The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions PDF Download
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Author: Carlo Carraro
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781009888
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 274
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Book Description
Some of the specific topics addressed include: advances in the theory of large co-operative games; non co-operative models of coalition formation; a survey of the partition function in the formation of coalitions; far-sightedness in coalition formation; coalition stability; coalition formation in industrialized economics, trade theory, environmental economics and public finance.
Author: Carlo Carraro
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781009888
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 274
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Book Description
Some of the specific topics addressed include: advances in the theory of large co-operative games; non co-operative models of coalition formation; a survey of the partition function in the formation of coalitions; far-sightedness in coalition formation; coalition stability; coalition formation in industrialized economics, trade theory, environmental economics and public finance.
Author: José Luis Ferreira
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Book Description
Author: Dmitry Levando
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This paper suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a noncooperative game theory.Definition of a suggested finite game includes a family of nested simultaneous non-cooperative finite games with intra- and inter-coalition externalities. In this family, games differ by the size of maximum coalition, partitions and by coalition structure formation rules. A result of every game consists of partition of players into coalitions and a payoff profile for every player. Every game in the family has an equilibrium in mixed strategies with possibly more than one coalition. The results of the game differ from those conventionally discussed in cooperative game theory, e.g. the Shapley value, strong Nash, coalition-proof equilibrium, core, kernel, nucleolus. We discuss the following applications of the new game: cooperation as an allocation in one coalition, Bayesian games, stochastic games and construction of a non-cooperative criterion of coalition structure stability for studying focal points.
Author: Debraj Ray
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019920795X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 336
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Book Description
Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
Author: Ning Sun
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
Author: Motty Perry
Publisher: London : Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario
ISBN:
Category : Coalitions
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Author: Daron Acemoglu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Coalitions
Languages : en
Pages : 55
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Book Description
will be the ruling coalition and conditions under which the most powerful individuals will not be included in the ruling coalition. We also use this framework to discuss endogenous party formation.
Author: Guillermo Owen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We develop a model of coalition formation based on personal proximities among the players of an n-person game. Several examples are worked out in detail, showing that certain coalitions are much more stable than others, and/or much more likely to form than others. We also consider the dynamics of such coalition-formation. By a numerical example, we show that small changes in the initial conditions can lead to very different results in the coalitions formed in a given game.
Author: Ad M.A. Van Deemen
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1475725787
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 248
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Book Description
Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games.
Author: John Keith Murnighan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Coalitions
Languages : en
Pages : 98
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Book Description
