Essays on the Economics of Contracts and Organizations PDF Download
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Author: Daisuke Hirata
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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The third essay studies stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof matching rules in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. First, the number of such rules is shown to be at most one.
Author: Daisuke Hirata
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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The third essay studies stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof matching rules in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. First, the number of such rules is shown to be at most one.
Author: Fausto Panunzi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 234
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Author: Bin Chen
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781360966762
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Stephen Leider
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 374
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This dissertation consists of three essays using experiments and theory to apply behavioral insights to questions of contract theory and organizational economics. The first essay (co-authored with Judd Kessler) argues that an important aspect of incomplete contracts is their role in establishing a norm for the transaction or relationship, which increases the efficiency of agents' actions. We demonstrate experimentally that unenforceable handshake agreements within a contract can substantially increase the efficiency of subjects' actions, particularly in games with strategic complements. When there is a handshake agreement, adding an additional enforceable clause to the contract often does not further increase efficiency in our experiment. The second essay (co-authored with Florian Englmaier) analyzes a principal-agent setting where the agent has reciprocity preferences (the intrinsic desire to repay generosity). We identify the optimal contract, which typically includes both monetary performance-pay incentives as well as excess rents to induce gift exchange incentives. We then identify several organizational characteristics that can enhance or diminish the efficacy of reciprocity-based incentives. In the third essay (co-authored with Florian Englmaier) we test experimentally a key prediction of our general theory: the value to the principal of the agent's output (relative to the effort cost) should influence the agent's willingness to reciprocate generous wage contracts. Our results confirm this prediction, as well as providing additional evidence that agent's effort decisions are motivated by reciprocity.
Author: Rongzhu Ke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 203
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(Cont.) The main advantage of the current approach is the relaxation of the global concavity of agent utility. We show that under a set of mild conditions, the fixed point approach is applicable and the solution to the principal agent problem exists. In particular, if the log likelihood ratio is monotonically increasing in output but decreasing in effort, the best response correspondence against a MK contract has and only has one unique fixed point. Our approach unifies Jewitt's (1988) and Rogerson's (1985) proofs of validity of FOA, and provides a general method to judge validity of FOA. Based on the fixed-point approach, with some additional specifications, we restore Jewitt's (1988) results to situations where the distribution is not convex and the log likelihood ratio is not bounded from below (e.g., normal distribution), or there exists a limited liability constraint. Furthermore, we generalize our results to a situation where the agent's utility is non separable. In this fairly general environment, we prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the FOA to be valid, which provides an important method to identify the validity of FOA and compute the solution of the original problem. Finally, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a general non-linear bi-level optimization problem to be solvable based on FOA, without a convex constrained set. Chapter 3 constructs a concrete mechanism/auction to explore the consequence of imposing the ex post participation constraint.
Author: Bin Chen (economist.)
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ISBN:
Category : Project management
Languages : en
Pages : 143
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Author: Lars Andreas Stole
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 256
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Author: Salvatore Piccolo
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 225
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In my dissertation, I study equilibrium and optimal contracting between parties in relationships with asymmetric information. The welfare and private properties of incomplete contracting are analyzed both in imperfectly and perfectly competitive markets. The first essay analyzes the welfare effects of incomplete contracting in a principal-agent set-up. I study Resale Price Maintenance, a complete contract, and quantity fixing, an incomplete one, in a successive monopolies framework with information asymmetries. Both contracts entail a double marginalization driven by information rents distributed to the retailer. When firms behave non-cooperatively, the principal imposes retail price restrictions, and the impact of complete contracting on consumers' surplus is ambiguous. When, firms maximize ex ante joint profits, policy recommendations are unambiguous: if the preferred contracting mode from an ex ante viewpoint entails retail price restrictions, it also raises consumers' surplus, thereby producing a Pareto improvement relative to incomplete contracts. The second essay examines the welfare effects of contracting incompleteness when agents' preferences and productivity depend on their health status, and occupational choices affect individual health distributions. Efficiency requires agents of the same type to obtain different expected utilities if assigned to different occupations. Workers with riskier jobs get higher (lower) expected utilities if health affects production (consumption) capabilities. Competitive equilibria are first-best if complete contracts are enforceable, but typically not if only incomplete ones are traded. Compensating wage differentials are incompatible with ex-ante efficiency. The third essay provides a rationale for contracting incompleteness in a competing organizations set-up. I show that principals dealing with competing agents may leave contracts silent on some verifiable performance measures when certain aspects of agents' activity are noncontractible. Two effects are at play once one moves from a complete to an incomplete contract. First, reducing the number of screening instruments has a detrimental effect on principals' profits as it makes information revelation more costly. Second, it may create strategic value by forcing competing organizations to behave in a more friendly manner at the competitive stage.
Author: Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3658241330
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 211
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Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.
Author: Steven Curtis Hackett
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Institutional economics
Languages : en
Pages : 418
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