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Author: Martin Grajner
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG
ISBN: 3110496763
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 462
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Book Description
In recent years, questions about epistemic reasons, norms and goals have seen an upsurge of interest. The present volume brings together eighteen essays by established and upcoming philosophers in the field. The contributions are arranged into four sections: (1) epistemic reasons, (2) epistemic norms, (3) epistemic consequentialism and (4) epistemic goals and values. The volume is key reading for researchers interested in epistemic normativity.
Author: Martin Grajner
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG
ISBN: 3110496763
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 462
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Book Description
In recent years, questions about epistemic reasons, norms and goals have seen an upsurge of interest. The present volume brings together eighteen essays by established and upcoming philosophers in the field. The contributions are arranged into four sections: (1) epistemic reasons, (2) epistemic norms, (3) epistemic consequentialism and (4) epistemic goals and values. The volume is key reading for researchers interested in epistemic normativity.
Author: Conor McHugh
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198758707
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 295
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Book Description
What should I do? What should I think? Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first question, while epistemologists tackle the second. Philosophers have tended to investigate the issue of what to do independently of the issue of what to think, that is, to do ethics independently of epistemology, and vice versa. This collection of new essays by leading philosophers focuses on a central concern of both epistemology and ethics: normativity. Normativity is a matter of what one should or may do or think, what one has reason or justification to do or to think, what it is right or wrong to do or to think, and so on. The volume is innovative in drawing together issues from epistemology and ethics and in exploring neglected connections between epistemic and practical normativity. It represents a burgeoning research programme in which epistemic and practical normativity are seen as two aspects of a single topic, deeply interdependent and raising parallel questions.
Author: Timothy Chan
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019967213X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 257
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Book Description
The Aim of Belief is the first book devoted to the question: 'what is belief?' Eleven newly commissioned essays by leading authors reflect the state of the art and further advance the current debate. The book will be key reading for researchers working on philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, and meta-ethics.
Author: H. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019108526X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 336
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Book Description
An important issue in epistemology concerns the source of epistemic normativity. Epistemic consequentialism maintains that epistemic norms are genuine norms in virtue of the way in which they are conducive to epistemic value, whatever epistemic value may be. So, for example, the epistemic consequentialist might say that it is a norm that beliefs should be consistent, in that holding consistent beliefs is the best way to achieve the epistemic value of accuracy. Thus epistemic consequentialism is structurally similar to the family of consequentialist views in ethics. Recently, philosophers from both formal epistemology and traditional epistemology have shown interest in such a view. In formal epistemology, there has been particular interest in thinking of epistemology as a kind of decision theory where instead of maximizing expected utility one maximizes expected epistemic utility. In traditional epistemology, there has been particular interest in various forms of reliabilism about justification and whether such views are analogous to—and so face similar problems to—versions of consequentialism in ethics. This volume presents some of the most recent work on these topics as well as others related to epistemic consequentialism, by authors that are sympathetic to the view and those who are critical of it.
Author: Clayton Littlejohn
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199660026
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 271
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Book Description
Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in current debates in epistemology and beyond. In this volume a team of established and emerging scholars presents new work on the key debates. They consider what epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief, assertion, and action, and explore the interconnections between these standards.
Author: Christopher Cowie
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192580426
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 160
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Book Description
Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This is the moral error theory, a deeply troubling yet plausible view that is now one of the canonical positions in moral philosophy. The most compelling argument against it is the argument from analogy. According to this, the moral error theory should be rejected because it would seriously compromise our practice of making epistemic judgments-judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence-and could undermine systematic thought and reason themselves. Christopher Cowie provides a novel assessment of the recent attention paid to this topic in moral philosophy and epistemology. He reasons that the argument from analogy fails because moral judgments are unlike judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence. On that basis, a moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments. The moral error theory may be true after all, Cowie concludes, and if it is then we will simply have to live with its concerning consequences.
Author: R. McKinnon
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137521724
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 251
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Book Description
When we make claims to each other, we're asserting. But what does it take to assert well? Do we need to know what we're talking about? This book argues that we don't. In fact, it argues that in some special contexts, we can lie.
Author: Sara Heinämaa
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1000553930
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 295
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Book Description
This volume investigates forms of normativity through the phenomenological methods of description, analysis, and interpretation. It takes a broad approach to norms, covering not only rules and commands but also goals, values, and passive drives and tendencies. Part I "Basic Perspectives" begins with an overview of the phenomena of normativity and then clarifies the constitution of norms by Husserlian and Heideggerian concepts. It offers phenomenological alternatives to the neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian approaches that dominate contemporary debates on the "sources of normativity." Part II "From Perception to Imagination" turns to the normativity of three basic types of experiences. This part first sheds light on the normativity of perception and then illuminates the kind of normativity characteristic of imagination and drive intentionality. Part III "Social Dimensions" analyzes the norms that regulate the formation of practical communities. It takes a broad view of practical norms, discussing social and moral norms as well as the epistemic norms of scientific practices. By clarifying the divergences and interrelations between various types and levels of norms, the volume demonstrates that normativity is not one phenomenon but a complex set of various phenomena with multiple sources. Contemporary Phenomenologies of Normativity: Norms, Goals, and Values will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on issues of normativity in phenomenology, epistemology, ethics, and social philosophy.
Author: Torbjörn Tännsjö
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9048132851
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 175
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Book Description
Metaethics is the inquiry into the nature of morality (or ethics, I use the words ‘morality’, ‘morals’, and ‘ethics’ as synonyms). When we pass moral judgements, what kind of claims are we then making? I speak of this as the semantic metaethical question. a re there moral facts, to be discovered by us and existing independently of our thoughts and conceptualisation? I speak of this as the ontological or me- physical metaethical question. a nd, if there are, can we know about them; and, if we can, how do we get this kind of knowledge? I speak of this as the epistemic metaethical question. a ll these metaethical questions, the semantic, the ontological, and the epistemic ones, are raised and discussed in this book, but they are not the core questions raised. I have been more concerned with another kind of questions, which deserve to be called metaethical as well: what are the problems of morality? a re there many different moral questions, or, do they all, in the final analysis, reduce to only a few, or perhaps just one? t his question is of special importance to a non-naturalist objectivist and realist like the present author, who believes that we do make truth-claims when we pass moral judgements and who believes that there is a truth in these matters so that we must face the possibility that even our most cherished moral judgements may be false.
Author: John Greco
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 019964263X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 302
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Book Description
Ntroduction : the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation / David Henderson and John Greco -- Part I : Philosophical methods and evaluative purposes -- Teleologies and the methodology of epistemology / Georgi Gardiner -- Know first, tell later : the truth about Craig on knowledge / Elizabeth Fricker -- What's the point? / David Henderson and Terence Horgan -- Part II : Contextualism and pragmatic encroachment -- Knowledge, practical interests, and rising tides / Stephen R. Grimm -- Two purposes of knowledge-attribution and the contextualism debate / Matthew McGrath -- Part III : Does knowledge always require reasons? -- Knowledge in practice / Michael Williams -- Regress-stopping and disagreement for epistemic neopragmatists / Jonathan M. Weinberg -- Part IV : The internalism/externalism debate -- What is the subject-matter of the theory of epistemic justification? / Sanford C. Goldberg -- Why justification matters / Declan Smithies -- Part V : Epistemic norms as social norms -- Epistemic normativity and social norms / Peter J. Graham -- Testimonial knowledge and the flow of information / John Greco.
