Asymmetric Adjustment in Menu Cost Duopoly PDF Download
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Author: Per Svejstrup Hansen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Duopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 11
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Book Description
Author: Per Svejstrup Hansen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Duopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 11
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Book Description
Author: Økonomisk Institut
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 11
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Book Description
Author: Per Svejstrup Hansen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Contrary to existing menu cost models we assume oligopolistic interaction. Symmetric duopoly may lead to asymmetric adjustment even when menu costs are negligible: In some equilibria only one Orm adjusts to negative shocks, while both Orms adjust to positive shocks.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Jakob Brochner Madsen
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780864225603
Category : Prices
Languages : en
Pages : 9
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Book Description
Author: Piercarlo Zanchettin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Duopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Author: Kangsik Choi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We consider a mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities when the public firm is less efficient than the private firm. Thus, even with cost asymmetry, we obtain exactly the same result (i.e., Bertrand competition) of Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) if Singh and Vives' (1984) assumption of positive primary outputs holds. However, compared to endogenous determination of the type of contract without cost asymmetry, our main finding is that in the wider range of cost asymmetry, different type(s) of equilibrium related to or not related to the limit-pricing strategy of the private firm can be sustained. Thus, when considering an implication on privatization, we may overestimate the welfare gain of privatization because Cournot competition takes place after privatization even though cost asymmetry exists between firms. While the result of Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) holds true if the goods are complements, we find the novel results in the case of substitutes.
Author: Xavier Vives
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
ISBN: 9780262220606
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 446
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Book Description
Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.
Author: Asher Wolinsky
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41
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Author: Tore Ellingsen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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