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Author: Justine Shirin Hastings
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 258
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Author: Justine Shirin Hastings
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 258
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Author: Chia-Wen Chen
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781124906683
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Vertical restraints between firms, such as exclusive dealing contracts that forbid a dealer from promoting other manufacturers' products, are controversial in competition policy because of their potential anticompetitive effects. This dissertation addresses three issues in competition policy and vertical relationships between firms: (1) what are the effects of exclusive dealing on competitiveness of brands? (2) does exclusive dealing foreclose new entrants out of a market? (3) what is the effect of retail competition on market price in a vertically integrated industry when upstream firms face capacity constraints? Chapter 1 examines the impact of allowing more brands access to exclusive distribution networks on brand and market level outcomes. In the U.S., Anheuser Busch is the dominant firm in the beer industry and has exclusive dealing arrangements with many of its distributors. I looked at a recent beer distribution deal between Anheuser Busch and InBev that moved InBev brands into Anheuser Busch distribution networks. I collected beer distributor data before and after the event and matched them with a panel scanner dataset from a major grocery chain in Northern California. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I compared the changes in InBev market shares in markets in which InBev switched to Anheuser Busch distributors, to the changes in market shares in markets in which InBev switched to Anheuser Busch exclusive distributors. The results suggest that exclusive dealing matters in the beer industry: I find InBev market shares to be higher once allowed access to Anheuser Busch exclusive distribution networks. In addition, I do not find overall market quantity to be larger when more brands have access to Anheuser Busch exclusive networks. Instead, the results show cannibalization effects on existing brands' market share when a distributor acquires more brands. These results are more consistent with an incentive-based explanation for firms preferring exclusive contracts. Chapter 2 examines the effect of exclusive dealing on rival firms' entry decisions. I estimated an entry model of specialty beer producers in Northern California and tested whether exclusive dealing raises a firm's fixed costs. I modeled each firm's entry decision as a static entry game of incomplete information that allows for strategic interactions and employed a new panel scanner dataset from a major grocery chain in Northern California. Given that both firm and location profitability are heterogeneous, I controlled for post-entry demand conditions by estimating the demand for beer using a discrete choice model. Using the demand estimates and the predicted entry probabilities, I recovered a firm's fixed costs using a two-step estimator. I find some spillover effects on specialty beer producers' entry decisions. After taking strategic interactions into account, the results indicate that a firm has higher fixed costs at locations with exclusive distributors. The estimates also show that a firm is less likely to enter a location that is farther from its brewery, has lower expected demand or is smaller in store size. Finally, I implemented counter-factual experiments to study the effect of banning exclusive dealing. The results show that the welfare improvement associated with banning exclusive contracts is very small. Chapter 3 (joint with Christopher R. Knittel) considers a model of oligopolistic competition when upstream firms face capacity constraints. We studied the optimality conditions of upstream firms under vertical separation and vertical integration when firms compete on quantity. We illustrated the properties of the equilibrium wholesale and retail prices when the downstream market becomes less competitive with a numerical example. Using data on gasoline demand and refineries' capacity levels in California, we generated equilibrium wholesale and retail prices when the number of downstream firms varies. We find that whether a higher degree of retail market concentration results in higher retail price depends on market structure and the effectiveness of the capacity constraints. When independent refineries' capacity constraints are binding, the effect of a decrease in the number of independent retailers on retail gasoline price is very small.
Author: Justine S. Hastings
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This study examines how much, if any, of the differences in retail gasoline prices between markets is attributable to differences in the composition of vertical contract types at gasoline stations in each market. The purchase of the independent retail gasoline chain, Thrifty, by ARCO provides a unique opportunity to examine the effects of changes in different vertical contract types on local retail prices. This event caused sharp changes in the market share of i) fully vertically integrated stations, and ii) independent stations; differentially affecting local markets in the Los Angeles and San Diego Metropolitan areas. Using unique and detailed station-level data, this study examines how these sharp changes affected local retail prices. The detailed data and the research design based on the Thrifty station conversions allow for credible estimation of the effects of the market share of independent retailers and vertically integrated retailers on local market prices, controlling for any omitted factors at the station level, and the city level over time. Results for the Los Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas indicate that a decrease in the market share of independent stations has a significant positive impact on local retail price. However, a change in the market share of refiner owned and operated branded stations does not have a significant impact on local market price. These results have important implications as policy makers consider the regulation of vertical contracts as a means to increase competition in gasoline markets. The research design and detailed data also allow for inference on the underlying nature of retail gasoline competition.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 816
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Author: Christopher Thomas Taylor
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Gasoline
Languages : en
Pages : 14
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Author: Justine Hastings
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 92
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Author: Robert Bork
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781736089712
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 536
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The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
Author: Woo-Hyung Hong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
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This dissertation studies the role of information in market performance, and pricing dynamics observed in the retail gasoline market. In Chapter 1, we empirically test whether smartphones, as information-providing devices, can improve market performance and reduce price dispersion. We treat the introduction of smartphones in the Korean gasoline market as a natural experiment to investigate the impact of smartphones on competition among gas stations. Smartphones provided consumers with direct access to price information through OPINET, a government-sponsored Internet website. Our results indicate that the adoption of smartphones is associated with dramatic decreases in price dispersion and average price-cost margins, thereby creating consumer gains. Additionally, we found a sudden decline in entries and a slow increase in exits after the introduction of smartphones. Chapter 2 investigates how and why a link between market power and asymmetric pricing occurs. Exploiting unique island panel data from the Korean gasoline market, we propose geographical separation as a reliable measure of market power. Our findings confirm a positive correlation between market power and price-response asymmetry. We provide direct evidence of tacit collusion by investigating sticky pricing behaviors and suggest that the tacit collusion is the main channel through which market power influences asymmetric pricing. Additionally, we examine the effect of station heterogeneity on asymmetric pricing to provide further evidence of tacit collusion even in relatively competitive environments.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 472
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertation abstracts
Languages : en
Pages : 776
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