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Author: A. Chapman
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137347953
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 694
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Book Description
A reply to contemporary skepticism about intuitions and a priori knowledge, and a defense of neo-rationalism from a contemporary Kantian standpoint, focusing on the theory of rational intuitions and on solving the two core problems of justifying and explaining them.
Author: A. Chapman
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137347953
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 694
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Book Description
A reply to contemporary skepticism about intuitions and a priori knowledge, and a defense of neo-rationalism from a contemporary Kantian standpoint, focusing on the theory of rational intuitions and on solving the two core problems of justifying and explaining them.
Author: Herman Cappelen
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199644861
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 255
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Book Description
The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false, and reveals how it has encouraged pseudo-problems, presented misguided ideas of what philosophy is, and misled exponents of metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy.
Author: Hillel D. Braude
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226071685
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 258
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Book Description
Intuition is central to discussions about the nature of scientific and philosophical reasoning and what it means to be human. In this bold and timely book, Hillel D. Braude marshals his dual training as a physician and philosopher to examine the place of intuition in medicine. Rather than defining and using a single concept of intuition—philosophical, practical, or neuroscientific—Braude here examines intuition as it occurs at different levels and in different contexts of clinical reasoning. He argues that not only does intuition provide the bridge between medical reasoning and moral reasoning, but that it also links the epistemological, ontological, and ethical foundations of clinical decision making. In presenting his case, Braude takes readers on a journey through Aristotle’s Ethics—highlighting the significance of practical reasoning in relation to theoretical reasoning and the potential bridge between them—then through current debates between regulators and clinicians on evidence-based medicine, and finally applies the philosophical perspectives of Reichenbach, Popper, and Peirce to analyze the intuitive support for clinical equipoise, a key concept in research ethics. Through his phenomenological study of intuition Braude aims to demonstrate that ethical responsibility for the other lies at the heart of clinical judgment. Braude’s original approach advances medical ethics by using philosophical rigor and history to analyze the tacit underpinnings of clinical reasoning and to introduce clear conceptual distinctions that simultaneously affirm and exacerbate the tension between ethical theory and practice. His study will be welcomed not only by philosophers but also by clinicians eager to justify how they use moral intuitions, and anyone interested in medical decision making.
Author: Hanno Sauer
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262546701
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 327
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Book Description
An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.
Author: S. Roeser
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230302459
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 223
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Book Description
The author presents a new philosophical theory according to which we need intuitions and emotions in order to have objective moral knowledge, which is called affectual intuitionism. Affectual Intuitionism combines ethical intuitionism with a cognitive theory of emotions.
Author: Anthony Robert Booth
Publisher:
ISBN: 0199609195
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 305
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Book Description
Intuitions may seem to play a fundamental role in philosophy: but their role and their value have been challenged recently. What are intuitions? Should we ever trust them? And if so, when? Do they have an indispensable role in science--in thought experiments, for instance--as well as in philosophy? Or should appeal to intuitions be abandoned altogether? This collection brings together leading philosophers, from early to late career, to tackle such questions. It presents the state of the art thinking on the topic.
Author: M. Huemer
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 023059705X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 331
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Book Description
A defence of ethical intuitionism where (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know these through an immediate, intellectual awareness, or 'intuition'; and (iii) knowing them gives us reasons to act independent of our desires. The author rebuts the major objections to this theory and shows the difficulties in alternative theories of ethics.
Author: Elijah Chudnoff
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 019968300X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 258
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Book Description
Elijah Chudnoff elaborates and defends a view of intuition according to which intuition purports to, and reveals, how matters stand in abstract reality by making us aware of that reality through the intellect. He explores the experience of having an intuition; justification for beliefs that derives from intuition; and contact with abstract reality.
Author: Joel Pust
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1000525015
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 150
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Book Description
First published in 2000. Starting with Kripke's quotation on intuitive content being philosophic evidence, in this essay, the author aims to demonstrate how contemporary philosophy relies on intuitions as evidence, to explain what intuitions are and show why certain contemporary arguments against the use of intuitions as evidence fail.
Author: Hilary Kornblith
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0198712456
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 233
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Book Description
This volume collects thirteen papers by Hilary Kornblith on the theme of naturalistic epistemology. These papers present Kornblith's own version of a naturalistic epistemology, together with critical discussion of alternative approaches, including work on foundationalism, the coherence theory of justification, internalism and externalism, social epistemology, the role of intuitions in philosophical theorizing, epistemic normativity, and the ways in whichphilosophical theories may be informed by empirical considerations.
