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Author: Andrin Pelican
Publisher:
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Languages : en
Pages :
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This dissertation contains three essays in Game Theory and Network Economics. The First Chapter studies how economic networks are formed. Random networks occur in many economic situations, such as transactions among financial institutions, trade between countries or social relationships. Network formation can be based on utility theory and translates into a game in a normal form. For this formation process, we derive a probability distribution over all networks. Further, we derive a test procedure to test whether the formation only depends on node characteristics or whether it involves strategic interaction. This test procedure does not require knowledge of model parameters. We show how a locally most powerful test statistic can be derived from the utility function. The network formation theory is extended from directed networks to undirected networks, in which a link is formed by bilateral agreement. The test procedure can also be used to test model parameters and to analyze restricted networks. Simulation results support the theory. The Second Chapter analyzes credit networks. Credit contracts among financial institutions form in a natural way a directed network. A default of a financial institution affects another institution via multiple paths in the network. The credit claims are settled in accordance with the seniority of the contract. The objective of this paper is to determine how the network and seniority structures impact the stability under shocks. In order to achieve this goal, we develop a simulation algorithm. The algorithm considers the network as well as the seniority constraints. We prove the correctness of the algorithm and derive a polynomial bound on the runtime. The simulation results indicate that the characteristics of a network have an impact on the overall stability of the financial system. Cyclic borrowing has a negative effect on stability. In a distressed situation, cyclic borrowing structure enhances.
Author: Andrin Pelican
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This dissertation contains three essays in Game Theory and Network Economics. The First Chapter studies how economic networks are formed. Random networks occur in many economic situations, such as transactions among financial institutions, trade between countries or social relationships. Network formation can be based on utility theory and translates into a game in a normal form. For this formation process, we derive a probability distribution over all networks. Further, we derive a test procedure to test whether the formation only depends on node characteristics or whether it involves strategic interaction. This test procedure does not require knowledge of model parameters. We show how a locally most powerful test statistic can be derived from the utility function. The network formation theory is extended from directed networks to undirected networks, in which a link is formed by bilateral agreement. The test procedure can also be used to test model parameters and to analyze restricted networks. Simulation results support the theory. The Second Chapter analyzes credit networks. Credit contracts among financial institutions form in a natural way a directed network. A default of a financial institution affects another institution via multiple paths in the network. The credit claims are settled in accordance with the seniority of the contract. The objective of this paper is to determine how the network and seniority structures impact the stability under shocks. In order to achieve this goal, we develop a simulation algorithm. The algorithm considers the network as well as the seniority constraints. We prove the correctness of the algorithm and derive a polynomial bound on the runtime. The simulation results indicate that the characteristics of a network have an impact on the overall stability of the financial system. Cyclic borrowing has a negative effect on stability. In a distressed situation, cyclic borrowing structure enhances.
Author: The late John F. Nash
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781956298
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 116
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'This short volume is very welcome . . . Most importantly, on pages 32-33, the volume reprints as an appendix to the journal article based on Nash's Princeton doctoral dissertation on non-cooperative games a section of the thesis on "motivation and interpretation" that was omitted from the article. An editorial note remarks mildly that "The missing section is of considerable interest". This section, not available in any other published source, makes the present volume indispensable for research libraries . . . Nash's Essays on Game Theory, dating from his years as a Princeton graduate student . . . has a lasting impact on economics and related fields unmatched by any series of articles written in such a brief time . . . To economists, his name will always bring to mind his game theory papers of the early 1950s. It is good to have these conveniently reprinted in this volume.' - Robert W. Dimand, The Economic Journal 'The news that John Nash was to share the 1994 Nobel Prize for Economics with John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten was doubly welcome. It signalled not only that the brilliant achievements of his youth were to be recognized in a manner consistent with their significance, but that the long illness that clouded his later years had fallen into remission. I hope that this collection of his economic papers will serve as another reminder that John Nash has rejoined the intellectual community to which he has contributed so much.' - From the introduction by Ken Binmore Essays on Game Theory is a unique collection of seven of John Nash's essays which highlight his pioneering contribution to game theory in economics. Featuring a comprehensive introduction by Ken Binmore which explains and summarizes John Nash's achievements in the field of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, this book will be an indispensable reference for scholars and will be welcomed by those with an interest in game theory and its applications to the social sciences.
Author: Nimrod Megiddo
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461226481
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 209
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This volume presents a collection of papers on game theory dedicated to Michael Maschler. Through his dedication and contributions to game theory, Maschler has become an important figure particularly in the area of cooperative games. Game theory has since become an important subject in operations research, economics and management science. As befits such a volume, the main themes covered are cooperative games, coalitions, repeated games, and a cost allocation games. All the contributions are authoritative surveys of a particular topic, so together they will present an invaluable overview of the field to all those working on game theory problems.
Author: Reinhard Selten (Economist, Germany)
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781008294
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 924
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'These two volumes constitute an impressive collection of selected path-breaking works of Professor Selten. . . . Edward Elgar Publications deserve merit for bringing out most frequently-cited and prominent articles of Professor Selten in a conveniently available package.' - K. Ravikumar, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research In 1994, the Nobel Prize was awarded to Reinhard Selten, John Nash and John Harsanyi, for pioneering analysis in game theory. Selten was the first to refine the Nash equilibrium concept of non-cooperative games for analysing dynamic strategic interaction and to apply these concepts to analyses of oligopoly.
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: Bibliographisches Institut & F.A. Brockhaus AG
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 206
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Author: Thomas Rivera
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Wanyi Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This dissertation has two chapters, one on information economics and one on game theory. The first chapter studies the scenarios where an analyst learns about a random variable by observing an ongoing rational experimentation. We assume an optimal stopping exercise with binary signals about a binary state of the world. The analyst observes a public history of experiments, but not an earlier experimentation pre-history of uncertain length. In this setting, a dynamic survivor bias emerges: the naive Bayes-updates ignoring the pre-history is more pessimistic than the sophisticated updates that accounts for all possible pre-histories consistent with an ongoing rational experimentation. We show that this bias is dynamic in the sense that the observation impacts the inference of the un-observed pre-history. In general, we find that the analyst's Bayes-optimal inference critically depends on the ordering of the signal history and the combined knowledge of the signal realizations and the experimenter's actions. My theory has implications for technology adoption in R & D settings, and formally subsumes a class of one armed bandits and the Wald experimentation problem, for instance. The second chapter studies a static population game with strategic substitutes. I assume one dimensional continuous action with heterogeneous action cost among players. I explore the diminishing cross effect condition on the payoff function, which delivers equilibrium uniqueness and several comparative statics results -- 1. The equilibrium distribution of actions level rises in the first order stochastic dominance order when the type distribution falls in the first order stochastic dominance order and the dispersion order. 2. The equilibrium distribution of actions rises when the own action effect is larger. My model has applications in games with a p2p network structure and other massive social interactions with a pairwise matching nature.
Author: Y. Narahari
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1848009380
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 274
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This monograph focuses on exploring game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. For the first time, the main theoretical issues and applications of mechanism design are bound together in a single text.
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 312
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Author: Wei Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 113
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