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Author: Patrick Bolton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We propose a dynamic theory of banking where the role of deposits is akin to that of productive capital in the classical Q-theory of investment for non-financial firms. As a key source of leverage, deposits create value for well-capitalized banks. However, unlike productive capital of nonfinancial firms that typically has a positive marginal q, the deposit q can turn negative for undercapitalized banks. Demand deposit accounts commit banks to allow holders to withdraw or deposit funds at will, so banks cannot perfectly control leverage. Therefore, for banks with insufficient capital to buffer risk, deposit inflow destroys value through the uncertainty it brings in future leverage. This intertemporal channel complements the focus of static models on value destruction of deposit outflow and bank run. Our model predictions on bank valuation and dynamic asset-liability management are broadly consistent with the evidence. Moreover, our model lends itself to a re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of leverage regulation, offers alternative perspectives on banking in a low interest rate environment, and reveals new aspects of deposit market power that has unique implications on bank franchise value.
Author: Patrick Bolton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We propose a dynamic theory of banking where the role of deposits is akin to that of productive capital in the classical Q-theory of investment for non-financial firms. As a key source of leverage, deposits create value for well-capitalized banks. However, unlike productive capital of nonfinancial firms that typically has a positive marginal q, the deposit q can turn negative for undercapitalized banks. Demand deposit accounts commit banks to allow holders to withdraw or deposit funds at will, so banks cannot perfectly control leverage. Therefore, for banks with insufficient capital to buffer risk, deposit inflow destroys value through the uncertainty it brings in future leverage. This intertemporal channel complements the focus of static models on value destruction of deposit outflow and bank run. Our model predictions on bank valuation and dynamic asset-liability management are broadly consistent with the evidence. Moreover, our model lends itself to a re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of leverage regulation, offers alternative perspectives on banking in a low interest rate environment, and reveals new aspects of deposit market power that has unique implications on bank franchise value.
Author: Urban Jermann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The majority of bank liabilities are deposits typically not withdrawn for extended periods. We propose a dynamic model of banks in which depositors forecast banks' leverage and default decisions, and withdraw optimally by trading off current against future liquidity needs. Endogenous deposit maturity creates a time-varying dilution problem that has major effects on bank dynamics. Interest rate cuts produce delayed increases in bank risk which are stronger in low rate regimes. Deposit insurance can exacerbate the deposit dilution and amplify the increase in bank risk.
Author: Sudipto Bhattacharya
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788477933274
Category : Bank management
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Author: Andrea M. Maechler
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
This paper investigates the presence of depositor discipline in the U.S. banking sector. We test whether depositors penalize (discipline) banks for poor performance by withdrawing their uninsured deposits. While focusing on the movements in uninsured deposits, we also account for the possibility that banks may be forced to pay a risk premium in the form of higher interest rates to induce depositors not to withdraw their uninsured deposits. Our results support the existence of depositor discipline: a weak bank may not necessarily be able to stop a deposit drain by raising its uninsured deposit interest rates.
Author: Thomas Bruce Robb
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 248
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Author:
Publisher: Lulu.com
ISBN: 9291316695
Category : Bank capital
Languages : en
Pages : 294
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Book Description
Author: Edward L. Glaeser
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 022644354X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 320
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Book Description
Includes papers presented at a conference held at the Columbia Business School in the spring of 2013 in honor of Josae Scheinkman's 65th birthday.
Author: Mr.Jaromir Benes
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475505523
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 71
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Book Description
At the height of the Great Depression a number of leading U.S. economists advanced a proposal for monetary reform that became known as the Chicago Plan. It envisaged the separation of the monetary and credit functions of the banking system, by requiring 100% reserve backing for deposits. Irving Fisher (1936) claimed the following advantages for this plan: (1) Much better control of a major source of business cycle fluctuations, sudden increases and contractions of bank credit and of the supply of bank-created money. (2) Complete elimination of bank runs. (3) Dramatic reduction of the (net) public debt. (4) Dramatic reduction of private debt, as money creation no longer requires simultaneous debt creation. We study these claims by embedding a comprehensive and carefully calibrated model of the banking system in a DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We find support for all four of Fisher's claims. Furthermore, output gains approach 10 percent, and steady state inflation can drop to zero without posing problems for the conduct of monetary policy.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bank examination
Languages : en
Pages : 736
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Author: Mr.Harald Finger
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451873425
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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This paper empirically examines the demand for commercial bank deposits in Lebanon, a regional financial center. With Lebanon's high fiscal deficits financed largely by domestic commercial banks that rely on deposit funding, deposit growth is a key variable to assess government financing conditions. At the macro level, we find that domestic factors such as economic activity, prices, and the interest differential between the Lebanese pound and the U.S. dollar are significant in explaining deposit demand, as are external factors such as advanced economy economic and financial conditions and variables proxying the availability of funds from the Gulf. Impulse response functions and variance decomposition analyses underscore the relative importance of the external variables. At the micro level, we find that in addition, bank-specific variables, such as the perceived riskiness of individual banks, their liquidity buffers, loan exposure, and interest margins, bear a significant influence on the demand for deposits.
