Author: Roman Inderst
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives
Author: Roman Inderst
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
One-Stop Shopping Behavior, Buyer Power, and Upstream Merger Incentives
Author: Irina Baye
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783863046002
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783863046002
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Supplier Innovation in the Presence of Buyer Power
Author: Zhiqi Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This article analyzes the impact of retailer buyer power on a supplier's incentive to conduct innovation, with a focus on the supplier's investment in product variety and quality improvement. The analysis shows that an increase in buyer power, manifested through either a weakening of the supplier's bargaining position or a strengthening of a large retailer's bargaining power, leads to greater product variety and higher quality if the elasticity of demand is not too large. Increased buyer power, manifested through a strengthening of a large retailer's bargaining position, stimulates the supplier to invest more in quality improvement.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This article analyzes the impact of retailer buyer power on a supplier's incentive to conduct innovation, with a focus on the supplier's investment in product variety and quality improvement. The analysis shows that an increase in buyer power, manifested through either a weakening of the supplier's bargaining position or a strengthening of a large retailer's bargaining power, leads to greater product variety and higher quality if the elasticity of demand is not too large. Increased buyer power, manifested through a strengthening of a large retailer's bargaining position, stimulates the supplier to invest more in quality improvement.
Countervailing Power and Dynamic Efficiency
Author: Roman Inderst
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
This paper studies the impact of buyer power on dynamic efficiency. We consider a bargaining model in which buyer power arises endogenously from size and may impact on a supplier's incentives to invest in lower marginal cost. We challenge the view frequently expressed in policy circles that the exercise of buyer power stifles suppliers' incentives. Instead, we find that the presence of larger buyers keeps a supplier "more on his toes" and induces him to improve the competitiveness of his offering, in terms of both price and quality, relative to buyers' alternative options. -- Buyer Power ; Countervailing Power ; Dynamic Efficiency
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
This paper studies the impact of buyer power on dynamic efficiency. We consider a bargaining model in which buyer power arises endogenously from size and may impact on a supplier's incentives to invest in lower marginal cost. We challenge the view frequently expressed in policy circles that the exercise of buyer power stifles suppliers' incentives. Instead, we find that the presence of larger buyers keeps a supplier "more on his toes" and induces him to improve the competitiveness of his offering, in terms of both price and quality, relative to buyers' alternative options. -- Buyer Power ; Countervailing Power ; Dynamic Efficiency
How Strong Buyers Spur Upstream Innovation
Author: Roman Inderst
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
We challenge the view that the presence of powerful buyers stifles suppliers' incentives to innovate. Following Katz (1987), we model buyer power as buyers' ability to substitute away from a given supplier and isolate several effects that support the opposite view, namely that the presence of powerful buyers induces a supplier to invest more in cost reduction. In contrast to negotiations with smaller buyers, the outcome of negotiations with large buyers is fully determined by their more valuable alternative supply option. This increases the supplier's incentives to reduce marginal costs, both as the supplier receives a larger fraction of the thereby generated incremental profits and as this makes buyers' alternative supply option less valuable. The latter effect is due to downstream competition between buyers and, as we show, is also stronger the larger and thus the more powerful buyers are.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
We challenge the view that the presence of powerful buyers stifles suppliers' incentives to innovate. Following Katz (1987), we model buyer power as buyers' ability to substitute away from a given supplier and isolate several effects that support the opposite view, namely that the presence of powerful buyers induces a supplier to invest more in cost reduction. In contrast to negotiations with smaller buyers, the outcome of negotiations with large buyers is fully determined by their more valuable alternative supply option. This increases the supplier's incentives to reduce marginal costs, both as the supplier receives a larger fraction of the thereby generated incremental profits and as this makes buyers' alternative supply option less valuable. The latter effect is due to downstream competition between buyers and, as we show, is also stronger the larger and thus the more powerful buyers are.
Buyer Power and Suppliers' Incentives to Innovate
Author: Christian Köhler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
Competition Policy and the Control of Buyer Power
Author: Peter C. Carstensen
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 178254058X
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 265
Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive overview of the economic and competition policy issues that buyer power creates. Drawing on economic analysis and cases from around the world, it explains why conventional seller side standards and analyses do not provide an adequate framework for responding to the problems that buyer power can create. Based on evidence that abuse of buyer power is a serious problem for the competitive process, the book evaluates the potential for competition law to deal directly with the problems of abuse either through conventional competition law or special rules aimed at abusive conduct. The author also examines controls over buying groups and mergers as potentially more useful responses to risks created by undue buyer power.
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 178254058X
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 265
Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive overview of the economic and competition policy issues that buyer power creates. Drawing on economic analysis and cases from around the world, it explains why conventional seller side standards and analyses do not provide an adequate framework for responding to the problems that buyer power can create. Based on evidence that abuse of buyer power is a serious problem for the competitive process, the book evaluates the potential for competition law to deal directly with the problems of abuse either through conventional competition law or special rules aimed at abusive conduct. The author also examines controls over buying groups and mergers as potentially more useful responses to risks created by undue buyer power.
Buyer Power and Quality Improvement
Author: Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
This paper analyses the sources of buyer power and its expect on sellers investment. We show that a retailer extracts a larger surplus from the negotiation with an upstream manufacturer the more it is essential to the creation of total surplus. In turn, this depends on the rivalry between retailers in the bargaining process. Rivalry increases when the retail market is more fragmented, when the retailers are less differentiated and when decreasing returns to scale in production are larger. The allocation of total surplus affects also the incentives of producers to invest in product quality, an instance of the hold up problem. This not only makes both the supplier and consumers worse off, but it may harm also the retailers.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
This paper analyses the sources of buyer power and its expect on sellers investment. We show that a retailer extracts a larger surplus from the negotiation with an upstream manufacturer the more it is essential to the creation of total surplus. In turn, this depends on the rivalry between retailers in the bargaining process. Rivalry increases when the retail market is more fragmented, when the retailers are less differentiated and when decreasing returns to scale in production are larger. The allocation of total surplus affects also the incentives of producers to invest in product quality, an instance of the hold up problem. This not only makes both the supplier and consumers worse off, but it may harm also the retailers.
Buyer Power and Supplier Relationship Commitment
Author: Sangho Chae
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 47
Book Description
Our study investigates how buyer power affects supplier relationship commitment. When a buyer exerts power on a supplier, the supplier response can be either simple compliance or commitment at a deeper level. Theoretically, the latter pertains to a supplier's intrinsic motivation. Building on cognitive evaluation theory, our model proposes the distinctive yet interactive nature of reward power and coercive power, commonly considered together as mediated powers. It also posits that non-mediated powers (expert, referent, and legitimate) amplify the influences of reward and coercive powers. An empirical investigation, based on large-scale multi-national survey data, provides support for our theoretical arguments. We discuss the practical implications for how buyers can use reward and coercive powers to improve supplier relationship commitment.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 47
Book Description
Our study investigates how buyer power affects supplier relationship commitment. When a buyer exerts power on a supplier, the supplier response can be either simple compliance or commitment at a deeper level. Theoretically, the latter pertains to a supplier's intrinsic motivation. Building on cognitive evaluation theory, our model proposes the distinctive yet interactive nature of reward power and coercive power, commonly considered together as mediated powers. It also posits that non-mediated powers (expert, referent, and legitimate) amplify the influences of reward and coercive powers. An empirical investigation, based on large-scale multi-national survey data, provides support for our theoretical arguments. We discuss the practical implications for how buyers can use reward and coercive powers to improve supplier relationship commitment.
Managing Suppliers
Author: John McMillan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description