Airpower Myths and Facts: World War II, Vietnam - Report on the Effectiveness of Bombing, Usage of the Atomic Bomb on Japan at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Strategic Bombing PDF Download
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Author: U. S. Military
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781973188896
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 82
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Book Description
This unique book examines a number of common myths and misconceptions about the effectiveness of airpower. Contents include: Chapter 1 - Between the world wars, even though the US Army Air Corps received more than its fair share of funds from the Army, it continued to complain, agitate, and ask for more. * Chapter 2 - Entering World War II, the Air Corps' unbalanced doctrine and force structure leaned too heavily towards strategic bombing. Thus, air support of ground forces was inadequate and largely ignored by airmen. * Chapter 3 - The Air Corps entered World War II with a "Douhetian" concept of air war that emphasized area bombing and the waging of war on women and children * Chapter 4 - Airmen thought they could win the war alone * Chapter 5 - The fact that German production, especially of aircraft, continued to increase throughout 1944 proves that the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) was ineffective and that the resources devoted to it would have been better spent elsewhere * Chapter 6 - Bombing was ineffective because it actually stiffened rather than lowered enemy morale. * Chapter 7 - The atomic bombs were unnecessary because Japan was about to surrender; even if it had not given up, an invasion or continued blockade would have been more humane * Chapter 8 - Overall, strategic bombing was a wasted effort that produced only minor effects * Chapter 9 - Airpower was a failure in Vietnam, losing the war and letting the Army down. Why even have an Air Force if it can't beat a fourth-rate power like North Vietnam? * Chapter 10 - Strategic bombing failed in Vietnam because Rolling Thunder did not break the will of Ho Chi Minh and his cohorts to continue the war in the south * Chapter 11 - Airpower was an indiscriminate weapon that killed excessive numbers of Vietnamese civilians * Chapter 12 - Too focused on strategic attack during the Persian Gulf War, the Air Force provided inadequate support to ground forces. * Chapter 13 - Air attack is nothing more than "recreational bombing"; pilots fly so high they can't possibly hit their targets accurately * Chapter 14 - Despite all the talk by airmen, the employment of airpower remains an indiscriminate use of military force that deliberately targets civilians
Author: U. S. Military
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781973188896
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 82
Get Book Here
Book Description
This unique book examines a number of common myths and misconceptions about the effectiveness of airpower. Contents include: Chapter 1 - Between the world wars, even though the US Army Air Corps received more than its fair share of funds from the Army, it continued to complain, agitate, and ask for more. * Chapter 2 - Entering World War II, the Air Corps' unbalanced doctrine and force structure leaned too heavily towards strategic bombing. Thus, air support of ground forces was inadequate and largely ignored by airmen. * Chapter 3 - The Air Corps entered World War II with a "Douhetian" concept of air war that emphasized area bombing and the waging of war on women and children * Chapter 4 - Airmen thought they could win the war alone * Chapter 5 - The fact that German production, especially of aircraft, continued to increase throughout 1944 proves that the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) was ineffective and that the resources devoted to it would have been better spent elsewhere * Chapter 6 - Bombing was ineffective because it actually stiffened rather than lowered enemy morale. * Chapter 7 - The atomic bombs were unnecessary because Japan was about to surrender; even if it had not given up, an invasion or continued blockade would have been more humane * Chapter 8 - Overall, strategic bombing was a wasted effort that produced only minor effects * Chapter 9 - Airpower was a failure in Vietnam, losing the war and letting the Army down. Why even have an Air Force if it can't beat a fourth-rate power like North Vietnam? * Chapter 10 - Strategic bombing failed in Vietnam because Rolling Thunder did not break the will of Ho Chi Minh and his cohorts to continue the war in the south * Chapter 11 - Airpower was an indiscriminate weapon that killed excessive numbers of Vietnamese civilians * Chapter 12 - Too focused on strategic attack during the Persian Gulf War, the Air Force provided inadequate support to ground forces. * Chapter 13 - Air attack is nothing more than "recreational bombing"; pilots fly so high they can't possibly hit their targets accurately * Chapter 14 - Despite all the talk by airmen, the employment of airpower remains an indiscriminate use of military force that deliberately targets civilians
Author: Department of Defense
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781549766718
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 113
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Book Description
This is the official U.S. government report on the atomic bombings of Japan which ended World War II and ushered in the atomic age. Contents include: I. Introduction * II. The Effects of the Atomic Bombings * A. The attacks and damage * 1. The attacks * 2. Hiroshima * 3. Nagasaki * B. General effects * 1. Casualties * Flash burns * Other injuries * Radiation disease * 2. Morale * 3. The Japanese decision to surrender * III. How the Atomic Bomb Works * A. The nature of the explosion * B. Heat * C. Radiation * D. Blast * E. The atomic bomb compared with other weapons * IV. Signposts * A. The danger * B. What we can do about it * 1. Shelters * 2. Decentralization * 3. Civilian defense * 4. Active defense * 5. Conclusion The introduction states: The available facts about the power of the atomic bomb as a military weapon lie in the story of what it did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Many of these facts have been published, in official and unofficial form, but mingled with distortions or errors. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, therefore, in partial fulfillment of the mission for which it was established, has put together in these pages a fairly full account of just what the atomic bombs did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Together with an explanation of how the bomb achieved these effects, this report states the extent and nature of the damage, the casualties, and the political repercussions from the two attacks. The basis is the observation, measurement, and analysis of the Survey's investigators. The conjecture that is necessary for understanding of complex phenomena and for applying the findings to the problems of defense of the United States is clearly labeled. When the atomic bombs fell, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey was completing a study of the effects of strategic bombing on Germany's ability and will to resist. A similar study of the effects of strategic bombing on Japan was being planned. The news of the dropping of the atomic bomb gave a new urgency to this project, for a Study of the air war against Japan clearly involved new weapons and new possibilities of concentration of attack that might qualify or even change the conclusions and recommendations of the Survey as to the effectiveness of air power. The directors of the Survey, therefore, decided to examine exhaustively the effects of the atomic bombs, in order that the full impact on Japan and the implications of their results could be confidently analyzed. A single atomic bomb, the first weapon of its type ever used against a target, exploded over the city of Hiroshima at 0815 on the morning of 6 August 1945. Most of the industrial workers had already reported to work, but many workers were en route and nearly all the school children and some industrial employees were at work in the open on the program of building removal to provide firebreaks and disperse valuables to the country. The attack came 45 minutes after the "all clear" had been sounded from a previous alert. Because of the lack of warning and the populace's indifference to small groups of planes, the explosion came as an almost complete surprise, and the people had not taken shelter. Many were caught in the open, and most of the rest in flimsily constructed homes or commercial establishments.
Author: United States Strategic Bombing Survey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Atomic bomb
Languages : en
Pages : 62
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Book Description
Author: Herbert Feis
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400868262
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 222
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Book Description
This book discusses the decision to use the atomic bomb. Libraries and scholars will find it a necessary adjunct to their other studies by Pulitzer-Prize author Herbert Feis on World War II. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Author: Stewart Halsey Ross
Publisher: Turtleback
ISBN: 9780613922180
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This work sets suppositions against facts surrounding the United States' use of strategic bombing in World War II. Chapters cover the events leading up to the war; the start of the war; the seers and the planners; the airplanes, bombs, bombsights, and air-crews; the planes Germany used to defend itself against American planes; the five cities (Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki) that saw the heaviest bombing; and the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey of the damage done. The book probes the government's myth-building statements that supported America's view of itself as a uniquely humanitarian nation, and analyzes the role played by interservice rivalry -- "battleship admirals" against "bomber generals."
Author: Department of Defense
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781549770722
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 92
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Book Description
This volume contains the Summary Reports (Europe and the Pacific) of the strategic bombing surveys conducted as World War II was coming to a close. Although originally published over four decades ago, and now reprinted by the Air University, they contain valuable lessons for modern airmen and are well worth another look. The "Blue Ribbon" Strategic Bombing Survey Team was tasked to enter those areas struck by our strategic bombers as soon as possible after the bombing to assess the effectiveness of the bombing effort and its contribution to the Allied victory. The result of each survey was a detailed, multivolume report that examines every aspect of the bombing campaigns. The summary report states: The new relation of air power to strategy presents one of the distinguishing contrasts between this war and the last. Air power in the last war was in its infancy. The new role of three-dimensional warfare was even then foreseen by a few farsighted men, but planes were insufficient in quality and quantity to permit much more than occasional brilliant assistance to the ground forces. Air power in the European phase of this war reached a stage of full adolescence, a stage marked by rapid development in planes, armament, equipment, tactics and concepts of strategic employment, and by an extraordinary increase in the effort allocated to it by all the major contestants. England devoted 40 to 50 percent of her war production to her air forces, Germany 40 percent, and the United States 35 percent. Nevertheless, at the end of hostilities in Europe, weapons, tactics and strategy were still in a state of rapid development. Air power had not yet reached maturity and all conclusions drawn from experience in the European theatre must be considered subject to change. No one should assume that because certain things were effective or not effective, the same would be true under other circumstances and other conditions. In the European war, Allied air power was called upon to play many roles-partner with the Navy over the sea lanes; partner with the Army in ground battle; partner with both on the invasion beaches; reconnaissance photographer for all; mover of troops and critical supplies; and attacker of the enemy's vital strength far behind the battle line. In the attack by Allied air power, almost 2,700,000 tons of bombs were dropped, more than 1,440,000 bomber sorties and 2,680,000 fighter sorties were flown. The number of combat planes reached a peak of some 28,000 at the maximum 1,300,000 men were in combat commands. The number of men lost in air action was 79,265 Americans and 79,281 British. More than 18,000 American and 22,000 British planes were lost or damaged beyond repair. As a bonus, this reproduction includes the complete 2012 Army Leadership manual (FM 6-22), which describes the Army's view of leadership, outlines the levels of leadership (direct, organizational, and strategic), and describes the attributes and core leader competencies across all levels.
Author: Robert James Maddox
Publisher: University of Missouri Press
ISBN: 0826265871
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 225
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Book Description
When President Harry Truman authorized the use of atomic weapons against Japan, he did so to end a bloody war that would have been bloodier still had the planned invasion of Japan proved necessary. Revisionists claim that Truman's real interest was a power play with the Soviet Union and that the Japanese would have surrendered even earlier had the retention of their imperial system been assured. Truman wanted the war to continue, they insist, in order to show off America's powerful new weapon. This anthology exposes revisionist fallacies about Truman's motives, the cost of an invasion, and the question of Japan's surrender. Essays by prominent military and diplomatic historians reveal the hollowness of revisionist claims, exposing the degree to which these agenda-driven scholars have manipulated the historical record to support their contentions. They show that, although some Japanese businessmen and minor officials indicated a willingness to negotiate peace, no one in a governmental decision-making capacity even suggested surrender. And although casualty estimates for an invasion vary considerably, the more authoritative approximations point to the very bloodbath that Truman sought to avoid. Volume editor Robert Maddox first examines the writings of revisionist Gar Alperovitz to expose the unscholarly methods Alperovitz employed to support his claims, then distinguished Japanese historian Sadao Asada reveals how difficult it was for his country's peace faction to prevail even after the bombs had been dropped. Other contributors point to continuing Japanese military buildups, analyze the revisionists' low casualty estimates for an invasion, reveal manipulations of the Strategic Bombing Survey of 1946, and show how even the exhibit commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum hewed to the revisionist line. And a close reading of Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's acclaimed Racing the Enemy exposes many grave discrepancies between that recent revisionist text and its sources. The use of atomic bombs against Japan remains one of the most controversial issues in American history. Gathered in a single volume for the first time, these insightful readings take a major step toward settling that controversy by showing how insubstantial Hiroshima revisionism really is--and that sometimes history cannot proceed without decisive action, however regrettable.
Author: United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Morale Division
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bombing, Aerial
Languages : en
Pages : 282
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Book Description
Examines the willingness and capacity of the Japanese to work and sacrifice to win the war, and how those attitudes changed as a result of the American bombing campaigns, including the atomic bombs, directed at the nation as a whole.
Author: United States Strategic Bombing Survey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Industries
Languages : en
Pages : 92
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Book Description
Author: Gar Alperovitz
Publisher: Alfred A. Knopf
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 872
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Book Description
The culmination of Alperovitz's longtime study of how the atomic bomb was used in war and diplomacy in the 1940s and '50s, this controversial book forcefully demonstrates that the United States did not need to use the atomic bomb against Japan. A major source for an ABC-TV documentary, hosted by Peter Jennings, scheduled to air in July 1995.
