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Author: Steven Glazerman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 70
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Book Description
The body of research on the design, implementation, and effects of performance-based compensation systems has influenced the design and evaluation of the 2010 Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grants. In the sections presented here, the authors describe the key components of 2010 TIF grants and the conceptual framework for the evaluation. The remainder of this report describes the plans for the study design in greater detail. In Chapter II, the authors provide context for the 2010 TIF grants and describe the treatment and counterfactual conditions--that is, the conditions that would exist in the absence of the performance pay systems. In Chapter III, they discuss data collection, the sample for the evaluation, and how they will conduct random assignment. Finally, they explain the analysis plans in Chapter IV. (Contains 12 tables, 1 figure and 15 footnotes.) [This report was submitted to the Institute of Education Sciences.].
Author: Steven Glazerman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 70
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Book Description
The body of research on the design, implementation, and effects of performance-based compensation systems has influenced the design and evaluation of the 2010 Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grants. In the sections presented here, the authors describe the key components of 2010 TIF grants and the conceptual framework for the evaluation. The remainder of this report describes the plans for the study design in greater detail. In Chapter II, the authors provide context for the 2010 TIF grants and describe the treatment and counterfactual conditions--that is, the conditions that would exist in the absence of the performance pay systems. In Chapter III, they discuss data collection, the sample for the evaluation, and how they will conduct random assignment. Finally, they explain the analysis plans in Chapter IV. (Contains 12 tables, 1 figure and 15 footnotes.) [This report was submitted to the Institute of Education Sciences.].
Author: Matthew G. Springer
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 0815701950
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 348
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Book Description
The concept of pay for performance for public school teachers is growing in popularity and use, and it has resurged to once again occupy a central role in education policy. Performance Incentives: Their Growing Impact on American K-12 Education offers the most up-to-date and complete analysis of this promising—yet still controversial—policy innovation. Performance Incentives brings together an interdisciplinary team of experts, providing an unprecedented discussion and analysis of the pay-for-performance debate by • Identifying the potential strengths and weaknesses of tying pay to student outcomes; • Comparing different strategies for measuring teacher accomplishments; • Addressing key conceptual and implemen - tation issues; • Describing what teachers themselves think of merit pay; • Examining recent examples in Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, and Texas; • Studying the overall impact on student achievement.
Author: Hanley Chiang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 262
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Book Description
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to fully implement their performance-based compensation system. The control schools were to implement the same performance-based compensation system with one exception--the pay-for-performance bonus component was replaced with a one percent bonus paid to all educators regardless of performance. This second report provides implementation and impact information. Ninety percent of all TIF districts in 2012-2013 reported implementing at least 3 of the 4 required components for teachers, and only about one-half (52 percent) reported implementing all four. This was a slight improvement from the first year of implementation. In a subset of 10 districts participating in the random assignment study, educators' understanding of key program components improved during the second year, but many teachers still did not understand that they were eligible for a bonus. The pay-for-performance bonus policy had small, positive impacts on students' reading achievement; impacts on students' math achievement were not statistically significant but similar in magnitude. Appended are: (1) Supplemental Information on Study Sample Design, Data, and Methods for Chapter II; (2) Supplemental Information on Analytic Methods for Chapter II; (3) Supplemental Findings on Programs and Experiences of All TIF Districts For Chapter III; (4) Supplemental Findings of TIF Implementation in Evaluation Districts for Chapter IV; (5) Supplemental Findings on Impacts Of Pay-For-Performance on Educators' Attitudes and Behaviors For Chapter V; (6) Supplemental Findings in Impacts of Pay-For-Performance on Educator Effectiveness and Student Achievement for Chapter VI; and (7) Supplemental Findings on Relationships between TIF Program Characteristics and the impacts of Pay-For Performance for Chapter VI.
Author: Jeffrey Max
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 186
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Book Description
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to fully implement their performance-based compensation system that included four required components. The control schools were to implement the same performance-based compensation system with one exception--the pay-for-performance bonus component was replaced with a one percent bonus paid to all educators regardless of performance. This first of four planned reports provides implementation information prior to educators receiving annual performance measure information or payouts. Fewer than half of all 2010 TIF districts reported implementing all four required program components, although 85 percent reported implementing at least three of the four. In a subset of 10 districts who participated in the random assignment study, educators' reporting of the program indicated most misunderstood the performance measures and the amount of pay-for-performance bonus that they were eligible for. Most educators were satisfied with their professional opportunities, school environment, and the TIF program. Educators in those schools that offered the pay-for-performance aspect of TIF tended to be less satisfied than those in schools that did not offer such bonuses. However, educators in schools offering pay-for-performance bonuses were more satisfied with the opportunity to earn additional pay, and a greater percentage indicated feeling increased pressure to perform due to the TIF program. Appendices include: (1) Supplementary Information on Study Sample and Design; (2) Survey Response Rates and Characteristics of Respondents; (3) Analytic Methods and Sensitivity Analyses; (4) Supplemental Findings on TIF Design and Implementation for Chapters III and IV; and (5) Supplementary Findings for Chapter V. [For the executive summary of this report, see ED546821. For the NCEE Snapshot of this report, see ED546823.].
Author: Jeffrey Max
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 10
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Book Description
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to fully implement their performance-based compensation system that included four required components. The control schools were to implement the same performance-based compensation system with one exception--the pay-for-performance bonus component was replaced with a one percent bonus paid to all educators regardless of performance. This executive summary provides highlights from the first of four planned reports providing implementation information prior to educators receiving annual performance measure information or payouts. Fewer than half of all 2010 TIF districts reported implementing all four required program components, although 85 percent reported implementing at least three of the four. In a subset of 10 districts who participated in the random assignment study, educators' reporting of the program indicated most misunderstood the performance measures and the amount of pay-for-performance bonus that they were eligible for. Most educators were satisfied with their professional opportunities, school environment, and the TIF program. Educators in those schools that offered the pay-for-performance aspect of TIF tended to be less satisfied than those in schools that did not offer such bonuses. However, educators in schools offering pay-for-performance bonuses were more satisfied with the opportunity to earn additional pay, and a greater percentage indicated feeling increased pressure to perform due to the TIF program. [For the full report, see ED546820.].
Author: Hanley Chiang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Book Description
Recent efforts to attract and retain effective educators and to improve teaching practices have focused on reforming evaluation and compensation systems for teachers and principals. In 2006, Congress established the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. This executive summary describes a study that focuses on performance-based compensation systems that were established under TIF grants awarded in 2010. It examines grantees' programs and implementation experiences and the impacts of pay-for-performance bonuses on educator effectiveness and student achievement. The full report, the second from the study, describes the programs and implementation experiences of all 2010 TIF grantees in the 2012-2013 school year, the second of four years of implementation for nearly all grantees. The report also provides detailed findings from a subset of 2010 TIF grantees, the evaluation districts, that participated in a random assignment study of the pay-for-performance component of TIF. For the ten evaluation districts that completed two years of TIF implementation, the report provides an in-depth analysis of TIF implementation and the impacts of pay-for-performance bonuses on educator and student outcomes after the first (2011-2012) and second (2012-2013) years. [For the full report, see ED559723.].
Author: Alison Wellington
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 274
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Book Description
Research indicates that effective teachers are critical to raising student achievement. However, there is little evidence about the best ways to improve teacher effectiveness, or how schools that serve the students most in need can attract and retain effective teachers. Traditional salary schedules, which pay teachers based on their years of teaching experience and degree attainment, do not reward effective teaching or provide incentives for the most effective teachers to teach in high-need schools. In 2006, Congress established the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. This study focuses on performance-based compensation systems that were established under TIF grants awarded in 2010. It examines grantees' programs and implementation experiences and the impacts of pay-for-performance bonuses on educator effectiveness and student achievement. This report, the third from the study, describes the programs and implementation experiences of all 2010 TIF grantees in the 2013-014 school year, the third of four years of implementation for nearly all grantees. The main findings for all districts that received 2010 TIF grants include the following: (1) Overall implementation of TIF requirements among all 2010 TIF districts was very similar in the third year of implementation as in previous years; and (2) Few TIF districts in the third year reported that key activities related to implementation of their program were a major challenge, and districts were less likely to report major challenges in the third year than in the second year. This report also provides detailed findings from a subset of 2010 TIF grantees, the evaluation districts, that participated in a random assignment study of the pay-for-performance component of TIF. For the ten evaluation districts that completed three years of TIF implementation, the report provides an in-depth analysis of TIF implementation and the impacts of pay-for-performance bonuses on educator and student outcomes after the first (2011-2012), second (2012-2013), and third (2013- 2014) years. The main findings for the ten evaluation districts include the following: (1) Pay-for-performance had small, positive impacts on students' reading and math achievement; (2) Few evaluation districts structured pay-for-performance bonuses to align well with TIF grant guidance; and (3) Teachers' understanding of performance measures continued to improve between the second and third year of implementation, but many teachers still did not understand that they were eligible for a bonus or underestimated how much they could earn. The following are appended: (1) Supplemental Information on Study Sample, Design, Data, and Methods for Chapter II; (2) Supplemental Information on Analytic Methods for Chapter II; (3) Supplemental Findings on Programs and Experiences of All TIF Districts for Chapter III; (4) Supplemental Findings on TIF Implementation in Evaluation Districts for Chapter IV; (5) Supplemental Findings on Impacts of Pay-for-Performance on Educators' Attitudes and Behaviors for Chapter V; (6) Supplemental Findings on Impacts of Pay-for-Performance on Educator Effectiveness and Student Achievement for Chapter VI; and (7) Supplemental Findings on Factors Associated with Differences in Impacts for Chapter VI. [For the Executive Summary, "Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund: Implementation and Impacts of Pay-for-Performance after Three Years. Executive Summary. NCEE 2016-4005," see ED568151. For the NCEE Study Snapshot, "Implementation and Impacts of Pay-for-Performance: The 2010 Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) Grantees after Three Years. NCEE Study Snapshot. NCEE 2016-2006," see ED568149.].
Author: National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance (ED)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 4
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Book Description
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to fully implement their performance-based compensation system. The control schools were to implement the same performance-based compensation system with one exception--the pay-for-performance bonus component was replaced with a one percent bonus paid to all educators regardless of performance. This second report provides implementation and impact information. Ninety percent of all TIF districts in 2012-2013 reported implementing at least 3 of the 4 required components for teachers, and only about one-half (52 percent) reported implementing all four. This was a slight improvement from the first year of implementation. In a subset of 10 districts participating in the random assignment study, educators' understanding of key program components improved during the second year, but many teachers still did not understand that they were eligible for a bonus. The pay-for-performance bonus policy had small, positive impacts on students' reading achievement; impacts on students' math achievement were not statistically significant but similar in magnitude. [For the full final report with technical details: Chiang, Hanley, Alison Wellington, Kristin Hallgren, Cecilia Speroni, Mariesa Herrmann, Steven Glazerman, and Jill Constantine (2015), "Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund: Implementation and Impacts of Pay-for-Performance After Two Years" (NCEE 2015-4020), see ED559723.].
Author: Alison Wellington
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Book Description
Research indicates that effective teachers are critical to raising student achievement. However, there is little evidence about the best ways to improve teacher effectiveness, or how schools that serve the students most in need can attract and retain effective teachers. Traditional salary schedules, which pay teachers based on their years of teaching experience and degree attainment, do not reward effective teaching or provide incentives for the most effective teachers to teach in high-need schools. In 2006, Congress established the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. This study focuses on performance-based compensation systems that were established under TIF grants awarded in 2010. It examines grantees' programs and implementation experiences and the impacts of pay-for-performance bonuses on educator effectiveness and student achievement. This report, the third from the study, describes the programs and implementation experiences of all 2010 TIF grantees in the 2013-2014 school year, the third of four years of implementation for nearly all grantees. The main findings for all districts that received 2010 TIF grants include the following: (1) Overall implementation of TIF requirements among all 2010 TIF districts was very similar in the third year of implementation as in previous years; and (2) Few TIF districts in the third year reported that key activities related to implementation of their program were a major challenge, and districts were less likely to report major challenges in the third year than in the second year. This report also provides detailed findings from a subset of 2010 TIF grantees, the evaluation districts, that participated in a random assignment study of the pay-for-performance component of TIF. For the ten evaluation districts that completed three years of TIF implementation, the report provides an in-depth analysis of TIF implementation and the impacts of pay-for-performance bonuses on educator and student outcomes after the first (2011-2012), second (2012-2013), and third (2013- 2014) years. The main findings for the ten evaluation districts include the following: (1) Pay-for-performance had small, positive impacts on students' reading and math achievement; (2) Few evaluation districts structured pay-for-performance bonuses to align well with TIF grant guidance; and (3) Teachers' understanding of performance measures continued to improve between the second and third year of implementation, but many teachers still did not understand that they were eligible for a bonus or underestimated how much they could earn. [For the full report, "Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund: Implementation and Impacts of Pay-for-Performance after Three Years. NCEE 2016-4004," see ED568150. For the NCEE Study Snapshot, "Implementation and Impacts of Pay-for-Performance: The 2010 Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) Grantees after Three Years. NCEE Study Snapshot. NCEE 2016-2006," see ED568149.].
Author: Jennifer King Rice
Publisher: Teachers College Press
ISBN: 0807775614
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 141
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Book Description
This book provides an in-depth analysis of a performance-based pay initiative and crystalizes the design issues and implementation challenges that confounded efforts to translate this promising policy into practice. This story has much to say to academics and policymakers who are trying to figure out the combinations of incentives and the full range of resources required to establish incentive programs that promote an adequate supply and equitable distribution of capable and committed educators for our public schools. The book uncovers the conditions that appear to be necessary, if not fully sufficient, for performance-based initiatives to have a chance to realize their ambitious aims and the research that is required to guide policy development. In so doing, the authors consider the thorny question of whether performance-based pay systems for educators are worth the investment. “Education reformers have long known that performance-based pay is devilishly difficult to implement. All too often top-down, piecemeal changes squander scarce resources and undermine trust. Now, Rice and Malen’s first-rate study of one district’s comprehensive pay reform reveals that even well-planned, collaborative efforts easily go awry, casting further doubt on the promise of pay incentives to improve schooling. This book is required reading for all well-intentioned reformers.” —Susan Moore Johnson, Harvard University “Rice and Malen provide a compelling account of one district’s experience with a performance-based incentive program for educators. This book is a rare and valuable analysis of a policy uncovering both the technical and political challenges inherent in designing and implementing reform even under the most promising of conditions. Given the enduring interest in and ongoing federal funding available for pay-for-performance policies—and the surprising lack of research evidence undergirding this popularity—it behooves policymakers, reformers, funders, and students to learn from this important case.” —Julie A. Marsh, University of Southern California
