Cooperation to the Fullest Extent Possible? An Infinitely Repeated Games Experiment PDF Download
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Author: Andrew Kloosterman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
I experimentally investigate a new game that modifies the prisoner's dilemma. In this game, as opposed to the regular prisoner's dilemma, there is no tradeoff between cooperation and strategic risk (uncertainty regarding the other player's strategy) that is the leading explanation for low cooperation rates found in past experiments with small discount factors. The main finding is that there is still not pervasive cooperation; the cooperation rate is less than 50% in both repeated game treatments. I argue that specific complexities inherent to repeated games and slightly more strategic uncertainty than traditionally modeled inhibit the emergence of full cooperation.
Author: Andrew Kloosterman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
I experimentally investigate a new game that modifies the prisoner's dilemma. In this game, as opposed to the regular prisoner's dilemma, there is no tradeoff between cooperation and strategic risk (uncertainty regarding the other player's strategy) that is the leading explanation for low cooperation rates found in past experiments with small discount factors. The main finding is that there is still not pervasive cooperation; the cooperation rate is less than 50% in both repeated game treatments. I argue that specific complexities inherent to repeated games and slightly more strategic uncertainty than traditionally modeled inhibit the emergence of full cooperation.
Author: Andrew Kloosterman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
I experimentally investigate a new game that modifies the prisoner's dilemma. In this game, as opposed to the regular prisoner's dilemma, there is no tradeoff between cooperation and strategic risk (uncertainty regarding the other player's strategy) that is the leading explanation for low cooperation rates found in past experiments with small discount factors. The main finding is that there is still not pervasive cooperation; the cooperation rate is less than 50% in both repeated game treatments. I argue that specific complexities inherent to repeated games and slightly more strategic uncertainty than traditionally modeled inhibit the emergence of full cooperation.
Author: Pedro Dal Bo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 83
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Book Description
There have been major advances in the theoretical study of the determinants of cooperation with many applications in economics and the social sciences. A growing experimental literature has studied the determinants of cooperation, tested different predictions of the theory, and suggested an empirical solution to the problem of multiple equilibria in infinitely repeated games. To provide a robust description of the literature's findings, we gather and analyze a meta-data set of experiments on infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games. The experimental data shows that cooperation is affected by infinite repetition and that cooperation is more likely to arise when it can be supported in equilibrium. However, the fact that cooperation can be supported in equilibrium does not imply that most subjects will cooperate. High cooperation rates will only emerge when the parameters of the repeated game are such that cooperation is very robust to strategic uncertainty.We also review the results regarding the effect of imperfect monitoring, changing partners and personal characteristics on cooperation and the strategies used to support it.
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262061940
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
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Book Description
This work explains that equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a process in which non-fully rational players search for optimality over time. The models they e×plore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
Author: Pedro Dal Bo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how %22the shadow of the future%22 affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. We simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab by having a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing literature by including sessions with finite repeated games as controls and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion effects). We find strong evidence that the higher the probability of continuation, the higher the levels of cooperation. We compare the behavior from these infinitely repeated games with behavior from finitely repeated games of the same expected length and we find that there is more cooperation in the infinitely repeated games. Finally, we consider different payoffs matrices that result in different equilibrium outcomes for some probabilities of continuation, and find that the set of observed outcomes closely follows the set of equilibrium outcomes.
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
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Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818464
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
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Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Author: Robert Axelrod
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400822300
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 247
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Book Description
Robert Axelrod is widely known for his groundbreaking work in game theory and complexity theory. He is a leader in applying computer modeling to social science problems. His book The Evolution of Cooperation has been hailed as a seminal contribution and has been translated into eight languages since its initial publication. The Complexity of Cooperation is a sequel to that landmark book. It collects seven essays, originally published in a broad range of journals, and adds an extensive new introduction to the collection, along with new prefaces to each essay and a useful new appendix of additional resources. Written in Axelrod's acclaimed, accessible style, this collection serves as an introductory text on complexity theory and computer modeling in the social sciences and as an overview of the current state of the art in the field. The articles move beyond the basic paradigm of the Prisoner's Dilemma to study a rich set of issues, including how to cope with errors in perception or implementation, how norms emerge, and how new political actors and regions of shared culture can develop. They use the shared methodology of agent-based modeling, a powerful technique that specifies the rules of interaction between individuals and uses computer simulation to discover emergent properties of the social system. The Complexity of Cooperation is essential reading for all social scientists who are interested in issues of cooperation and complexity.
Author: Robert Axelrod
Publisher: Basic Books
ISBN: 0786734884
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 258
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Book Description
A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Author: Karl Sigmund
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691171084
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 184
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Book Description
This volume looks at social dilemmas where cooperative motivations are subverted and self-interest becomes self-defeating. Sigmund, a pioneer in evolutionary game theory, uses simple and well-known game theory models to examine the foundations of collective action and the effects of reciprocity and reputation.
