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Author: Rad Niazadeh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial auction with complementarities, where truthful auctions such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) can yield unacceptably low revenue. We therefore study core selecting auctions, which boost revenue by setting payments so that no group of agents, including the auctioneer, can jointly improve their utilities by switching to a different outcome. Our main result is a combinatorial algorithm that finds an approximate bidder optimal core point with almost linear number of calls to the welfare maximization oracle. Our algorithm is faster than previously-proposed heuristics in the literature and has theoretical guarantees. We conclude that core pricing is implementable even for very time sensitive practical use cases such as realtime auctions for online advertising and can yield more revenue. We justify this claim experimentally using the Microsoft Bing Ad Auction data, through which we show our core pricing algorithm generates almost 26% more revenue than VCG on average, about 9% more revenue than other core pricing rules known in the literature, and almost matches the revenue of the standard Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction.
Author: Rad Niazadeh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial auction with complementarities, where truthful auctions such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) can yield unacceptably low revenue. We therefore study core selecting auctions, which boost revenue by setting payments so that no group of agents, including the auctioneer, can jointly improve their utilities by switching to a different outcome. Our main result is a combinatorial algorithm that finds an approximate bidder optimal core point with almost linear number of calls to the welfare maximization oracle. Our algorithm is faster than previously-proposed heuristics in the literature and has theoretical guarantees. We conclude that core pricing is implementable even for very time sensitive practical use cases such as realtime auctions for online advertising and can yield more revenue. We justify this claim experimentally using the Microsoft Bing Ad Auction data, through which we show our core pricing algorithm generates almost 26% more revenue than VCG on average, about 9% more revenue than other core pricing rules known in the literature, and almost matches the revenue of the standard Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction.
Author: Andor Goetzendorff
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 20
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Book Description
Motivated by markets for television advertising time-slots, we introduce a new combinatorial auction format, including a general method for approximating core-selecting payments for hard problems. Given the size and complexity of ad markets in practice, an enumerative XOR bidding language (widely discussed in the literature and used in recent government spectrum auctions) grows too quickly to be practical. We therefore propose a compact bidding language for coverage or demographic reach, and investigate the resulting winner determination (a form of multi-knapsack problem) using numerical experiments. For realistic instances of the problem, very good solutions can be found relatively quickly, though closing the integrality gap to find marginally better solutions or prove optimality can take a prohibitively large amount of time. Our subsequent adaptation of the core-selecting payment technique to this environment of nearly-optimal optimization results is a new, practically viable paradigm by which competitive market outcomes can be achieved despite computational limitations.
Author: Minming Li
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3031393449
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 312
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Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on Theoretical Computer Science-Frontier of Algorithmic Wisdom (IJTCS-FAW 2023), consisting of the 17th International Conference on Frontier of Algorithmic Wisdom (FAW) and the 4th International Joint Conference on Theoretical Computer Science (IJTCS), held in Macau, China, during August 14–18, 2023. FAW started as the Frontiers of Algorithmic Workshop in 2007 at Lanzhou, China, and was held annually from 2007 to 2021 and published archival proceedings. IJTCS, the International joint theoretical Computer Science Conference, started in 2020, aimed to bring in presentations covering active topics in selected tracks in theoretical computer science. To accommodate the diversified new research directions in theoretical computer science, FAW and IJTCS joined their forces together to organize an event for information exchange of new findings and work of enduring value in the field. The 21 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 34 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: algorithmic game theory; algorithms and data structures; combinatorial optimization; and computational economics.
Author: Xujin Chen
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030649466
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 476
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Book Description
This book constitutes the proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2020, held in Beijing, China, in December 2020. The 31 full papers presented together with 11 abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 136 submissions. The issues in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, operations research are of particular importance in the Web and the Internet that enable the interaction of large and diverse populations. The Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) is an interdisciplinary forum for the exchange of ideas and results on incentives and computation arising from these various fields.
Author: Ioannis Caragiannis
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030353893
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 357
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Book Description
This book constitutes the proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2019, held in New York City, USA, in December 2019. The 23 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 111 submissions. T The papers reflect the work of researchers in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics who have joined forces to tackle problems at the intersection of computation, game theory and economics.
Author: Hana Choi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper considers how a publisher should set reserve prices for real-time bidding (RTB) auctions when selling display advertising impressions through ad exchanges, a $115 billion market and growing. Conducting a series of field experiments to induce exogenous variation in reserve prices at a major publisher, we find an increase in the publisher's revenues by 35% and observe evidence that advertisers use a minimum impression constraint to ensure advertising reach.Based on this insight, we construct a structural model of advertiser bidding model that accommodates impression constraints to infer the overall demand for advertising as a function of reserve prices. Using this demand model, we solve the publisher pricing problem. Consideration of minimum impression constraints in setting reserve prices generates a predicted increase in profits of nine percentage points over a solution that does not incorporate the constraint. In a final series of field experiments, we validate our model's predictions by showing ad revenues tend to be highest across exogenously varied reserve price levels closest to the imputed optimal reserve prices.
Author: Michael Ostrovsky
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Internet advertising
Languages : en
Pages : 18
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Book Description
Author: Debasis Mishra
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Author: David John Martin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Internet search results are a growing and highly profitable advertising platform. Search providers auction advertising slots to advertisers on their search result pages. Due to the high volume of searches and the users' low tolerance for search result latency, it is important to resolve these auctions quickly. Current approaches restrict the expressiveness of bids in order to achieve fast winner determination, which is the problem of allocating slots to advertisers so as to maximize the expected revenue given that advertisers are charged what they bid. The goal of this work is to permit more expressive bidding, thus allowing advertisers to achieve complex advertising goals, while still providing fast and scalable techniques for winner determination. To this end, we allow advertisers to submit programs that express complex and dynamic bidding strategies. We provide techniques for reducing the amount of program evaluation necessary to solve the winner determination problem, and we study the complexity of sharing aggregation computations between these programs. In addition, we also examine the problem of providing advertisers with data about search auctions without disclosing too much about any individual. We provide algorithms for both checking and enforcing privacy in this context.
Author: Asunción Mochón
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319088130
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 161
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Book Description
In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book is to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic. Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book, the authors summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic. “This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible.” Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University.
