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Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Executives
Languages : en
Pages : 216
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Book Description
Author: United States. Congress
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781983735776
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 214
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Book Description
Compensation structure and systemic risk : hearing before the Committee of Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, June 11, 2009.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Executives
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: John Kambhu
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428988769
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 214
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Book Description
Hedge funds have become important players in the U.S. & global capital markets. These largely unregulated funds use: a variety of complex trading strategies & instruments, in their liberal use of leverage, in their opacity to outsiders, & in their convex compensation structure. These differences can exacerbate market failures associated with agency problems, externalities, & moral hazard. Counterparty credit risk mgmt. (CCRM) practices are the first line of defense against market disruptions with potential systemic consequences. This article examines how the unique nature of hedge funds may generate market failures that make CCRM for exposures to the funds intrinsically more difficult to manage, both for regulated institutions & for policymakers. Ill.
Author: Robert DeYoung
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437931006
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 57
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Book Description
This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, or were influenced by, the risky business policy decisions made by these firms. The authors find strong evidence that bank CEOs responded to contractual risk-taking incentives by taking more risk; bank boards altered CEO compensation to encourage executives to exploit new growth opportunities; and bank boards set CEO incentives in a manner designed to moderate excessive risk-taking. These relationships are strongest during the second half of the author¿s sample, after deregulation and technological change had expanded banks' capacities for risk-taking. Charts and tables.
Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
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Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Author: Lin Guo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
This paper investigates (1) how the composition of executive compensation is related to a bank's incentive to take excessive risk, (2) whether executive compensation in larger banks, especially the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, induces more severe moral hazard behavior, and (3) how the relation between bank executive compensation and risk taking changes before and during the recent financial crisis. We find that bank risk measured by the Z-score and the volatility of stock returns increases with both the percentages of short-term and long-term incentive compensation. However, greater proportion of incentive pay decreases the likelihood for a bank to become a problem or failed institution. This result holds for the periods before and during the recent financial crisis. The distress-mitigating effects of incentive compensation are further confirmed by our finding that both the proportions of bonus and long-term incentives are positively related to bank valuation and performance. Interestingly, we find that TBTF banks experience greater risk taking (lower Z-score) and are more likely to be in financial distress than smaller banks. However, greater incentive compensation in TBTF banks helps reduce their insolvency risk relative to smaller institutions.
