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Author: Flávio Marques Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
In this paper, we study an auction where bidders only know the number of potential applicants. After seeing their values for the object, bidders decide whether or not to enter the auction. Players may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize the optimal bidding strategies for both first- and second- price sealed-bid auction when participation is endogenous. We show that only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point will bid in these auctions. In this context, both auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrarily to the predictions of the fixed-n literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts greatly with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry.
Author: Flávio Marques Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
In this paper, we study an auction where bidders only know the number of potential applicants. After seeing their values for the object, bidders decide whether or not to enter the auction. Players may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize the optimal bidding strategies for both first- and second- price sealed-bid auction when participation is endogenous. We show that only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point will bid in these auctions. In this context, both auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrarily to the predictions of the fixed-n literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts greatly with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry.
Author: Ronald M. Harstad
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : de
Pages : 51
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Book Description
Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
Author: Robert Marquez
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55
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Book Description
We study endogenous participation in asymmetric second price auctions where one bidder is "special". We show seller revenue decreases whenever the special bidder becomes more dominant in the sense of FOSD, or more generally whenever the other bidders' profits are reduced. We also establish an equivalence result for second price auctions - any arbitrary distribution of the special bidder's value is "competitively equivalent" to one that is a power function of the value distribution of the other bidders. Finally, we analyze first-price auctions numerically and show that our results extend to this alternate mechanism.
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Antonio Estache
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Alex Arsenault Morin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper empirically explores how varying the timing of a sequence of auctions affects both bidder behavior and the welfare of procurers and bidders. We develop a structural auction model with endogenous participation in which bidding may be either simultaneous or sequential, and bidders may perceive auctioned objects as either complements or substitutes. We then apply this model to data on auctions for roof-maintenance projects in Montreal. We show that complementarities can account for as high as 17% of the total size of a contract combination. Finally, we develop an algorithm to search a schedule of auctions and show that the total cost of projects can be reduced by more than 8%.
Author: Hanming Fang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Bidders' risk attitudes have key implications for choices of revenue-maximizing auction formats. In ascending auctions, bid distributions do not provide information about risk preference. We infer risk attitudes using distributions of transaction prices and participation decisions in ascending auctions with entry costs. Nonparametric tests are proposed for two distinct scenarios: first, the expected entry cost can be consistently estimated from data; second, the data does not report entry costs but contains exogenous variations of potential competition and auction characteristics. In the first scenario, we exploit the fact that the risk premium required for entry - the difference between ex ante expected profits from entry and the certainty equivalent - is strictly positive if and only if bidders are risk averse. Our test is based on identification of bidders' ex ante profits. In the second scenario, our test builds on the fact that risk attitudes affect how equilibrium entry probabilities vary with observed auction characteristics and potential competition. We also show identification of risk attitudes in a more general model of ascending auctions with selective entry, where bidders receive entry-stage signals that are correlated with private values.
Author: Ron Harstad
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Potential bidders respond to a seller's choice of auction mechanism for a common-value or affiliated-values asset by endogenous decisions whether to incur an information-acquisition cost (and observe a private estimate), or forgo competing. Privately informed participants decide whether to incur a bid-preparation cost and pay an entry fee, or cease competing. Auction rules and information flows are quite general; participation decisions may be simultaneous or sequential. The resulting revenue identity for any auction mechanism implies that optimal auctions are allocatively efficient; a nontrivial reserve price is revenue-inferior. Optimal auctions are otherwise contentless: any auction that sells without reserve becomes optimal by adjusting any one of the continuous, spanning parameters, e.g., the entry fee. Seller's surplus-extracting tools are now substitutes, not complements. Many econometric studies of auction markets are seen to be flawed in their identification of the number of bidders.
Author: Hanming Fang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
