Bank Profitability, Leverage Constraints, and Risk-taking

Bank Profitability, Leverage Constraints, and Risk-taking PDF Author: Natalya Martynova
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783957295965
Category :
Languages : de
Pages : 0

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Book Description
Traditional theory suggests that higher bank profitability (or franchise value) dissuades bank risk-taking. We highlight an opposite effect: higher profitability loosens bank borrowing constraints. This enables profitable banks to take risk on a larger scale, inducing risk-taking. This effect is more pronounced when bank leverage constraints are looser, or when new investments can be financed with senior funding (such as repos). The model's predictions are consistent with some notable cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run-up to the 2008 crisis

Bank Profitability, Leverage Constraints, and Risk-taking

Bank Profitability, Leverage Constraints, and Risk-taking PDF Author: Natalya Martynova
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783957295965
Category :
Languages : de
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
Traditional theory suggests that higher bank profitability (or franchise value) dissuades bank risk-taking. We highlight an opposite effect: higher profitability loosens bank borrowing constraints. This enables profitable banks to take risk on a larger scale, inducing risk-taking. This effect is more pronounced when bank leverage constraints are looser, or when new investments can be financed with senior funding (such as repos). The model's predictions are consistent with some notable cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run-up to the 2008 crisis

Bank Profitability and Risk-Taking

Bank Profitability and Risk-Taking PDF Author: Natalya Martynova
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1513565818
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 44

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Book Description
Traditional theory suggests that more profitable banks should have lower risk-taking incentives. Then why did many profitable banks choose to invest in untested financial instruments before the crisis, realizing significant losses? We attempt to reconcile theory and evidence. In our setup, banks are endowed with a fixed core business. They take risk by levering up to engage in risky ‘side activities’(such as market-based investments) alongside the core business. A more profitable core business allows a bank to borrow more and take side risks on a larger scale, offsetting lower incentives to take risk of given size. Consequently, more profitable banks may have higher risk-taking incentives. The framework is consistent with cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run up to the recent financial crisis.

Bank Profitability and Risk-taking

Bank Profitability and Risk-taking PDF Author: Natalya Martynova
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781513553733
Category : Bank profits
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description


Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Bank Risk Taking

Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Bank Risk Taking PDF Author: Mr.Luc Laeven
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1455210838
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 38

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Book Description
We provide a theoretical foundation for the claim that prolonged periods of easy monetary conditions increase bank risk taking. The net effect of a monetary policy change on bank monitoring (an inverse measure of risk taking) depends on the balance of three forces: interest rate pass-through, risk shifting, and leverage. When banks can adjust their capital structures, a monetary easing leads to greater leverage and lower monitoring. However, if a bank's capital structure is fixed, the balance depends on the degree of bank capitalization: when facing a policy rate cut, well capitalized banks decrease monitoring, while highly levered banks increase it. Further, the balance of these effects depends on the structure and contestability of the banking industry, and is therefore likely to vary across countries and over time.

Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel

Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel PDF Author: Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 148433373X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 41

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Book Description
We present evidence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on the internal ratings of U.S. banks on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve’s survey of terms of business lending. We find that ex-ante risk taking by banks (as measured by the risk rating of the bank’s loan portfolio) is negatively associated with increases in short-term policy interest rates. This relationship is less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods when banks’ capital erodes, such as episodes of financial and economic distress. These results contribute to the ongoing debate on the role of monetary policy in financial stability and suggest that monetary policy has a bearing on the riskiness of banks and financial stability more generally.

Bank Profitability and Financial Stability

Bank Profitability and Financial Stability PDF Author: Ms.TengTeng Xu
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484393805
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 54

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Book Description
We analyze how bank profitability impacts financial stability from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We first develop a theoretical model of the relationship between bank profitability and financial stability by exploring the role of non-interest income and retail-oriented business models. We then conduct panel regression analysis to examine the empirical determinants of bank risks and profitability, and how the level and the source of bank profitability affect risks for 431 publicly traded banks (U.S., advanced Europe, and GSIBs) from 2004 to 2017. Results reveal that profitability is negatively associated with both a bank’s contribution to systemic risk and its idiosyncratic risk, and an over-reliance on non-interest income, wholesale funding and leverage is associated with higher risks. Low competition is associated with low idiosyncratic risk but a high contribution to systemic risk. Lastly, the problem loans ratio and the cost-to-income ratio are found to be key factors that influence bank profitability. The paper’s findings suggest that policy makers should strive to better understand the source of bank profitability, especially where there is an over-reliance on market-based non-interest income, leverage, and wholesale funding.

Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited

Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited PDF Author: Mr.Gianni De Nicolo
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451865570
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 51

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Book Description
This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.

Bank Profitability and Risk-Taking Under Low Interest Rates

Bank Profitability and Risk-Taking Under Low Interest Rates PDF Author: Jacob Antoon Bikker
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41

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Book Description
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of the unusually low interest rate environment on the soundness of the US banking sector in terms of profitability and risk-taking. Using both dynamic and static modeling approaches and various estimation techniques, we find that the low interest rate environment indeed impairs bank performance and compresses net interest margins. Nonetheless, banks have been able to maintain their overall level of profits, due to lower provisioning, which in turn may endanger financial stability. Banks did not compensate for their lower interest income by expanding operations to include trading activities with a higher risk exposure.

Monetary Policy, Bank Leverage, and Financial Stability

Monetary Policy, Bank Leverage, and Financial Stability PDF Author: Mr.Fabian Valencia
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1463923236
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 39

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Book Description
This paper develops a model to assess how monetary policy rates affect bank risk-taking. In the model, a reduction in the risk-free rate increases lending profitability by reducing funding costs and increasing the surplus the monopolistic bank extracts from borrowers. Under limited liability, this increased profitability affects only upside returns, inducing the bank to take excessive leverage and hence risk. Excessive risk-taking increases as the interest rate decreases. At a broader level, the model illustrates how a benign macroeconomic environment can lead to excessive risk-taking, and thus it highlights a role for macroprudential regulation.

Sovereign Risk and Bank Risk-Taking

Sovereign Risk and Bank Risk-Taking PDF Author: Mr.Anil Ari
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484333055
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 72

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Book Description
I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and slow recovery from crises. When banks' investment decisions are not contractible, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on deposits according to their risk. This creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, high funding costs hinder the accumulation of bank net worth, leading to a persistent drop in investment and output. I bring the model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which under-capitalized banks in defaultrisky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quantified using Portuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 2010-2016. Policy interventions face a trade-off between alleviating banks' funding conditions and strengthening risk-taking incentives. Liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good equilibrium when not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate adverse equilibria.