Author: Lars Andreas Stole
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 256
Book Description
Essays on the Economics of Contracts
Author: Lars Andreas Stole
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 256
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 256
Book Description
Essays on the Economics of Contracting and Institutional Choice
Author: Steven Curtis Hackett
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Institutional economics
Languages : en
Pages : 418
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Institutional economics
Languages : en
Pages : 418
Book Description
The Theory of Contract Law
Author: Peter Benson
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521640385
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 365
Book Description
Essays addressing a variety of issues in the theory and practice of contract law.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521640385
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 365
Book Description
Essays addressing a variety of issues in the theory and practice of contract law.
Essays on the Economics of Contracts and Organizations
Author: Daisuke Hirata
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
The third essay studies stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof matching rules in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. First, the number of such rules is shown to be at most one.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
The third essay studies stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof matching rules in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. First, the number of such rules is shown to be at most one.
Essays in Law and Economics II
Author: Boudewijn Bouckaert
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 324
Book Description
Selection of (anonymously refereed) papers presented at the Fifth Belgian Workshop on Law & Economics ... held at Ghent March 4, 1994.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 324
Book Description
Selection of (anonymously refereed) papers presented at the Fifth Belgian Workshop on Law & Economics ... held at Ghent March 4, 1994.
Essays on Economics of Information, Contract and Experimentation
Author: Wentao Fu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 310
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 310
Book Description
Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision
Author: Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3658241330
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 211
Book Description
Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3658241330
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 211
Book Description
Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.
Two Essays on the Economics of Contract and Organization
Author: Bin Chen
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781360966762
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781360966762
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Essays on Experimental Economics and Behavioral Contract Theory
Author: Stephen Leider
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 374
Book Description
This dissertation consists of three essays using experiments and theory to apply behavioral insights to questions of contract theory and organizational economics. The first essay (co-authored with Judd Kessler) argues that an important aspect of incomplete contracts is their role in establishing a norm for the transaction or relationship, which increases the efficiency of agents' actions. We demonstrate experimentally that unenforceable handshake agreements within a contract can substantially increase the efficiency of subjects' actions, particularly in games with strategic complements. When there is a handshake agreement, adding an additional enforceable clause to the contract often does not further increase efficiency in our experiment. The second essay (co-authored with Florian Englmaier) analyzes a principal-agent setting where the agent has reciprocity preferences (the intrinsic desire to repay generosity). We identify the optimal contract, which typically includes both monetary performance-pay incentives as well as excess rents to induce gift exchange incentives. We then identify several organizational characteristics that can enhance or diminish the efficacy of reciprocity-based incentives. In the third essay (co-authored with Florian Englmaier) we test experimentally a key prediction of our general theory: the value to the principal of the agent's output (relative to the effort cost) should influence the agent's willingness to reciprocate generous wage contracts. Our results confirm this prediction, as well as providing additional evidence that agent's effort decisions are motivated by reciprocity.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 374
Book Description
This dissertation consists of three essays using experiments and theory to apply behavioral insights to questions of contract theory and organizational economics. The first essay (co-authored with Judd Kessler) argues that an important aspect of incomplete contracts is their role in establishing a norm for the transaction or relationship, which increases the efficiency of agents' actions. We demonstrate experimentally that unenforceable handshake agreements within a contract can substantially increase the efficiency of subjects' actions, particularly in games with strategic complements. When there is a handshake agreement, adding an additional enforceable clause to the contract often does not further increase efficiency in our experiment. The second essay (co-authored with Florian Englmaier) analyzes a principal-agent setting where the agent has reciprocity preferences (the intrinsic desire to repay generosity). We identify the optimal contract, which typically includes both monetary performance-pay incentives as well as excess rents to induce gift exchange incentives. We then identify several organizational characteristics that can enhance or diminish the efficacy of reciprocity-based incentives. In the third essay (co-authored with Florian Englmaier) we test experimentally a key prediction of our general theory: the value to the principal of the agent's output (relative to the effort cost) should influence the agent's willingness to reciprocate generous wage contracts. Our results confirm this prediction, as well as providing additional evidence that agent's effort decisions are motivated by reciprocity.
Essays in Contract Economics
Author: Maitreesh Ghatak
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial law
Languages : en
Pages : 127
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial law
Languages : en
Pages : 127
Book Description