An Ascending Multi-item Auction with Financially Constrained Bidders PDF Download
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Author: Gerardus Laan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
Author: Gerardus Laan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
Author: Dolf Talman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 10
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Book Description
An auctioneer wishes to sell several heterogeneous indivisible items to a group of potential bidders. Each bidder has valuations over the items but faces a budget constraint and may therefore not be able to pay up to his valuations. In such markets, a competitive equilibrium typically fails to exist. We develop a dynamic auction and prove that the auction always finds a core allocation in finitely many rounds. The core allocation consists of an assignment of the items and its associated supporting price vector.
Author: Jean-Pierre Benoit
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders, but need not be identical and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first; (2) the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction used recently by the FCC if the discrepancy in the values is large, or if there are significant complementarities; (3) a hybrid simultaneous-sequential form is revenue superior to the sequential auction; and (4) budget constraints arise endogenously.
Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Author: Zaifu Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Yanwu Yang
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0124115047
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 213
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Book Description
The Intelligent Systems Series publishes reference works and handbooks in three core sub-topic areas: Intelligent Automation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, and Intelligent Computing. They include theoretical studies, design methods, and real-world implementations and applications. The series' readership is broad, but focuses on engineering, electronics, and computer science. Budget constraints and optimization in sponsored search auctions takes into account consideration of the entire life cycle of campaigns for researchers and developers working on search systems and ROI maximization. The highly experienced authors compiled their knowledge and experience to provide insight, algorithms and development techniques for successful optimized/constrained systems. The book presents a cutting-edge budget optimization approach that embraces three-level budget decisions in the life cycle of search auctions: allocation across markets at the system level, distribution over temporal slots at the campaign level, and real-time adjustment at the keyword level. Delivers a systematic overview and technique for understanding budget constraints and ROI optimization in sponsored search auction systems, including algorithms and developer guides for a range of scenarios Explores effects of constraints on mechanisms, bidding and keyword strategies, and the strategies for budget optimization that developers can employ An informative reference source for both software and systems developers working in the search auctions, marketing and sales strategy optimization, services development for online marketing and advertisement, e-commerce, social and economic networking
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Hanming Fang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 21
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Book Description
Author: Pak-Sing Choi
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030695751
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
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Book Description
This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
Author: Stefano Leonardi
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642108407
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 654
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Book Description
This volume contains the papers presented at WINE 2009:the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics held December 14–18, 2009, in Rome,attheDepartmentofComputerandSystemSciences,SapienzaUniversity of Rome. Over the past decade there has been growing interaction between researchers in theoretical computer science, networking and security, economics, mathem- ics, sociology, and management sciences devoted to the analysis of problems arising in the Internet and the worldwide web. The Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE) is an interdisciplinary forum for the exchange of ideas and results arising in these varied ?elds. There were 142 submissions to the workshop including regular and short - pers.Allsubmissionswererigorouslypeer reviewedandevaluatedonthebasisof the quality of their contribution, originality,soundness, and signi?cance. Almost all submissions were reviewed by at least three Program Committee members. The committee decided to accept 34 regular papers and 29 short papers. The Best Student Paper award sponsored by Google Inc. was given to Saeed Alaei and AzarakhshMalekianfor the paper “An Analysisof Troubled Assets Reverse Auction.” The program also included three invited talks by S. Muthukrishnan (Google Inc.and RutgersUniversity),H. PeytonYoung (OxfordandJohns Hopkins U- versity)andEvaTardos(CornellUnversity).Threetutorialswerealsoo?eredon the days before the workshop, from Andrei Broder (Yahoo! Research) on C- putational Advertising, Nikhil Devanur and Kamal Jain (Microsoft Research) on Computational Issues in Market Equilibria, and Tim Roughgarden(Stanford University) on Bayesian and Worst-Case Revenue Maximization.
