Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Econometric Society. World Congress
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521871522
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 431
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Book Description
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Author: Henner Gimpel
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540775544
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 242
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Book Description
This book contains a selection of papers presented at the International Seminar "Negotiation and Market Engineering", held at Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, in November 2006. The 17 revised full papers presented were carefully selected and reviewed. The papers deal with the complexity of negotiations, auctions, and markets as economic, social, and IT systems. The authors give a broad overview on the major issues to be addressed and the methodologies used to approach them.
Author: Jayson L. Lusk
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521671248
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 316
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Book Description
Economists, psychologists, and marketers are interested in determining the monetary value people place on non-market goods for a variety of reasons: to carry out cost-benefit analysis, to determine the welfare effects of technological innovation or public policy, to forecast new product success, and to understand individual and consumer behavior. Unfortunately, many currently available techniques for eliciting individuals' values suffer from a serious problem in that they involve asking individuals hypothetical questions about intended behavior. Experimental auctions circumvent this problem because they involve individuals exchanging real money for real goods in an active market. This represents a promising means for eliciting non-market values. Lusk and Shogren provide a comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions. It will be a valuable resource to graduate students, practitioners and researchers concerned with the design and utilization of experimental auctions in applied economic and marketing research.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 66
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Book Description
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814452165
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 471
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Book Description
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Author: Leigh Tesfatsion
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0080459870
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 905
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Book Description
The explosive growth in computational power over the past several decades offers new tools and opportunities for economists. This handbook volume surveys recent research on Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE), the computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents. Empirical referents for "agents" in ACE models can range from individuals or social groups with learning capabilities to physical world features with no cognitive function. Topics covered include: learning; empirical validation; network economics; social dynamics; financial markets; innovation and technological change; organizations; market design; automated markets and trading agents; political economy; social-ecological systems; computational laboratory development; and general methodological issues.*Every volume contains contributions from leading researchers*Each Handbook presents an accurate, self-contained survey of a particular topic *The series provides comprehensive and accessible surveys
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 023154457X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 222
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Book Description
Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.
Author: Robert A. Schwartz
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461516978
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 457
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Book Description
ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ The primary objective of this book is to consider how the inclusion of electronic call auction trading would affect the performance of our U.S. equity markets. The papers it contains focus on the call auction and its role in a hybrid market struc ture. The purpose is to increase understanding of this trading environment, and to consider the design of a more efficient stock market. This book had its origin in a symposium, Electronic Call Market Trading, that was held at New York University's Salomon Center on April 20, 1995. Nearly 150 people from 16 different countries attended. At the time, three proprietary trading systems based on call auction principles (The Arizona Stock Exchange, Posit, and Instinet's Crossing Network) had been operating for several years and interest already existed in the procedure. Since the symposium, increasing use has been made of call auctions, primarily by the ParisBourse in its Nouveau Marchi: and CAC markets, by Deutsche Borse in its Xetra market, and in the U.S. by OptiMark. Rather than being used as stand alone systems, however, call auctions are now being interfaced with continuous markets so as to produce hybrid market structures, a development that is given considerable attention to in a number of the chapters in this book.
Author: Peter C. Cramton
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 678
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Book Description
A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.
