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Author: C. Pigden
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 023028115X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 317
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Book Description
This collection is devoted to questions in meta-ethics and moral psychology arising from the work of David Hume. The collection focuses on questions arising from Hume's views on reason, motivation and virtue including new essays from notable Hume scholars.
Author: C. Pigden
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 023028115X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 317
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Book Description
This collection is devoted to questions in meta-ethics and moral psychology arising from the work of David Hume. The collection focuses on questions arising from Hume's views on reason, motivation and virtue including new essays from notable Hume scholars.
Author: Christine Swanton
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118939395
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 245
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Book Description
This ground-breaking and lucid contribution to the vibrant field of virtue ethics focuses on the influential work of Hume and Nietzsche, providing fresh perspectives on their philosophies and a compelling account of their impact on the development of virtue ethics. A ground-breaking text that moves the field of virtue ethics beyond ancient moral theorists and examines the highly influential ethical work of Hume and Nietzsche from a virtue ethics perspective Contributes both to virtue ethics and a refreshed understanding of Hume’s and Nietzsche’s ethics Skilfully bridges the gap between continental and analytical philosophy Lucidly written and clearly organized, allowing students to focus on either Hume or Nietzsche Written by one of the most important figures contributing to virtue ethics today
Author: Philip A. Reed
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351720511
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 386
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Book Description
Recent work at the intersection of moral philosophy and the philosophy of psychology has dealt mostly with Aristotelian virtue ethics. The dearth of scholarship that engages with Hume’s moral philosophy, however, is both noticeable and peculiar. Hume's Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology demonstrates how Hume’s moral philosophy comports with recent work from the empirical sciences and moral psychology. It shows how contemporary work in virtue ethics has much stronger similarities to the metaphysically thin conception of human nature that Hume developed, rather than the metaphysically thick conception of human nature that Aristotle espoused. It also reveals how contemporary work in moral motivation and moral epistemology has strong affinities with themes in Hume’s sympathetic sentimentalism.
Author: David Hume
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 582
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Book Description
Author: Juan S. Santos Castro
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Happiness
Languages : en
Pages : 306
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Book Description
That Hume offers an account of motivation and action is widely accepted. But whether he offers a distinct theory of moral motivation is less obvious. Contemporary scholarship has attempted to reconstruct this theory, but not always fruitfully, given its focus on examining the moral psychology of moral sentiments: do moral sentiments produce virtuous actions? I depart from this traditional approach. I set up Hume's views as addressing two crucial concerns present in his contemporaries' discussions of the problem of moral motivation: the nature of virtuous motives and the role that reflection plays in virtuous behaviour. To reveal Hume's position, I propose to look at the historical evolution of the motives that, on his view, are objects of positive moral judgment. In my reading of Hume, the motivational impulse of virtue derives from the convergence between the gradual regulation and refinement in the satisfaction of the passions -- i.e., happiness -- and the sense of virtue. This convergence shows up only through the lens of conjectural history, a genre of historiography used by Hume to describe the nature and civilizing potential of the passions. My central argument is a reconstruction of the conjectural histories that Hume scatters throughout his texts, by means of which I show that behind the story of the 'rise and progress' of justice, commerce, government, the arts and sciences, and politeness lies the natural history of civilized individuals' motivation towards virtue. This argument allows me to articulate Hume's distinctive views in regards to the problem of moral motivation. For Hume, it is not true, against the common interpretations of Hobbes and Mandeville, that self-regarding motives are more natural, basic, or stronger than other-regarding ones. In fact, Hume conceives human motives, very much like Butler, as native affections directed at various objects, some of which affect the self, some of which affect other people. Their moral quality derives, as in Butler's view, from how they are regulated. But whereas Butler takes it that the principles of self-love and of conscience regulate in each individual the direction and strength of the passions, Hume conceives the regulation and refinement of the passions as a process driven by experience, that unfolds historically as human beings interact with the world and with each other and which is finally realized in the practices and institutions of 'polished' and 'luxurious' societies. Further, the crucial effect of this historical progress of the passions is that members of such societies are able to adopt a reflective perspective from which they recognize the coincidence between satisfying their regulated and refined passions and acting virtuously. In a 'polished' and 'luxurious' society, individuals' psychology is shaped in such a way that what people see as contributing to their happiness is what they see as virtuous ways of acting. In this sense, happiness and virtue finally converge.
Author: Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199573298
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 243
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Book Description
David Hume's theory of action is well known for several provocative theses, including that passion and reason cannot be opposed over the direction of action. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe defends an original interpretation of Hume's views on passion, reason, and motivation which is consistent with other theses in Hume's philosophy, loyal to his texts, and historically situated. She challenges the now orthodox interpretation of Hume on motivation, presenting an alternative that situates Hume closer to "Humeans" than many recent interpreters have. Part of the strategy is to examine the thinking of the early modern intellectuals to whom Hume responds. Most of these thinkers insisted that passions lead us to pursue harmful objects unless regulated by reason; and most regarded passions as representations of good and evil, which can be false. Understanding Hume's response to these claims requires appreciating his respective characterizations of reason and passion. The author argues that Hume's thesis that reason is practically impotent apart from passion is about beliefs generated by reason, rather than about the capacity of reason. Furthermore, the argument makes sense of Hume's sometimes-ridiculed description of passions as "original existences" having no reference to objects. The author also shows how Hume understood morality as intrinsically motivating, while holding that moral beliefs are not themselves motives, and why he thought of passions as self-regulating, contrary to the admonitions of the rationalists.
Author: David Hume
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Ethics
Languages : en
Pages : 276
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Book Description
Author: Elizabeth S. Radcliffe
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108586864
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 141
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Book Description
David Hume's moral system involves considerations that seem at odds with one another. He insists on the reality of moral distinctions, while showing that they are founded on the human constitution. He notes the importance to morality of the consequences of actions, while emphasizing that motives are the subjects of moral judgments. He appeals to facts about human psychology as the basis for an argument that morality is founded, not on reason, but on sentiment. Yet, he insists that no “ought” can follow from an “is.” He thinks that our motivation to justice must derive from our nature. Yet, he wonders how to explain why anyone would be motivated to follow rules when doing so does not further their personal interests. As an empiricist, his approach is descriptive, yet morality is prescriptive. This Element addresses these puzzles in Hume's moral theory, with reference to historical and contemporary discussions.
Author: Rachel Cohon
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199268444
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 296
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Book Description
Rachel Cohon offers an original interpretation of the ethical thinking of the 18th-century philosopher David Hume. She focuses on two claims: that human beings figure out what is good or evil by using our feelings or emotions, and that some of the good traits we recognize are produced by informal social agreement and teaching.
Author: Constantine Sandis
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781138283787
Category : Act (Philosophy)
Languages : en
Pages : 148
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Book Description
In the first ever book-length treatment of David Hume's philosophy of action, Constantine Sandis brings together seemingly disparate aspects of Hume's work to present an understanding of human action that is much richer than previously assumed. Sandis showcases Hume's interconnected views on action and its causes by situating them within a wider vision of our human understanding of personal identity, causation, freedom, historical explanation, and morality. In so doing, he also relates key aspects of the emerging picture to contemporary concerns within the philosophy of action and moral psychology, including debates between Humeans and anti-Humeans about both 'motivating' and 'normative' reasons. Character and Causation takes the form of a series of essays which collectively argue that Hume's overall project proceeds by way of a soft conceptual revisionism that emerges from his Copy Principle. This involves re-calibrating our philosophical ideas of all that agency involves to fit a scheme that more readily matches the range of impressions that human beings actually have. On such a reading, once we rid ourselves of a certain kind of metaphysical ambition we are left with a perfectly adequate account of how it is that people can act in character, freely, and for good reasons. The resulting picture is one that both unifies Hume's practical and theoretical philosophy and radically transforms contemporary philosophy of action for the better.