Bargaining Solutions and Stationary Sets in N-person Games PDF Download
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Author: Robert James Weber
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 196
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Book Description
The formal proceedings of an n-person cooperative game can be modelled as a multi-stage negotiation process. At each stage, coalitions may object to the proposal at hand. If a particular objection is given recognition, then the non-objecting players respond to that objection in such a manner that a new proposal results from the objection and response. An equilibrium collection of strategies in this negotiation game may be viewed as a 'standard of behavior' to which no nonconformist pressures exist. This paper explores the relationship between the set of proposals to which no objections are made in such an equilibrium collection, and the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of the original game. (Modified author abstract).
Author: Robert James Weber
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 196
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Book Description
The formal proceedings of an n-person cooperative game can be modelled as a multi-stage negotiation process. At each stage, coalitions may object to the proposal at hand. If a particular objection is given recognition, then the non-objecting players respond to that objection in such a manner that a new proposal results from the objection and response. An equilibrium collection of strategies in this negotiation game may be viewed as a 'standard of behavior' to which no nonconformist pressures exist. This paper explores the relationship between the set of proposals to which no objections are made in such an equilibrium collection, and the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of the original game. (Modified author abstract).
Author: Zhi Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 218
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Book Description
Author: R. Henn
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642454941
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 714
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Book Description
Author: Shigeo Muto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 306
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Book Description
Stable sets and subsolutions are studied mainly for symmetric, n-person, characteristic-function form games (n;k) in which k-person coalitions are strongly vital, i.e., v(s)
Author: Reinhard Selten
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3662073676
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 292
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Book Description
The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored.
Author: J.C. Harsanyi
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401725276
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 264
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Book Description
This volume contains twelve of my game-theoretical papers, published in the period of 1956-80. It complements my Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation, Reidel, 1976, and my Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge University Press, 1977. These twelve papers deal with a wide range of game-theoretical problems. But there is a common intellectual thread going though all of them: they are all parts of an attempt to generalize and combine various game-theoretical solution concepts into a unified solution theory yielding one-point solutions for both cooperative and noncooperative games, and covering even such 'non-classical' games as games with incomplete information. SECTION A The first three papers deal with bargaining models. The first one discusses Nash's two-person bargaining solution and shows its equivalence with Zeuthen's bargaining theory. The second considers the rationality postulates underlying the Nash-Zeuthen theory and defends it against Schelling's objections. The third extends the Shapley value to games without transferable utility and proposes a solution concept that is at the same time a generaliza tion of the Shapley value and of the Nash bargaining solution.
Author: William F. Lucas
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
ISBN: 9780821867334
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 138
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Book Description
Author: Albert G. Holzman
Publisher: CRC Press
ISBN: 100014612X
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 393
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Book Description
This book covers the fundamentals of linear programming, extension of linear programming to discrete optimization methods, multi-objective functions, quadratic programming, geometric programming, and classical calculus methods for solving nonlinear programming problems.
Author: H.J. Peters
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401580227
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 244
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Book Description
Many social or economic conflict situations can be modeled by specifying the alternatives on which the involved parties may agree, and a special alternative which summarizes what happens in the event that no agreement is reached. Such a model is called a bargaining game, and a prescription assigning an alternative to each bargaining game is called a bargaining solution. In the cooperative game-theoretical approach, bargaining solutions are mathematically characterized by desirable properties, usually called axioms. In the noncooperative approach, solutions are derived as equilibria of strategic models describing an underlying bargaining procedure. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides the reader with an up-to-date survey of cooperative, axiomatic models of bargaining, starting with Nash's seminal paper, The Bargaining Problem. It presents an overview of the main results in this area during the past four decades. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides a chapter on noncooperative models of bargaining, in particular on those models leading to bargaining solutions that also result from the axiomatic approach. The main existing axiomatizations of solutions for coalitional bargaining games are included, as well as an auxiliary chapter on the relevant demands from utility theory.
Author: Harold W. Kuhn
Publisher: Duke University Press
ISBN: 9780822317821
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 512
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Book Description
This collection celebrates the pathbreaking work in game theory and mathematics of John F. Nash Jr., winner of the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics. Nash's analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games has had a major impact on modern economic theory. This book, also published as volume 81 of the Duke Mathematical Journal, includes an important, but previously unpublished paper by Nash; the proceedings of the Nobel seminar held in Stockholm on December 8, 1994 in his honor; and papers by distinguished mathematicians and economists written in response to and in honor of Nash's pioneering contributions to those fields. In 1950, when he was 22 years old, Nash presented his key idea--the Nash equilibrium--in the Ph.D. thesis he submitted to the Mathematics Department at Princeton University. In that paper, he defined a new concept of equilibrium and used methods from topology to prove the existence of an equilibrium point for n-person, finite, non-cooperative games, that is, for games in which the number of possible strategies are limited, no communication is allowed between the players, and n represents the number of players. The Nash equilibrium point is reached when none of the players can improve their position by changing strategies. By taking into account situations involving more than two players, specifically the general n-player game, Nash built significantly on the previous work of John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Contributors. Abbas Bahri, Eric A. Carlen, Ennio De Giorgi, Charles Fefferman, Srihari Govidan, John C. Harsanyi, H. Hoffer, Carlos E. Kenig, S. Klainerman, Harold F. Kuhn, Michael Loss, William F. Lucas, M. Machedon, Roger B. Myerson, Raghavan Narasimhan, John F. Nash Jr., Louis Nirenberg, Jill Pipher, Zeév Rudnick, Peter Sarnak, Michael Shub, Steve Smale, Robert Wilson, K. Wysocki, E. Zehnder
