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Author: Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Decision making
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
Author: Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Decision making
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
Author: Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Author: Luís Santos-Pinto
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to find support for it. By contrast, the experiments find that simultaneous-move outcomes are modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous. This paper generalizes Saloner's (1987) and Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing games by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. We explore the theoretical implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical evidence. We find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games. However, inequity aversion is not able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky's endogenous timing games.
Author: Yuanzhu Lu
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage.
Author: Miguel A. Fonseca
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Lin Liu
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.
Author: Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly where firms first strategically choose their capacity levels and then compete at price level. In equilibrium, firms are shown to set prices simultaneously while capacities are chosen sequentially. This result is in contrast to the assumption of simultaneous order of moves for capacities choice made by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 1-7) in a mixed duopoly. Besides, we find that there are two equilibria: in one of them the public firm is the leader in capacities and, in the other, the follower.
Author: Kangsik Choi
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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A model of endogenous payoff motives and endogenous order of moves is analysed in a mixed duopoly. We find that, when a non-negative price constraint is imposed on public and private firms' quantity choice, both firms always choose to be relative-payoff-maximisers, and both simultaneous move and sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium. In contrast, when non-negative absolute profit constraint is imposed, public and private firms always choose to be absolute-payoff-maximisers, and only sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium.
Author: Toshihiro Matsumura
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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