Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings Management PDF Download
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Author: Joseph V. Carcello
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55
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Book Description
A prime objective of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and recent changes to stock exchange listing standards is to improve the quality of financial reporting. We examine the associations between audit committee financial expertise and alternate corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management. We find that both accounting and certain types of non-accounting financial expertise reduce earnings management for firms with weak alternate corporate governance mechanisms, but that independent audit committee members with financial expertise are most effective in mitigating earnings management. Importantly we find that alternate corporate governance mechanisms are an effective substitute for audit committee financial expertise in constraining earnings management. Finally, we find either no association or a positive association between financial expertise and real earnings management. Our results suggest that alternate governance approaches are equally effective in improving the quality of financial reporting, and that firms should have the flexibility to design the particular set of governance mechanisms that best fit their unique situations.
Author: Joseph V. Carcello
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55
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Book Description
A prime objective of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and recent changes to stock exchange listing standards is to improve the quality of financial reporting. We examine the associations between audit committee financial expertise and alternate corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management. We find that both accounting and certain types of non-accounting financial expertise reduce earnings management for firms with weak alternate corporate governance mechanisms, but that independent audit committee members with financial expertise are most effective in mitigating earnings management. Importantly we find that alternate corporate governance mechanisms are an effective substitute for audit committee financial expertise in constraining earnings management. Finally, we find either no association or a positive association between financial expertise and real earnings management. Our results suggest that alternate governance approaches are equally effective in improving the quality of financial reporting, and that firms should have the flexibility to design the particular set of governance mechanisms that best fit their unique situations.
Author: Patrick Badolato
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Regulatory pressure to increase both audit committee financial expertise and board independence has resulted in lower status for audit committees relative to management. This status differential is relevant because expertise and relative status are important determinants of each party's ability to influence outcomes, particularly when parties face conflicting goals. We find that audit committees with both financial expertise and high relative status are associated with lower levels of earnings management, as measured by accounting irregularities and abnormal accruals. These results speak to benefits and limitations of financial expertise, which have been the focus of considerable debate.
Author: April Klein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
This study examines whether audit committee and board characteristics are related to earnings management by the firm. The motivation behind this study is the implicit assertion by the SEC, the NYSE and the NASDAQ that earnings management and poor corporate governance mechanisms are positively related. A non-linear negative relation is found between audit committee independence and earnings manipulation. Specifically, a significant relation is found only when the audit committee has less than a majority of independent directors. Surprisingly, and in contrast to the new regulations, no significant association is found between earnings management and the more stringent requirement of 100% audit committee independence. Empirical evidence also is provided that other corporate governance characteristics are related to earnings management. Earnings management is positively related to whether the CEO sits on the board's compensation committee. It is negatively related to the CEO's shareholdings and to whether a large outside shareholder sits on the board's audit committee. These results suggest that boards structured to be more independent of the CEO may be more effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process.
Author: Joon S. Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
Regulators have frequently expressed concerns about corporate earnings management. Audit committees are expected to monitor managers' tendencies to manipulate their earnings numbers. The extant literature until now has focused on managers' incentives to manipulate annual earnings numbers. However, managers also have incentives to manage quarterly earnings, due for example, to pressures to meet quarterly analyst forecasts. We test whether audit committees with certain characteristics curb managers' ability to engage in quarterly earnings management. We examine the following characteristics of audit committees: their independence, number of meetings, financial expertise, stock ownership, outside directorships, tenure, and number of directors.Using a sample of 896 firm-year observations for the years 1996-2000, we report three findings. First, the number of outside directorships held by audit committee directors is negatively associated with earnings management behavior. This could reflect possible independence of these directors because of their desire to maintain their reputations or their expertise in dealing with financial reporting issues. Second, we find that stock ownership by independent audit committee directors is positively associated with earnings management. The monitoring benefits of independent directors seem to be eroded in situations where they are given stock ownership. Moreover, in our sample, it is mainly the independent directors that own stock. Although we do not know how generalizable this finding is, it suggests that stock ownership by audit committee directors is undesirable. Third, the average tenure of audit committee directors is negatively associated with quarterly earnings management suggesting a possible positive effect of experience with the firm and its accounting. Our results are robust to two different measures of quarterly earnings management.
Author: Frank M. Burke
Publisher: CCH
ISBN: 9780808091646
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 468
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Book Description
Author: Dan S. Dhaliwal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
Following the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002, US stock exchanges strongly advocate the presence of financial experts on audit committees. However, the ideal definition of financial expertise proves to be a controversial issue culminating with the stock exchanges adopting a wide scoped definition of financial expertise. Using this definition, prior studies have not provided consistent evidence of financial expertise positively influencing audit committee effectiveness. We investigate the association between three types of audit committee financial expertise (accounting, finance and supervisory expertise) and accruals quality. We find significant positive relation between accounting expertise and accruals quality, which is more pronounced in the presence of strong audit committee governance. The findings indicate that the current definition of financial expertise is too broad and any future refinements must focus on accounting expertise of the audit committee members.
Author: Rohaida Basiruddin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auditing
Languages : en
Pages : 302
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Book Description
This thesis examines two empirical studies. Firstly, it examines the relationship between corporate governance characteristics (relating to the size, composition of independent members, financial expertise and meeting frequency of boards of directors and audit committee) and audit quality. Secondly, the study investigates the effectiveness of corporate governance characteristics and higher quality auditors in constraining earnings management. There are three proxies of audit quality employed: audit fees, non-audit fees and industry specialist auditors. Based on data obtained from the FTSE 350 between 2005 and 2008, the first empirical findings suggest that independent non-executive directors on board demand an additional and extensive audit effort from the auditor in order to certify their monitoring function, resulting in an increase in the audit fees and the perceived audit quality. The results also indicate a positive relationship between independent board and non-audit fees, suggesting that independent board support the view that the joint provision of audit and non-audit services does not necessarily compromise auditor independence, but rather that it broadens the auditors? knowledge and improves audit judgement. The findings from the second empirical study suggest that higher quality auditors (which either charge higher audit fees or are industry specialist auditors) are likely to reduce earnings manipulation. However, no evidence suggests that NAS fees affect earnings management. In addition, the current study finds inconsistent results linking the corporate governance characteristics and opportunistic earnings. Overall, both findings are consistent with agency theory, which states that independent board and higher quality auditors are associated with effective monitoring, which in turn helps to improve the quality of financial reporting. The findings are of potential interest to policy makers, professionals and boards of directors, especially on issues relating to audit quality and the mandating of corporate governance practices.
Author: Jagan Krishnan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
Recent debates on audit committee financial expertise have focused on quot;accountingquot; and quot;non-accountingquot; financial experts. A significant proportion of firms do not appoint accounting financial experts (i.e., persons with specialized accounting/auditing experience) to their audit committees. We examine the determinants of firms' choice of the quot;audit committee financial expertsquot;, for a sample of Fortune 1000 firms. We test the relation between the demand for accounting financial experts (AFEs), potential litigation risk, and corporate governance. We find that firms with higher litigation risk are more likely to have AFEs on their audit committee. However, the association between litigation risk and the likelihood of appointing accounting financial experts occurs for firms with relatively strong governance but not for those with weak governance. Thus, our findings indicate that (1) companies with demand for accounting financial experts - measured by potential litigation risk - seem to be able to secure accounting financial experts but (2) such benefits only accrue in the presence of otherwise strong corporate governance.
Author: Rachel M. Hayes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Badolato et al. (2014) (BDE) examine the effectiveness of audit committee financial expertise. They find that financial expertise does not deter irregularities unless the audit committee also has high status. I review prior research on financial expertise to place the current study in the literature and for guidance in assessing the paper's assumptions and empirical specifications. BDE's conclusions run counter to many of the prior findings and to broad patterns in the data. I discuss how empirical research design choices and self-selection may affect the paper's conclusions.
Author: Bo Qin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
An audit committee with financial expertise is expected to strengthen the firms' internal control system, and consequently, contribute to reliable and relevant financial reporting. The controversial definition of financial expert was intensively commented on before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stipulated the final rules. In this study, the author examines whether the impact of audit committee's financial expertise on earnings quality as measured by returns-earnings relation varies with the way the financial expert is defined. The results indicate that the firms with an accounting-literate professional serving on the audit committee are more likely to have high quality of reported earnings than others without such an expert. In addition, the size of the audit committee with accounting-related expertise has a positive impact on earnings quality. In contrast, the presence of a financial expert under SEC final definition is not significantly related to earnings quality. The results are robust with other influential factors, such as earnings growth, persistence, firm size, and industry specificity, taken into account.
