Author: Tom Cooper
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780985455415
Category : Air forces
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Volume 4 in Harpia Publishing's highly successful Arab MiGs series expands the history of the major Arab air forces that became involved in the wars with Israel during the period 1967 to 1973. It solves the intractable complexity of this violent period by dispassionately outlining the sequence of political and military events -- in chronological and geographic order. The reader is systematically taken through Egyptian attempts to reconstruct its battered air force and expand its air defense capabilities, and then reestablish control of its airspace in spite of increasing and ever more aggressive Israeli attacks. The military support Israel received from the United States not only resulted in both sides developing, testing and employing ever more advanced methods of air warfare, but eventually provoked a Soviet military intervention, which marked the culmination of the period better known as the War of Attrition. The narrative continues with dramatic descriptions of the developments in Jordan, which culminated in a civil war in 1970, and with an exclusive insight into the previously unknown expansion of the Syrian air arm with extensive support from Czechoslovakia, in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The content is concluded with lesser known military events in Algeria, Morocco, Iraq and Libya, where a series of military coups resulted in developments that were to become critical not only for the future of the local air forces, but also well beyond the borders of those countries.
Arab MiGs: Attrition War, 1967-1973
Author: Tom Cooper
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780985455415
Category : Air forces
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Volume 4 in Harpia Publishing's highly successful Arab MiGs series expands the history of the major Arab air forces that became involved in the wars with Israel during the period 1967 to 1973. It solves the intractable complexity of this violent period by dispassionately outlining the sequence of political and military events -- in chronological and geographic order. The reader is systematically taken through Egyptian attempts to reconstruct its battered air force and expand its air defense capabilities, and then reestablish control of its airspace in spite of increasing and ever more aggressive Israeli attacks. The military support Israel received from the United States not only resulted in both sides developing, testing and employing ever more advanced methods of air warfare, but eventually provoked a Soviet military intervention, which marked the culmination of the period better known as the War of Attrition. The narrative continues with dramatic descriptions of the developments in Jordan, which culminated in a civil war in 1970, and with an exclusive insight into the previously unknown expansion of the Syrian air arm with extensive support from Czechoslovakia, in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The content is concluded with lesser known military events in Algeria, Morocco, Iraq and Libya, where a series of military coups resulted in developments that were to become critical not only for the future of the local air forces, but also well beyond the borders of those countries.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780985455415
Category : Air forces
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Volume 4 in Harpia Publishing's highly successful Arab MiGs series expands the history of the major Arab air forces that became involved in the wars with Israel during the period 1967 to 1973. It solves the intractable complexity of this violent period by dispassionately outlining the sequence of political and military events -- in chronological and geographic order. The reader is systematically taken through Egyptian attempts to reconstruct its battered air force and expand its air defense capabilities, and then reestablish control of its airspace in spite of increasing and ever more aggressive Israeli attacks. The military support Israel received from the United States not only resulted in both sides developing, testing and employing ever more advanced methods of air warfare, but eventually provoked a Soviet military intervention, which marked the culmination of the period better known as the War of Attrition. The narrative continues with dramatic descriptions of the developments in Jordan, which culminated in a civil war in 1970, and with an exclusive insight into the previously unknown expansion of the Syrian air arm with extensive support from Czechoslovakia, in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The content is concluded with lesser known military events in Algeria, Morocco, Iraq and Libya, where a series of military coups resulted in developments that were to become critical not only for the future of the local air forces, but also well beyond the borders of those countries.
The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973
Author: Isabella Ginor
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190911433
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 539
Book Description
Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history. This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces and some 20,000 Soviet servicemen with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope, timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the conventional view that détente with the US induced Moscow to restrainthat a US-Moscow détente led to a curtailment of Egyptian ambitions to recapture of the land it lost to Israel in 1967. Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new genre of sources-- -memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit this pivotal moment in world history.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190911433
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 539
Book Description
Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history. This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces and some 20,000 Soviet servicemen with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope, timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the conventional view that détente with the US induced Moscow to restrainthat a US-Moscow détente led to a curtailment of Egyptian ambitions to recapture of the land it lost to Israel in 1967. Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new genre of sources-- -memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit this pivotal moment in world history.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross Of Decisive Victory [Illustrated Edition]
Author: Dr. George W. Gawrych
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252791
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 242
Book Description
Includes 8 maps and more than 20 illustrations Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance. The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252791
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 242
Book Description
Includes 8 maps and more than 20 illustrations Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance. The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.
Key to the Sinai
Author: George Walter Gawrych
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Abu Ageila, Battle of, Abū ʻUjaylah, Egypt, 1956
Languages : en
Pages : 164
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Abu Ageila, Battle of, Abū ʻUjaylah, Egypt, 1956
Languages : en
Pages : 164
Book Description
The Yom Kippur War
Author:
Publisher: Doubleday Books
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 580
Book Description
Reports findings of a December 1973 Jerusalem Symposium assessing the trauma among the world's Jews (and non-Jews) during and following the October war.
Publisher: Doubleday Books
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 580
Book Description
Reports findings of a December 1973 Jerusalem Symposium assessing the trauma among the world's Jews (and non-Jews) during and following the October war.
Arab Migs
Author: Tom Cooper
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780985455460
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Arab MiGs Volume 6 continues Harpia Publishing's renowned coverage of air actions by Arab air forces during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. After researching in the Middle East for more than 40 years, interviewing and discussing the fighting in detail with pilots, participants and eyewitnesses from almost every unit involved, the authors provide the first ever coherent narrative of this air war. While it has often been argued that air power did not play a dominant role in the conflict, it eventually proved critical to its outcome. Moreover, thousands of combat experiences that were learned during this war -- and paid for in blood by both sides -- proved extremely influential for the development of new aircraft types and new weapons systems. The October 1973 conflict was one of the best examples of the ever increasing importance of electronic warfare and unmanned aircraft upon the modern-day battlefield, and therefore prompted fundamental changes in the tactics and strategy of the dominant air powers across the globe during the late 20th century. As well as enabling the reader to gain a clear insight into the nature of the air operations by all involved air powers - and the Arab air forces in particular - and the weaponry deployed, this book contains a detailed cross-examination of claims from both sides, analyses aircraft losses on both sides and lays bare the over-claims, regardless of whether officially confirmed. Descriptions based on the reminiscences of veteran aircrews provide an unprecedented insider's view of key aircraft and operations, illustrating how developments in technology and information warfare added a new dimension to the history of air warfare. Supported by a plethora of background information, more than 300 photographs, color profiles, maps and diagrams depicting the action, aircraft, camouflage patterns, markings, and weaponry deployed, Arab MiGs Volume 6 is set to become the standard reference work on the subject.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780985455460
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Arab MiGs Volume 6 continues Harpia Publishing's renowned coverage of air actions by Arab air forces during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. After researching in the Middle East for more than 40 years, interviewing and discussing the fighting in detail with pilots, participants and eyewitnesses from almost every unit involved, the authors provide the first ever coherent narrative of this air war. While it has often been argued that air power did not play a dominant role in the conflict, it eventually proved critical to its outcome. Moreover, thousands of combat experiences that were learned during this war -- and paid for in blood by both sides -- proved extremely influential for the development of new aircraft types and new weapons systems. The October 1973 conflict was one of the best examples of the ever increasing importance of electronic warfare and unmanned aircraft upon the modern-day battlefield, and therefore prompted fundamental changes in the tactics and strategy of the dominant air powers across the globe during the late 20th century. As well as enabling the reader to gain a clear insight into the nature of the air operations by all involved air powers - and the Arab air forces in particular - and the weaponry deployed, this book contains a detailed cross-examination of claims from both sides, analyses aircraft losses on both sides and lays bare the over-claims, regardless of whether officially confirmed. Descriptions based on the reminiscences of veteran aircrews provide an unprecedented insider's view of key aircraft and operations, illustrating how developments in technology and information warfare added a new dimension to the history of air warfare. Supported by a plethora of background information, more than 300 photographs, color profiles, maps and diagrams depicting the action, aircraft, camouflage patterns, markings, and weaponry deployed, Arab MiGs Volume 6 is set to become the standard reference work on the subject.
1973 - the First Nuclear War
Author: Tom Cooper
Publisher: Middle East@War
ISBN: 9781911628712
Category : Arab-Israeli conflict
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The majority of narratives about the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War stress that air power did not play a dominant role. The deployment of strong, well-integrated air defenses by Egypt and Syria, that caused heavy losses to the Israeli air force early during that conflict, not only spoiled Israel's prewar planning, but prevented it from providing support for Israeli ground forces too. A cross-examination of interviews with dozens of Egyptian participants in that conflict, contemporary reporting in the media, and also intelligence reports, offers an entirely different picture. Accordingly, for much of that war, the Israelis flew heavy air strikes on Port Said, on the northern entry to the Suez Canal. Furthermore, they repeatedly attacked two major Egyptian air bases in the Nile Delta - el-Mansourah and Tanta - in turn causing some of the biggest air battles of this war. Indeed, in Egypt, the response to these attacks reached the level of legend: the supposed repelling of an Israeli air strike on el-Mansourah, on 14 October 1973, prompted Cairo to declare not only a massive victory, but also that date for the day of its air force. However, the actual reasons for Israeli air strikes on Port Said, el-Mansourah and Tanta remain unclear to this day: there are no Israeli publications offering a sensible explanation, and there are no Egyptian publications explaining the reasoning. Only a cross-examination of additional reporting provides a possible solution: el-Mansourah was also the base of the only Egyptian unit equipped with R-17E ballistic missiles, known as the SS-1 Scud in the West. As of October 1973, these missiles were the only weapon in Egyptian hands capable of reaching central Israel - and that only if fired from the area around Port Said. While apparently unimportant in the overall context, this fact gains immensely in importance considering reports from the US intelligence services about the possible deployment of Soviet nuclear warheads to Egypt in October 1973. Discussing all the available information, strategy, tactics, equipment and related combat operations of both sides, '1973: the First Nuclear War' provides an in-depth insight into the Israeli efforts to prevent the deployment of Egyptian Scud missiles - whether armed with Soviet nuclear warheads or not - in the Port Said area: an effort that dictated a lengthy segment of the application of air power during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and resulted in some of the most spectacular air-to-air and air-to-ground battles of that conflict. Illustrated by over 100 photographs, a dozen maps and 18 color profiles, this book thus offers an entirely new thesis about crucial, but previously unknown factors that determined the flow of the aerial warfare in October 1973.
Publisher: Middle East@War
ISBN: 9781911628712
Category : Arab-Israeli conflict
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The majority of narratives about the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War stress that air power did not play a dominant role. The deployment of strong, well-integrated air defenses by Egypt and Syria, that caused heavy losses to the Israeli air force early during that conflict, not only spoiled Israel's prewar planning, but prevented it from providing support for Israeli ground forces too. A cross-examination of interviews with dozens of Egyptian participants in that conflict, contemporary reporting in the media, and also intelligence reports, offers an entirely different picture. Accordingly, for much of that war, the Israelis flew heavy air strikes on Port Said, on the northern entry to the Suez Canal. Furthermore, they repeatedly attacked two major Egyptian air bases in the Nile Delta - el-Mansourah and Tanta - in turn causing some of the biggest air battles of this war. Indeed, in Egypt, the response to these attacks reached the level of legend: the supposed repelling of an Israeli air strike on el-Mansourah, on 14 October 1973, prompted Cairo to declare not only a massive victory, but also that date for the day of its air force. However, the actual reasons for Israeli air strikes on Port Said, el-Mansourah and Tanta remain unclear to this day: there are no Israeli publications offering a sensible explanation, and there are no Egyptian publications explaining the reasoning. Only a cross-examination of additional reporting provides a possible solution: el-Mansourah was also the base of the only Egyptian unit equipped with R-17E ballistic missiles, known as the SS-1 Scud in the West. As of October 1973, these missiles were the only weapon in Egyptian hands capable of reaching central Israel - and that only if fired from the area around Port Said. While apparently unimportant in the overall context, this fact gains immensely in importance considering reports from the US intelligence services about the possible deployment of Soviet nuclear warheads to Egypt in October 1973. Discussing all the available information, strategy, tactics, equipment and related combat operations of both sides, '1973: the First Nuclear War' provides an in-depth insight into the Israeli efforts to prevent the deployment of Egyptian Scud missiles - whether armed with Soviet nuclear warheads or not - in the Port Said area: an effort that dictated a lengthy segment of the application of air power during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and resulted in some of the most spectacular air-to-air and air-to-ground battles of that conflict. Illustrated by over 100 photographs, a dozen maps and 18 color profiles, this book thus offers an entirely new thesis about crucial, but previously unknown factors that determined the flow of the aerial warfare in October 1973.
Foxbats Over Dimona
Author: Isabella Ginor
Publisher: Yale University Press
ISBN: 0300135041
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 301
Book Description
Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez’s groundbreaking history of the Six-Day War in 1967 radically changes our understanding of that conflict, casting it as a crucial arena of Cold War intrigue that has shaped the Middle East to this day. The authors, award-winning Israeli journalists and historians, have investigated newly available documents and testimonies from the former Soviet Union, cross-checked them against Israeli and Western sources, and arrived at fresh and startling conclusions. Contrary to previous interpretations, Ginor and Remez’s book shows that the Six-Day War was the result of a joint Soviet-Arab gambit to provoke Israel into a preemptive attack. The authors reveal how the Soviets received a secret Israeli message indicating that Israel, despite its official ambiguity, was about to acquire nuclear weapons. Determined to destroy Israel’s nuclear program before it could produce an atomic bomb, the Soviets then began preparing for war--well before Moscow accused Israel of offensive intent, the overt trigger of the crisis. Ginor and Remez’s startling account details how the Soviet-Arab onslaught was to be unleashed once Israel had been drawn into action and was branded as the aggressor. The Soviets had submarine-based nuclear missiles poised for use against Israel in case it already possessed and tried to use an atomic device, and the USSR prepared and actually began a marine landing on Israel’s shores backed by strategic bombers and fighter squadrons. They sent their most advanced, still-secret aircraft, the MiG-25 Foxbat, on provocative sorties over Israel’s Dimona nuclear complex to prepare the planned attack on it, and to scare Israel into making the first strike. It was only the unpredicted devastation of Israel’s response that narrowly thwarted the Soviet design.
Publisher: Yale University Press
ISBN: 0300135041
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 301
Book Description
Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez’s groundbreaking history of the Six-Day War in 1967 radically changes our understanding of that conflict, casting it as a crucial arena of Cold War intrigue that has shaped the Middle East to this day. The authors, award-winning Israeli journalists and historians, have investigated newly available documents and testimonies from the former Soviet Union, cross-checked them against Israeli and Western sources, and arrived at fresh and startling conclusions. Contrary to previous interpretations, Ginor and Remez’s book shows that the Six-Day War was the result of a joint Soviet-Arab gambit to provoke Israel into a preemptive attack. The authors reveal how the Soviets received a secret Israeli message indicating that Israel, despite its official ambiguity, was about to acquire nuclear weapons. Determined to destroy Israel’s nuclear program before it could produce an atomic bomb, the Soviets then began preparing for war--well before Moscow accused Israel of offensive intent, the overt trigger of the crisis. Ginor and Remez’s startling account details how the Soviet-Arab onslaught was to be unleashed once Israel had been drawn into action and was branded as the aggressor. The Soviets had submarine-based nuclear missiles poised for use against Israel in case it already possessed and tried to use an atomic device, and the USSR prepared and actually began a marine landing on Israel’s shores backed by strategic bombers and fighter squadrons. They sent their most advanced, still-secret aircraft, the MiG-25 Foxbat, on provocative sorties over Israel’s Dimona nuclear complex to prepare the planned attack on it, and to scare Israel into making the first strike. It was only the unpredicted devastation of Israel’s response that narrowly thwarted the Soviet design.
Israeli Air Force Operations in the 1956 Suez War
Author: Shlomo Aloni
Publisher: Middle East@War
ISBN: 9781910294123
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
By participating in 1956 Suez Crisis Israel exploited an opportunity to join forces with France and the United Kingdom in an attack against Egypt in order to accomplish diplomatic, military and political objectives: to open the Red Sea international shipping lane to ships sailing from and to Eilat; to strengthen its alliance with France; to end - or at least to scale down - Egyptian hosted Palestinian terror attacks against Israel; to launch a preventive war in order to crush Egyptian military power before its completion of the transition to Soviet weapons could tempt Egypt to attack Israel and in order to accomplish a profound victory to deter Egypt from pursuing a another round of war policy. Operation KADESH was the Israeli part in the Anglo-French attack and this title chronicles Israeli Air Force operations along the timeline of Operation KADESH - from day 1 on 29 October 1956 until day 11 on 8 November 1956 - in thus far unmatched depth and detail; all known Israel Air Force missions and sorties are listed and described and all air combats between Israeli Mysteres and Egyptian MiGs and Vampires are presented and analyzed. The large variety of aircraft flown - Dassault Mysteres, Dassault Ouragans and Gloster Meteors; B-17 Flying Fortresses, P-51 Mustangs and De Havilland Mosquitoes; T-6 Texans (Harvards) and T-17 Kaydets (Stearmans); Nord 2501 Noratlases, C-47 Skytrains (Dakotas), Pipers and Consuls and even a pair of Sikorsky S-55 helicopters - are all covered in this title, which presents Israeli Air Force operations during the Suez War in a depth and detail unseen in previous publications. The text is supported by numerous photographs and color profiles. Middle East@War - following on from our highly successful Africa@War series, Middle East@War replicates the same format - concise, incisive text, rare images and high quality color artwork providing fresh accounts of both well-known and more esoteric aspects of conflict in this part of the world since 1945.
Publisher: Middle East@War
ISBN: 9781910294123
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
By participating in 1956 Suez Crisis Israel exploited an opportunity to join forces with France and the United Kingdom in an attack against Egypt in order to accomplish diplomatic, military and political objectives: to open the Red Sea international shipping lane to ships sailing from and to Eilat; to strengthen its alliance with France; to end - or at least to scale down - Egyptian hosted Palestinian terror attacks against Israel; to launch a preventive war in order to crush Egyptian military power before its completion of the transition to Soviet weapons could tempt Egypt to attack Israel and in order to accomplish a profound victory to deter Egypt from pursuing a another round of war policy. Operation KADESH was the Israeli part in the Anglo-French attack and this title chronicles Israeli Air Force operations along the timeline of Operation KADESH - from day 1 on 29 October 1956 until day 11 on 8 November 1956 - in thus far unmatched depth and detail; all known Israel Air Force missions and sorties are listed and described and all air combats between Israeli Mysteres and Egyptian MiGs and Vampires are presented and analyzed. The large variety of aircraft flown - Dassault Mysteres, Dassault Ouragans and Gloster Meteors; B-17 Flying Fortresses, P-51 Mustangs and De Havilland Mosquitoes; T-6 Texans (Harvards) and T-17 Kaydets (Stearmans); Nord 2501 Noratlases, C-47 Skytrains (Dakotas), Pipers and Consuls and even a pair of Sikorsky S-55 helicopters - are all covered in this title, which presents Israeli Air Force operations during the Suez War in a depth and detail unseen in previous publications. The text is supported by numerous photographs and color profiles. Middle East@War - following on from our highly successful Africa@War series, Middle East@War replicates the same format - concise, incisive text, rare images and high quality color artwork providing fresh accounts of both well-known and more esoteric aspects of conflict in this part of the world since 1945.
The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War
Author: Yaacov Ro'i
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 9780804758802
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 400
Book Description
Why did the Soviet Union spark war in 1967 between Israel and the Arab states by falsely informing Syria and Egypt that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border? Based on newly available archival sources, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War answers this controversial question more fully than ever before. Directly opposing the thesis of the recently published Foxbats over Dimona by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, the contributors to this volume argue that Moscow had absolutely no intention of starting a war. The Soviet Union's reason for involvement in the region had more to do with enhancing its own status as a Cold War power than any desire for particular outcomes for Syria and Egypt. In addition to assessing Soviet involvement in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War, this book covers the USSR's relations with Syria and Egypt, Soviet aims, U.S. and Israeli perceptions of Soviet involvement, Soviet intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition (1969-70), and the impact of the conflicts on Soviet-Jewish attitudes. This book as a whole demonstrates how the Soviet Union's actions gave little consideration to the long- or mid-term consequences of their policy, and how firing the first shot compelled them to react to events.
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 9780804758802
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 400
Book Description
Why did the Soviet Union spark war in 1967 between Israel and the Arab states by falsely informing Syria and Egypt that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border? Based on newly available archival sources, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War answers this controversial question more fully than ever before. Directly opposing the thesis of the recently published Foxbats over Dimona by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, the contributors to this volume argue that Moscow had absolutely no intention of starting a war. The Soviet Union's reason for involvement in the region had more to do with enhancing its own status as a Cold War power than any desire for particular outcomes for Syria and Egypt. In addition to assessing Soviet involvement in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War, this book covers the USSR's relations with Syria and Egypt, Soviet aims, U.S. and Israeli perceptions of Soviet involvement, Soviet intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition (1969-70), and the impact of the conflicts on Soviet-Jewish attitudes. This book as a whole demonstrates how the Soviet Union's actions gave little consideration to the long- or mid-term consequences of their policy, and how firing the first shot compelled them to react to events.