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Author: Negin Golrezaei
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35
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Book Description
We combine theory and empirics to (i) show that some buyers in online advertising markets are financially constrained and (ii) demonstrate how to design auctions that take into account such financial constraints. We use data from a field experiment where reserve prices were randomized on Google's advertising exchange (AdX). We find that, contrary to the predictions of classical auction theory, a significant set of buyers lowers their bids when reserve prices go up. We show that this behavior can be explained if we assume buyers have constraints on their minimum return on investment (ROI). We proceed to design auctions for ROI-constrained buyers. We show that optimal auctions for symmetric ROI-constrained buyers are either second-price auctions with reduced reserve prices or subsidized second-price auctions. For asymmetric buyers, the optimal auction involves a modification of virtual values. Going back to the data, we show that usingROI-aware optimal auctions can lead to large revenue gains and large welfare gains for buyers.
Author: Negin Golrezaei
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35
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Book Description
We combine theory and empirics to (i) show that some buyers in online advertising markets are financially constrained and (ii) demonstrate how to design auctions that take into account such financial constraints. We use data from a field experiment where reserve prices were randomized on Google's advertising exchange (AdX). We find that, contrary to the predictions of classical auction theory, a significant set of buyers lowers their bids when reserve prices go up. We show that this behavior can be explained if we assume buyers have constraints on their minimum return on investment (ROI). We proceed to design auctions for ROI-constrained buyers. We show that optimal auctions for symmetric ROI-constrained buyers are either second-price auctions with reduced reserve prices or subsidized second-price auctions. For asymmetric buyers, the optimal auction involves a modification of virtual values. Going back to the data, we show that usingROI-aware optimal auctions can lead to large revenue gains and large welfare gains for buyers.
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 023154457X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 222
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Book Description
Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.
Author: Jugal Garg
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3031489748
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 728
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Book Description
This volume LNCS 14413 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 19th International Conference, WINE 2023, in December 2023 held in Shanghai, China. The 37 full papers presented together with 29 one-page abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 221 submissions. The WINE conference series aims to exchange research ideas in a diverse area of application at the intercept of theoretical computer science , artificial intelligence, operations research, and economics.
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Asunción Mochón
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319088130
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 161
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Book Description
In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book is to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic. Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book, the authors summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic. “This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible.” Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University.
Author: Yeon-Koo Che
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Book Description
Author: Srobonti Chattopadhyay
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351271067
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 100
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Book Description
The book elaborates the basic principles of Auction Theory in a non-technical language so as to make them easily accessible to even those not trained in the discipline. Auctions as allocation mechanisms have been in use across the world since antiquity and are still employed in different countries for purchase and sales of a wide range of objects, both by governments and by private agents. Auction has gained popularity over other allocation mechanisms since the rules of auctions are very precise, involve much less subjective judgements compared to other alternative allocation mechanisms and lead to a more efficient process of discovering the true willingness of the buyers to pay. Moreover, the principles of Auction Theory are used in other contexts, for example in designing contests, or in controlling emission levels through allocation of permits and licenses.
Author: K. Gal
Publisher: IOS Press
ISBN: 164368437X
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 3328
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Book Description
Artificial intelligence, or AI, now affects the day-to-day life of almost everyone on the planet, and continues to be a perennial hot topic in the news. This book presents the proceedings of ECAI 2023, the 26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, and of PAIS 2023, the 12th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Intelligent Systems, held from 30 September to 4 October 2023 and on 3 October 2023 respectively in Kraków, Poland. Since 1974, ECAI has been the premier venue for presenting AI research in Europe, and this annual conference has become the place for researchers and practitioners of AI to discuss the latest trends and challenges in all subfields of AI, and to demonstrate innovative applications and uses of advanced AI technology. ECAI 2023 received 1896 submissions – a record number – of which 1691 were retained for review, ultimately resulting in an acceptance rate of 23%. The 390 papers included here, cover topics including machine learning, natural language processing, multi agent systems, and vision and knowledge representation and reasoning. PAIS 2023 received 17 submissions, of which 10 were accepted after a rigorous review process. Those 10 papers cover topics ranging from fostering better working environments, behavior modeling and citizen science to large language models and neuro-symbolic applications, and are also included here. Presenting a comprehensive overview of current research and developments in AI, the book will be of interest to all those working in the field.
Author: Vijay Krishna
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 0080922937
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 337
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Book Description
Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Author: David J. Salant
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262321831
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 199
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Book Description
A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.
