How the Auction Design Influences Procurement Prices PDF Download
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Author: Karl-Martin Ehrhart
Publisher:
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Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
The targeted design of auctions has to take behavioral regularities into account. This paper explores whether procurement auction formats can take advantage of bidders' willingness-to-pay-willingness-to-accept disparity. In a laboratory experiment, we compare four different second-price auction formats for procuring a good. The four formats are a sealed-bid auction and three di erent descending-clock auctions. We assume that a bidder's willingness-to-accept exceeds his willingness-to-pay and that, depending on the auction format, a bidder's reference-state shifts such that the bidder's perspective moves from a willingness-to-accept perspective towards a willingness-to-pay perspective, thus inducing aggressive bids. In line with the prediction, auction prices decline across the four formats. In particular, we observe the lowest prices in those two clock auction formats that, at every auction stage, select a bidder as the current leading bidder. We conclude that mechanisms influence the reference state and that auctions that foster reference-state shifts lead to lower payments for the buyer. These results support and generalize findings on sales auctions. However, not all of our findings on procurement auctions mirror findings on sales auctions. Bidders overbid in sealed-bid procurement auctions, which does not mirror the commonly observed overbidding in sealed-bid sales auctions.
Author: Karl-Martin Ehrhart
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
The targeted design of auctions has to take behavioral regularities into account. This paper explores whether procurement auction formats can take advantage of bidders' willingness-to-pay-willingness-to-accept disparity. In a laboratory experiment, we compare four different second-price auction formats for procuring a good. The four formats are a sealed-bid auction and three di erent descending-clock auctions. We assume that a bidder's willingness-to-accept exceeds his willingness-to-pay and that, depending on the auction format, a bidder's reference-state shifts such that the bidder's perspective moves from a willingness-to-accept perspective towards a willingness-to-pay perspective, thus inducing aggressive bids. In line with the prediction, auction prices decline across the four formats. In particular, we observe the lowest prices in those two clock auction formats that, at every auction stage, select a bidder as the current leading bidder. We conclude that mechanisms influence the reference state and that auctions that foster reference-state shifts lead to lower payments for the buyer. These results support and generalize findings on sales auctions. However, not all of our findings on procurement auctions mirror findings on sales auctions. Bidders overbid in sealed-bid procurement auctions, which does not mirror the commonly observed overbidding in sealed-bid sales auctions.
Author: Karl-Martin Ehrhart
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Debasis Mishra
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 208
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Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 023154457X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 222
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Book Description
Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.
Author: Thomas G. Parker
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 142
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Book Description
Industrial online-reverse-auctions have become a common procurement strategy used by many firms to reduce the cost of purchased goods and services. The advantages of online-reverse-auctions include significant price reductions, increased purchasing and selling efficiencies, and access to new supply and purchasing markets. Despite these benefits, practitioners and academics alike have raised concerns with respect to the impact of online-reverse-auctions on the buyer-supplier relationship. Previous research suggests that the parameters and characteristics of an online-reverse-auction can influence the perceptions of online-reverse-auction participants. This dissertation investigates this phenomenon by examining how the design of an online-reverse-auction influences the supplier's perception of the buyer-supplier relationship.
Author: Wei-Shiun Chang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 103
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Book Description
ABSTRACT: This dissertation examines a variety of mechanism designs adopted by industry to resolve two problematic issues in procurement auctions. Laboratory experiments are utilized to test theoretical predictions. The first essay investigates procurement auctions in a private value environment where procured goods are differentiated by unobservable characteristics. When unobservable characteristics are not taken into account in the selection process, the outcome of a procurement auction likely deviate from the buyer's optimal outcome. Three commonly used mechanisms are considered, namely standard second price auction, performance based contracting and pseudo quality screening. Bidders internalize unobservable characteristics into their bids and systematically transfer the equivalent value of those characteristics to buyers in the procurement auctions with performance based contracting. Subjects bid at their costs as predicted in the procurement auctions with pseudo quality screening and the price only mechanisms while they bid closely to their net costs in the auction with performance based contract. Experimental data has shown that the performance based contract mechanism generates higher buyer revenue than other two mechanisms do. The second essay is a test of a mechanism, average bid, used to resolve the winner's curse in a common value environment. Bidders' behavior in this mechanism is not significantly different from that in a conventional mechanism, low price. Consequently, price in the average bid mechanism is driven up and there is a reduction in the frequency of negative earnings and bankruptcy.
Author: Asunción Mochón
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319088130
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 161
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Book Description
In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book is to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic. Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book, the authors summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic. “This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible.” Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University.
Author: Pak-Sing Choi
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030695751
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
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Book Description
This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
Author: Hidenori Takahashi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
