Allocation of Income Within the Household PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Allocation of Income Within the Household PDF full book. Access full book title Allocation of Income Within the Household by Edward P. Lazear. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Edward P. Lazear
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 9780226469669
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 242
Get Book Here
Book Description
To everyone who knows her, Annalise Decker is a model wife and mother. No one knows that she was once Deidre O'Reilly, a troubled young woman whose testimony put a dangerous criminal behind bars. Relocated through the Witness Security Program to the sleepy town of Deep Haven, Deidre got a new identity and a fresh start. When Agent Frank Harrison arrives with news that the man she testified against is out on bail and out for revenge, Annalise is forced to face the consequences of her secrets.
Author: Edward P. Lazear
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 9780226469669
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 242
Get Book Here
Book Description
To everyone who knows her, Annalise Decker is a model wife and mother. No one knows that she was once Deidre O'Reilly, a troubled young woman whose testimony put a dangerous criminal behind bars. Relocated through the Witness Security Program to the sleepy town of Deep Haven, Deidre got a new identity and a fresh start. When Agent Frank Harrison arrives with news that the man she testified against is out on bail and out for revenge, Annalise is forced to face the consequences of her secrets.
Author: Michael Geerken
Publisher: SAGE Publications, Incorporated
ISBN: 9780803919419
Category : Family & Relationships
Languages : en
Pages : 165
Get Book Here
Book Description
Drawing on economic theory, the authors postulate that a family allocates work -- any work, be it housework, doing the shopping, or earning money outside the home -- on the basis of maximum utility to the family unit. Its ideas on utility are derived from such factors as its income, education, ideology. A carefully crafted research study confirms these ideas on the allocation of work and housework. The impact on the quality of family relationships of such allocations is also considered. 'This book is well written and clearly organized...It is sensitive to the limitations of its methodology and full of suggestive theoretical insights.' -- Choice, October 1983 @3`...an exemplary little volume which should be
Author:
Publisher: Rozenberg Publishers
ISBN: 9036101336
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 190
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: David B. Rottman
Publisher: Combat Poverty Agency
ISBN: 1871643376
Category : Households
Languages : en
Pages : 87
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Duncan Thomas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Households
Languages : en
Pages : 35
Get Book Here
Book Description
The vast majority of the literature in economics on household decisions assumes that the household maximizes a unique utility function given a set of constraints dictated by the household budget and available technology. An implication of this model is that it should matter not a whit whether income is under the control of men or women within the household. This paper tests that implication. Using household budget data from the 1980 Taiwanese Survey of the Distribution of Personal Income, we find that household expenditure choices are sensitive to the share of income attributed to women. As her share rises, so the share spent on education rises and the share allocated to staples, alcohol and tobacco falls. Apparently household members do not speak with one voice when making resource allocation decisions. Rejection of this "unitary" model of the household tells us precious little about mechanisms that underlie resource allocations. The authors turn, therefore, to a more general "individualistic" model of the household in which members allocate resources in such a way that no allocation could result in one member being better off without some other member being worse off: that is, resource allocations are Parento efficient. It is shown that under very general conditions, this assumption imposes testable restrictions on data and that the ratio of male to female income effects are equal across all commodities. This is a powerful result as it is not, at first blush, intuitively obvious that it should be true. The implication of Parento efficiency is not rejected by these data and there is not a single case in which the ratio of income effects differ significantly across any pairs. There is some suggestion that the "unitary" model may not be rejected for all sub-groups in the data and so the final section of the paper attempts to identify some of the characteristics of these households. The "unitary" model performs quite well among urban, young and better educated households indicating, perhaps, that there tends to be greater heterogeneity in preferences among more traditional families in Taiwan.
Author: James Cécora
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Division of labor
Languages : en
Pages : 356
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Carolina Castilla
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 84
Get Book Here
Book Description
Abstract: This dissertation examines the interaction between the intra-household resource management structure and asymmetric information over the quantity of resources available to the household as causes of income-hiding between spouses. I illustrate the incentives to hide income through a set of theoretical models, and I identify income-hiding empirically drawing survey data from Ghana. Income-hiding can have negative implications in the effectiveness of poverty alleviation policies, as spouses wishing to successfully hide income must allocate resources away from household public goods, such as child education and health, which are easily monitored. To illustrate the incentives to hide income, I developed a set of related, but distinct, theoretical models that differ in the contract over the allocation of resources between spouses. In Chapter 2, I show that the incentives to hide when income is unobserved by one spouse differ for three different household resource management structures. I illustrate this with a simple two-stage game. In the first stage, one spouse receives a monetary transfer that is unobserved by her spouse, and she must decide whether to reveal or to hide it. In the second stage, spouses bargain over the allocation of resources between a household good and private expenditure. The three models differ in the resource allocation mechanism that takes place in second stage of the game: housekeeping allowance, independent management, and joint management. Results indicate that hiding is more likely to occur in households with a housekeeping allowance contract, compared to independent or joint management. In joint management households, however, a spouse may hide in equilibrium if the change in bargaining power associated with revealing the transfer is not significant enough to compensate for the loss in discretionary expenditure. To identify income-hiding empirically, it is necessary to test whether unobservable resources attributable to one spouse are more likely to be allocated towards goods that are not easily monitored, relative to observable resources. In Chapter 3 I draw data from Southern Ghana. The data contains information on cross-reporting of each spouse's farm income. I exploit the variation in the degree of asymmetric information between spouses, measured as the difference between the husband's own reporting of farm sales and the wife's reporting of his farm sales to test whether the allocation of resources in Ghanaian households is consistent with hiding. For identification, the wife's clan and the husband's bride-wealth payments upon marriage are used as instruments for asymmetric information. My findings indicate that men hide farm sales income in the form of gifts to family members other than children and their spouse, which are not closely monitored. In doing so, men give up bargaining power as there is a reduction in observable expenditures such as public transportation. The wife's response is also consistent with hiding. As information asymmetries increase, she reduces her expenditure in non-essential items, such as prepared foods and oil, but increases personal spending as a result of the gain in bargaining power.
Author: Martin Browning
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107728924
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 511
Get Book Here
Book Description
The family is a complex decision unit in which partners with potentially different objectives make consumption, work and fertility decisions. Couples marry and divorce partly based on their ability to coordinate these activities, which in turn depends on how well they are matched. This book provides a comprehensive, modern and self-contained account of the research in the growing area of family economics. The first half of the book develops several alternative models of family decision making. Particular attention is paid to the collective model and its testable implications. The second half discusses household formation and dissolution and who marries whom. Matching models with and without frictions are analyzed and the important role of within-family transfers is explained. The implications for marriage, divorce and fertility are discussed. The book is intended for graduate students in economics and for researchers in other fields interested in the economic approach to the family.
Author: Susan McRae
Publisher: Oxford [Oxfordshire] ; New York : Clarendon Press
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Get Book Here
Book Description
What happens to a marriage when the wife is a professional and the husband is a manual worker? Cross-Class Families takes a keen look at families that break with the convention of male occupational superiority. Key issues addressed by the families studied include paid work and its relation to family life; the division of household labor, including childcare; responsibility for long-term financial security; and the impact of differences in status, class position, political preference, choice of friends, and attitudes toward trade unions.
Author: Juanita Morris Kreps
Publisher: Durham, N.C. : Duke University Press
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 184
Get Book Here
Book Description
Economic analysis of patterns of employment, leisure and income, and their allocation through the lifespan according to age, with emphasis on retirement - includes a comparison of labour force activity, work life, hours of work and wages by age group in developed countries, and examines consumer expenditure and savings needs for retirement by occupational structure, and the incomes policy implications of financing old age benefits in the USA. References and statistical tables.
