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Author: Willard C. Matthias
Publisher: Penn State Press
ISBN: 0271039825
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This survey of more than fifty years of national security policy juxtaposes declassified U. S. national intelligence estimates with recently released Soviet documents disclosing the views of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies on the same events. Matthias shows that U. S. intelligence estimates were usually correct but that our political and military leaders generally ignored them&—with sometimes disastrous results. The book begins with a look back at the role of U. S. intelligence during World War II, from Pearl Harbor through the plot against Hitler and the D-day invasion to the &"unconditional surrender&" of Japan, and reveals how better use of the intelligence available could have saved many lives and shortened the war. The following chapters dealing with the Cold War disclose what information and advice U. S. intelligence analysts passed on to policy makers, and also what sometimes bitter policy debates occurred within the Communist camp, concerning Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, the turmoil in Eastern Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars in the Middle East, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In many ways, this is a story of missed opportunities the U. S. government had to conduct a more responsible foreign policy that could have avoided large losses of life and massive expenditures on arms buildups. While not exonerating the CIA for its own mistakes, Matthias casts new light on the contributions that objective intelligence analysis did make during the Cold War and speculates on what might have happened if that analysis and advice had been heeded.
Author: Willard C. Matthias
Publisher: Penn State Press
ISBN: 0271039825
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 378
Get Book
Book Description
This survey of more than fifty years of national security policy juxtaposes declassified U. S. national intelligence estimates with recently released Soviet documents disclosing the views of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies on the same events. Matthias shows that U. S. intelligence estimates were usually correct but that our political and military leaders generally ignored them&—with sometimes disastrous results. The book begins with a look back at the role of U. S. intelligence during World War II, from Pearl Harbor through the plot against Hitler and the D-day invasion to the &"unconditional surrender&" of Japan, and reveals how better use of the intelligence available could have saved many lives and shortened the war. The following chapters dealing with the Cold War disclose what information and advice U. S. intelligence analysts passed on to policy makers, and also what sometimes bitter policy debates occurred within the Communist camp, concerning Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, the turmoil in Eastern Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars in the Middle East, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In many ways, this is a story of missed opportunities the U. S. government had to conduct a more responsible foreign policy that could have avoided large losses of life and massive expenditures on arms buildups. While not exonerating the CIA for its own mistakes, Matthias casts new light on the contributions that objective intelligence analysis did make during the Cold War and speculates on what might have happened if that analysis and advice had been heeded.
Author: David C. Gompert
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833087770
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 329
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Book Description
The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon’s invasion of Russia to America’s invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case.
Author: Jeremi Suri
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190611480
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 433
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Book Description
Sustaining security : rethinking American national security strategy / Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino -- Dollar diminution and new macroeconomic constraints on American power / Jonathan Kirshner -- Does American military power attract foreign investment? / Daniel Drezner and Nancy Hite-Rubin -- Preserving national strength in a period of fiscal restraint / Cindy Williams -- State finance and national power : Great Britain, China, and the United States in historical perspective / Jeremi Suri -- Reforming American power : civilian national security institutions in the early cold war and beyond / William Inboden -- To starve an army : how great power armies respond to austerity / John W. Hall -- Climate change and US national security : sustaining security amidst unsustainability / Joshua William Busby -- At home abroad : public attitudes towards America's overseas commitments / Benjamin Valentino -- The right choice for NATO / William Wohlforth -- The United States and the Middle East : interests, risks, and costs / Daniel Byman and Sara Bjerg Moller -- Keep, toss, or fix? : assessing US alliances in East Asia / Jennifer Lind -- Terminating the interminable? / Sumit Ganguly -- Neutralization as a sustainable approach to Afghanistan / Audrey Kurth Cronin -- Conclusion / Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino
Author: Derek Leebaert
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
ISBN: 1439125716
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 354
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Book Description
As the nation commits itself to a renewed military effort in Afghanistan, Georgetown foreign relations professor Leebaert explains why we have so often stumbled in our foreign policy. He analyzes the follies and failures of "emergency men, " the political appointees, intellectuals, and policy entrepreneurs of the national security establishment, from the Best and Brightest architects of the Vietnam debacle to the neo-con masterminds of the Iraq War.
Author: Jim Powell
Publisher: Random House Digital, Inc.
ISBN:
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 362
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Book Description
The fateful blunder that radically altered the course of the twentieth century—and led to some of the most murderous dictators in history President Woodrow Wilson famously rallied the United States to enter World War I by saying the nation had a duty to make “the world safe for democracy.” But as historian Jim Powell demonstrates in this shocking reappraisal, Wilson actually made a horrible blunder by committing the United States to fight. Far from making the world safe for democracy, America’s entry into the war opened the door to murderous tyrants and Communist rulers. No other president has had a hand—however unintentional—in so much destruction. That’s why, Powell declares, “Wilson surely ranks as the worst president in American history.” Wilson’s Warreveals the horrifying consequences of our twenty-eighth president’s fateful decision to enter the fray in Europe. It led to millions of additional casualties in a war that had ground to a stalemate. And even more disturbing were the long-term consequences—consequences that played out well after Wilson’s death. Powell convincingly demonstrates that America’s armed forces enabled the Allies to win a decisive victory they would not otherwise have won—thus enabling them to impose the draconian surrender terms on Germany that paved the way for Adolf Hitler’s rise to power. Powell also shows how Wilson’s naiveté and poor strategy allowed the Bolsheviks to seize power in Russia. Given a boost by Woodrow Wilson, Lenin embarked on a reign of terror that continued under Joseph Stalin. The result of Wilson’s blunder was seventy years of Soviet Communism, during which time the Communist government murdered some sixty million people. Just as Powell’sFDR’s Follyexploded the myths about Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal,Wilson’s Wardestroys the conventional image of Woodrow Wilson as a great “progressive” who showed how the United States can do good by intervening in the affairs of other nations. Jim Powell delivers a stunning reminder that we should focus less on a president’s high-minded ideals and good intentions than on the consequences of his actions. A selection of the Conservative Book Club and American Compass
Author: James H. Lebovic
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190935332
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 240
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Book Description
The United States national-security establishment is vast, yet the United States has failed to meet its initial objectives in almost every one of its major, post-World War II conflicts. Of these troubled efforts, the US wars in Vietnam (1965-73), Iraq (2003-11), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and miscalculated decisions. Because overarching policy goals are distant and open to interpretation, policymakers ground their decisions in the immediate world of short-term objectives, salient tasks, policy constraints, and fixed time schedules. As a consequence, they exaggerate the benefits of their preferred policies, ignore the accompanying costs and requirements, and underappreciate the benefits of alternatives. In Planning to Fail, James H. Lebovic argues that a profound myopia helps explain US decision-making failures. In each of the wars explored in this book, he identifies four stages of intervention. First and foremost, policymakers chose unwisely to go to war. After the fighting began, they inadvisably sought to extend or expand the mission. Next, they pursued the mission, in abbreviated form, to suboptimal effect. Finally, they adapted the mission to exit from the conflict. Lebovic argues that US leaders were effectively planning to fail whatever their hopes and thoughts were at the time the intervention began. Decision-makers struggled less than they should have, even when conditions allowed for good choices. Then, when conditions on the ground left them with only bad choices, they struggled furiously and more than could ever matter. Policymakers allowed these wars to sap available capabilities, push US forces to the breaking point, and exhaust public support. They finally settled for terms of departure that they (or their predecessors) would have rejected at the start of these conflicts. Offering a far-ranging and detailed analysis, this book identifies an unmistakable pattern of failure and highlights lessons we can learn from it.
Author: Richard K. Betts
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 023113889X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 266
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Book Description
Combining study with experience, Richard K. Betts draws on three decades of work within the U.S. intelligence community to illuminate the paradoxes and problems that frustrate the intelligence process. Unlike America's efforts to improve its defenses against natural disasters, strengthening its strategic assessment capabilities means outwitting crafty enemies who operate beyond U.S. borders. It also requires looking within to the organizational and political dynamics of collecting information and determining its implications for policy. Betts outlines key strategies for better intelligence gathering and assessment. He describes how fixing one malfunction can create another; in what ways expertise can be both a vital tool and a source of error and misjudgment; the pitfalls of always striving for accuracy in intelligence, which in some cases can render it worthless; the danger, though unavoidable, of "politicizing" intelligence; and the issue of secrecy--when it is excessive, when it is insufficient, and how limiting privacy can in fact protect civil liberties. Grounding his arguments in extensive theory and policy analysis, Betts takes a comprehensive and realistic look at the convergence of knowledge and power in facing the intelligence challenges of the twenty-first century.
Author: Michael Doran
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
ISBN: 1451697759
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 304
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Book Description
In a bold reinterpretation of history, Ike's Gamble shows how the 1956 Suez Crisis taught President Eisenhower that Israel, not Egypt, would have to be America's ally in the region. In 1956 President Nasser of Egypt moved to take possession of the Suez Canal, bringing the Middle East to the brink of war. Distinguished Middle East expert Michael Doran shows how Nasser played the United States, invoking America's opposition to European colonialism to his own benefit. At the same time Nasser made weapons deals with the USSR and destabilized other Arab countries that the United States had been courting. In time, Eisenhower would realize that Nasser had duped him and that the Arab countries were too fractious to anchor America's interests in the Middle East. Affording deep insight into Eisenhower and his foreign policy, this fascinating and provocative history provides a rich new understanding of the tangled path by which the United States became the power broker in the Middle East. -- Back cover.
Author: Harlan Ullman
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1682472264
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 150
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Book Description
Why, since the end of World War II, has the United States either lost every war it started or failed in every military intervention it prosecuted? Harlan Ullman's new book answers this most disturbing question, a question Americans would never think of even asking because this record of failure has been largely hidden in plain sight or forgotten with the passage of time. The most straightforward answer is that presidents and administrations have consistently failed to use sound strategic thinking and lacked sufficient knowledge or understanding of the circumstances prior to deciding whether or not to employ force. Making this case is an in-depth analysis of the records of presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama and Donald Trump in using force or starting wars. His recommended solutions begin with a "brains-based" approach to sound strategic thinking to address one of the major causes of failure ----the inexperience of too many of the nation's commanders-in-chief. Ullman reinforces his argument through the use of autobiographical vignettes that provide a human dimension and insight into the reasons for failure, in some cases making public previously unknown history. The clarion call of Anatomy of Failure is that both a sound strategic framework and sufficient knowledge and understanding of the circumstance that may lead to using force are vital. Without them, failure is virtually guaranteed.
Author: Geoffrey Regan
Publisher: Madcap
ISBN: 9780233005096
Category : Battles
Languages : en
Pages : 272
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Book Description
"From ancient times to the Bay of Pigs and the Falklands War, military history has been marked as much by misjudgements and incompetence as by gallantry and glory. In this fascinating and entertaining collection, author Geoffrey Regan recounts some of the staggering stories of military blunder. His anecdotes encompass every aspect of warfare from the insanity of commanders to the provision of inadequate supplies."--Back cover.
