fashion on loan-to-value ratios. As a consequence we find that coordinated fiscal and/or macroprudential policy measures can have much larger stimulus and spillover effects than what has traditionally been found in the literature on conventional monetary policy.

Model Uncertainty. Learning, and the Gains from Coordination

Model Uncertainty. Learning, and the Gains from Coordination PDF Author: International Monetary Fund
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451943148
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 38

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Book Description
The paper considers gains from international economic policy coordination when there is uncertainty concerning the functioning of the world economy, but also learning about the “true” model on the part of policymakers. The paper reports estimates of plausible alternative versions of a standard, two-country model. Activist policy (either coordinated or uncoordinated) may produce large welfare losses in the absence of learning, if policymakers believe in the wrong model; hence exogenous money targets and freely flexible exchange rates may be best. However, model learning (from observations on macroeconomic variables) causes coordinated policies to dominate activist uncoordinated policies or exogenous money targets.

Macroeconomic Policies in an Interdependent World

Macroeconomic Policies in an Interdependent World PDF Author: Mr.Paul R. Masson
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 9781557751119
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 438

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Book Description
Copublished with the Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. and the Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, and edited by Ralph Bryant, David Currie, Jacob A. Frenkel, Paul Masson, and Richard Portes, this volume considers economic interdependence among well developed countries as well as between them and the developing regions of the world.

International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination

International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination PDF Author: Group of Thirty
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economic policy
Languages : en
Pages : 56

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Book Description


Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Coordination Among Multiple Equilibria

Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Coordination Among Multiple Equilibria PDF Author: Mr.Itai Agur
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484382757
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 33

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Book Description
The notion of a tradeoff between output and financial stabilization is based on monetarymacroprudential models with unique equilibria. Using a game theory setup, this paper shows that multiple equilibria lead to qualitatively different results. Monetary and macroprudential authorities have tools that impose externalities on each other's objectives. One of the tools (macroprudential) is coarse, while the other (monetary policy) is unconstrained. We find that this asymmetry always leads to multiple equilibria, and show that under economically relevant conditions the authorities prefer different equilibria. Giving the unconstrained authority a weight on "helping" the constrained authority ("leaning against the wind") now has unexpected effects. The relation between this weight and the difficulty of coordinating is hump-shaped, and therefore a small degree of leaning worsens outcomes on both authorities' objectives.