Information Sharing with Fusion Centers Has Improved, But Information System Challenges Remain _Re PDF Download
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Author: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781723134234
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain _Re
Author: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781723134234
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain _Re
Author: United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Information networks
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
We reviewed the department's approach to information sharing with state and local fusion centers. Our objectives were to determine (1) the effectiveness of DHS' strategy, processes, and activities for facilitating information sharing with fusion centers; and (2) the extent to which information technology systems support information sharing between the department and these centers. DHS has made progress in its efforts to improve information sharing with fusion centers. Fusion center personnel indicated that information sharing had improved over time and the information received from the department met their needs primarily due to the deployment of DHS intelligence officers to the centers. As a result of improved information sharing, fusion centers have successfully collaborated with the department during numerous large-scale events and maintained situational awareness after attempted terrorist attacks or other incidents. However, DHS component collaboration in the information sharing process needs improvement, and some intelligence products could better meet state and local needs. In addition, information technology systems do not fully support information sharing between DHS and state and local fusion centers. Specifically, fusion center personnel make limited use of information sharing systems and instead rely on emails for situational awareness and intelligence sharing. Personnel from fusion centers identified challenges with limited system content and usability, as well as the existence of too many federal systems and no ability to conduct comprehensive or simultaneous searches across multiple systems or department databases.
Author: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781722246112
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Information sharing with fusion centers has improved, but information system challenges remain
Author: Eileen R. Larence
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437940633
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Book Description
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Recent terrorist activity, such as the attempted Times Square bombing, underscores the need for terrorism-related information sharing. Since 2001, all 50 states and some local governments have established fusion centers, where homeland security, terrorism, and other intelligence information is shared. The fed. gov¿t. recognizes the importance of fusion centers; however, as reported in October 2007, centers face challenges in sustaining their operations. This report assesses the extent to which: (1) the Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken action to support fusion centers' efforts to maintain and grow their operations; and (2) DHS and the Dept. of Justice have supported fusion centers in establishing privacy and civil liberties protections. Illustrations.
Author: U.s. Government Accountability Office
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781974444533
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Book Description
Recent terrorist activity, such as the attempted Times Square bombing, underscores the need for terrorism-related information sharing. Since 2001, all 50 states and some local governments have established fusion centers, where homeland security, terrorism, and other intelligence information is shared. The federal government recognizes the importance of fusion centers; however, as GAO reported in October 2007, centers face challenges in sustaining their operations. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken action to support fusion centers efforts to maintain and grow their operations, and (2) DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have supported fusion centers in establishing privacy and civil liberties protections. GAO reviewed relevant legislation and federal guidance; conducted interviews with 14 of 72 fusion centers, selected on the basis of location and time in operation, among other factors; and interviewed DHS and DOJ officials. The views of fusion center officials are not generalizable but provided insights.
Author: United States. Government Accountability Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Intelligence service
Languages : en
Pages : 41
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Book Description
Recent terrorist activity, such as the attempted Times Square bombing, underscores the need for terrorism-related information sharing. Since 2001, all 50 states and some local governments have established fusion centers, where homeland security, terrorism, and other intelligence information is shared. The federal government recognizes the importance of fusion centers; however, as GAO reported in October 2007, centers face challenges in sustaining their operations. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken action to support fusion centers' efforts to maintain and grow their operations, and (2) DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have supported fusion centers in establishing privacy and civil liberties protections. GAO reviewed relevant legislation and federal guidance; conducted interviews with 14 of 72 fusion centers, selected on the basis of location and time in operation, among other factors; and interviewed DHS and DOJ officials. The views of fusion center officials are not generalizable but provided insights.
Author: Renee Dianne Graphia
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Criminal justice, Administration of
Languages : en
Pages : 305
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Book Description
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 9/11 Commission concluded that the nation's intelligence agencies had failed to "connect the dots, " and improving the country's intelligence capabilities among all levels of government has been highly prioritized. While several federal initiatives were proposed to overcome "the wall" inhibiting information flow between agencies, a subfederal response was the establishment of fusion centers. Briefly, fusion centers are multiagency facilities tasked with improving the collection, analysis and dissemination of information and intelligence within the law enforcement community as well as between public and private sector partners. They are designed to maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve law enforcement's ability to fight crime and terrorism through all-source analysis and dissemination of information. Due to their relative newness, several issues currently remain unclear. Specifically, little research exists addressing whether fusion centers are fulfilling their intended functions, to what degree they have facilitated changes in how law enforcement understands and uses threat information, whether they are perceived effective, and whether they are innovative. Using case study design and qualitative methods, this study explored the perceived efficacy of fusion centers, using data collected from open-ended, semi-structured interviews and site visits. Using purposive and convenience sampling techniques, forty-nine (N=49) individuals offering a range of perspectives participated. Participants were solicited from, or affiliated with, four separate state fusion centers. In addition, individuals from key federal organizations and others with expert knowledge on the subject matter were interviewed for this research. The study's findings indicate that while fusion centers are partially fulfilling their designated tasks, they continue to struggle with several challenges. Although they have improved law enforcement's information collection and sharing capabilities, they have yet to develop robust analytical capabilities, or to overcome other obstacles. Moreover, the findings from this study suggest that the threat of terrorism is perceived as neither paramount nor trivial to fusion centers; however, fusion centers are perceived as valuable resources to address other criminal threats. The findings from this research have important policy implications for practitioners, as well as being a source from which future research regarding fusion center's processes and products can be empirically designed.
Author: U. S. Military
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781983132100
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
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Book Description
This study intends to uncover why critics have cited fusion centers at the national, regional, and state levels of the Intelligence Community (IC) for the inability to share intelligence. The research method examines three case studies: the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and state and local fusion centers now combined into a National Network. All three case studies reveal how fusion centers at these various levels of the IC have been inhibited from sharing information because of three primary challenges: (1) the absence of a standardized model, (2) an insufficient concentration on counterterrorism (CT) as a mission, and (3) underdeveloped or missing external agency partnerships, although each challenge often affects each particular case study in different ways. For NCTC, external partnerships exhibit the most prevalent challenge at the national level; for EPIC, the diffusion of its mission creates the most difficult obstacle for it to overcome; and for the National Network, standardization precludes state and local fusion centers from sharing information while barring them from a more refined mission-set and better, more reciprocal partnerships. I. INTRODUCTION * A. THE PRIMARY PROBLEM WITH FUSION CENTERS * B. WHY FUSION CENTERS EXIST * C. WHY FUSION CENTERS FAIL TO SHARE INFORMATION * 1. Critiques of Fusion Centers * 2. The Absence of a Standardized Model * 3. The Counter-Terrorism Mission * 4. Underdeveloped or Missing External Agency Partnerships * 5. Conclusions * D. WHAT THE ANALYSIS REVEALS * E. RESEARCH DESIGN AND CASE STUDIES * F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE * II. THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER * A. INTRODUCTION * B. BACKGROUND * 1. Executive Order 13354 * 2. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act * 3. The Mission of NCTC * 4. The Functions of NCTC * 5. The Structure of NCTC * C. REVIEWS, CRITICISM, AND SUPPORT FOR THE NCTC * D. THE LACK OF A STANDARDIZED MODEL * E. COUNTERTERRORISM AS A MISSION * F. UNDERDEVELOPED OR MISSING EXTERNAL AGENCY PARTNERSHIPS * 1. NCTC's Partnership Problem * 2. NCTC Partnership Achievements and Solutions * G. SUMMARY * III. THE EL PASO INTELLIGENCE CENTER * A. INTRODUCTION * B. THE BACKGROUND OF EPIC * C. REVIEWS, CRITICISM, AND SUPPORT FOR EPIC * D. THE ABSENCE OF A STANDARDIZED MODEL * E. COUNTERTERRORISM AS A MISSION * F. UNDERDEVELOPED OR MISSING EXTERNAL AGENCY PARTNERSHIPS * G. SUMMARY * IV. STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS * A. INTRODUCTION * 1. Differences in Opinion between State and Federal Leaders. * B. THE BACKGROUND OF FUSION CENTERS * 1. The Founding History * 2. The Information Sharing Environment (ISE) * 3. Priorities and Functions of State and Local Fusion Centers * C. REVIEWS, CRITICISM, AND SUPPORT FOR FUSION CENTERS * D. THE ABSENCE OF A STANDARDIZED MODEL * 1. The Lack of Standardization as a Benefit * E. COUNTERTERRORISM AS A MISSION * 1. An Expanded Mission * 2. The Relationship between Crime and Terror * 3. The Way Ahead * F. UNDERDEVELOPED OR MISSING EXTERNAL AGENCY PARTNERSHIPS * 1. The Way Ahead * G. SUMMARY * V. CONCLUSION * A. NCTC * 1. The Lack of a Standardized Model * 2. Counterterrorism as a Mission * 3. Underdeveloped or Missing External Agency Partnerships * B. EPIC * 1. The Lack of a Standardized Model * 2. Counterterrorism as a Mission * . Underdeveloped or Missing External Agency Partnerships * C. STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS * 1. The Lack of a Standardized Model * 2. Counterterrorism as a Mission * 3. Underdeveloped or Missing External Agency Partnerships. * D. RECOMMENDATIONS * E. FINAL THOUGHTS * 1. The Largest Hurdle
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher: Jeffrey Frank Jones
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 228
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Book Description
Executive Summary The National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) set out to determine whether the right people are receiving the right intelligence information at the right time to support robust protection and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure. More than 200 interviews and extensive open-source research uncovered a wealth of insights on this complex problem. First, there have been marked improvements in the sharing of intelligence information within the Federal Intelligence Community, and between the Federal Government and regions, States, and municipalities. However, this level of improvement has not been matched in the sharing of intelligence information between the Federal Government and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure. Despite some notable successes, this bi-directional sharing is still relatively immature, leaving a large gap between current practices and an optimal system of effective public-private intelligence information sharing. We observe that trust is the essential glue to make this public-private system work. Trust results when partner capabilities are understood and valued, processes are tailored to leverage these capabilities, and these processes are tested and proven valuable to all partners. When breakdowns in information sharing occur, it erodes trust and is counterproductive to risk management. Information sharing is perhaps the most important factor in the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure. Information on threats to infrastructure and their likely impact underlies nearly every security decision made by owners and operators, including which assets to protect, how to make operations more resilient, how to plan for potential disasters, when to ramp up to higher levels of security, and how to respond in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. We looked at intelligence information flowing from the Federal Government to critical infrastructure owners and operators as well as risk information flowing from critical infrastructure owners and operators to the government. Our study reveals the complex ways information is gathered, analyzed, packaged, and shared among government and the owners and operators of critical infrastructures. In tackling this complex subject, we examined the different stages of the intelligence cycle, including requirements generation, information collection, analysis, and dissemination. To gather a variety of perspectives, we conducted extensive interviews with security directors, chief executives, subject matter experts, and government executives and managers. Recognizing that distinct sector characteristics shape information sharing needs, we conducted case studies of five sectors: Commercial Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Energy (Oil and Natural Gas), Banking and Finance, and Chemical. While we found some information sharing approaches to be effective, others were not. As a result, we adopted a “capability maturity approach,” which acknowledges that different Federal agencies have different abilities to share information effectively, and we sought to build on what is working.
