Aggressive Biddings and the Renegotiation of Concession Contracts PDF Download
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Author: Eduardo H. Saavedra
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper confirms a positive relationship between the aggressiveness of bids and the probability of renegotiating concession contracts. We use a database of 113 concessions awarded in Peru, finding that a 1% increase in bidding aggressiveness increases the probability of contract renegotiation by 2.4% to 3%. This impact is higher for the transportation sector. Our results are robust to several econometric specifications. These results confirm the hypothesis that bidders are willing to submit aggressive bids with a view to renegotiating contract terms once the government and concessionaire are tied and competition is no longer possible.
Author: Eduardo H. Saavedra
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper confirms a positive relationship between the aggressiveness of bids and the probability of renegotiating concession contracts. We use a database of 113 concessions awarded in Peru, finding that a 1% increase in bidding aggressiveness increases the probability of contract renegotiation by 2.4% to 3%. This impact is higher for the transportation sector. Our results are robust to several econometric specifications. These results confirm the hypothesis that bidders are willing to submit aggressive bids with a view to renegotiating contract terms once the government and concessionaire are tied and competition is no longer possible.
Author: J. Luis Guasch
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 9780821357927
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 212
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Book Description
During the 1990s, infrastructure concessions were hailed as the solution to Latin America's endemic infrastructure deficit, by combining private sector efficiency with rent dissipation brought about by competition. This publication examines the design and implementation of over 1,000 examples of concession contracts, in order to identify the problems that have occurred in the process. It goes on to highlight lessons to be learned for the future, in order to realise the potential benefits of infrastructure reform and to contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction.
Author: Antonio Estache
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Concessions
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
If having firm-driven renegotiations of contracts for infrastructure services is a major concern, efficiency should not be the only consideration in selecting an operator, indeed, consumers may want to award the concession to a less efficient firm if that would reduce the probability of renegotiation.
Author: Michael Klein
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
En la última década ha sido práctica común la privatización de empresas gestoras de infraestructura, en sectores como el del transporte, las telecomunicaciones, la energía y el agua. Muy a menudo se adjudican a empresas privadas franquicias monopolistas, mediante concesiones a largo plazo. En este trabajo se analizan aquellas cuestiones relacionadas con el diseño de estos contratos de concesión y su adjudicación a empresas privadas.
Author: Laure Athias
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In this paper, we empirically assess the effects of the winner's curse in auctions for toll road concession contracts. Such auctions are common-value auctions for incomplete contracts prone to pervasive renegotiations. We address three questions in turn. First, we investigate the overall effects of the winner's curse on bidding behaviour in such auctions. Second, we examine the effects of the winner's curse on contract auctions with differing levels of common-value components. Third, we investigate how the winner's curse affects bidding behaviour when we account for the possibility for bidders to renegotiate. Using a unique dataset of 49 worldwide concessions, we show that bidders bid less aggressively in toll road concession auctions when they expect more competition. In addition, we observe that this effect is larger for projects where the common uncertainty is greater, but weaker in weaker institutional frameworks, in which renegotiations are easier, implying opportunistic behaviour.
Author: Michael Klein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Infrastructure concession contracts set out the performance obligations and rights of concessionaires and the incentives and risks under which they operate, including pricing arrangements. The clarity with which these terms can be defined determines whether there is likely to be renegotiations after contract award, which may undermine the significance of the initial auction. The design of incentives and risk allocation will affect first the intensity of competition and then the sustainability of the original contract. This Note examines these issues.
Author: Michael U. Klein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
When privatization transforms a public infrastructure monopoly into a private one by means of a long-term concession agreement, how should concession contracts be designed and awarded?In the past decade it has become popular to privatize infrastructure ventures in such sectors as energy, telecommunications, transport, and water. For good reasons or bad, private firms are often given monopoly franchises through long-term concession agreements (for example, build-operate-transfer schemes).Klein surveys issues associated with the design of such concession contracts and their award to private parties. The discussion focuses on:- Contract design (what is to be awarded).- Whether to use competitive bidding or negotiation to make the award.- How to structure competitive bidding.- Who conducts the auction and who monitors the concessionaires` performance.To encourage efficient performance and to minimize post-award renegotiation, it is crucial to consistently and comprehensively define performance specifications and the parameters of incentives and risk-sharing. As a rule the concession award should be made competitively, unless there are good reasons to do otherwise, such as excessive transactions costs (for the size of the contract) or special requirements for speed or innovation.Typically, competitive concession awards are made by first-price sealed bids. In a number of cases, however, there are strong arguments for open auctions. Concessions may also be re-awarded by way of auction, although somewhat arbitrary bid preferences may have to be set.Auctioneers for complex concession contracts should operate at arm's length from all interested parties, including politicians. It may make sense to let independent agencies that regulate the concession scheme run the auction.This paper - a product of the Private Participation in Infrastructure Division, Private Sector Development Department - s part of a larger effort in the department to analyze issues on private participation in infrastructure. The author may be contacted at
[email protected].
Author: Barry E. Hawk
Publisher: Juris Publishing, Inc.
ISBN: 1578232120
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 696
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Book Description
Every October the Fordham Corporate Law Institute brings together leading figures from governmental organizations, leading international law firms and corporations and academia to examine and analyze the most important issues in international antitrust and trade policy of the United States, the EU and the world. This work is the most definitive and comprehensive annual analysis of international antitrust law and policy available anywhere. Each annual edition sets out to explore and analyze the areas of antitrust/competition law that have had the most impact in that year. Recent "hot topics" include antitrust enforcement in Asia, Latin America: competition enforcement in the areas of telecommunications, media and information technology. None of the chapters are merely descriptive, all raise questions of policy or discuss new developments and assess their significance and impact on antitrust and trade policy. All chapters, if necessary, are revised and updated before publication. As a result, the reader receives up-to-date practical tips and important analyses of difficult policy issues. The Annuals are an indispensable guide through the sea of international antitrust law. The Fordham Corporate Law Proceedings are acknowledged as simply the most definitive US/EC annual analyses of antitrust/competition law published.
Author: Aikaterini Florou
Publisher: BRILL
ISBN: 9004407472
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 261
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Book Description
In Contractual Renegotiations and International Investment Arbitration, Aikaterini Florou explores the complex phenomenon of the renegotiation of investor-state contracts. The author reconstructs the relationship between those contracts and the overarching investment treaties using an original interpretative methodology based on transaction cost economics and relational contract theory.
Author: Gustavo Piga
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351584790
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 268
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Book Description
Appropriate laws and regulations are essential tools to direct the action of procurers toward the public good and avoid corruption and misallocation of resources. Common laws and regulations across regions, nations and continents potentially allow for the further opening of markets and ventures to newcomers and new ideas to satisfy public demand. Law and Economics of Public Procurement Reforms collects the original contributions related to the new European Union Directives approved in 2014 by the EU Parliament. They are of both economists and lawyers, and have been presented in a manner that allows for exchanges of views and "real time" interaction. This book features, for each section, an introductory exchange between two experts of different disciplines, made up of a series of sequential interactions between an economist and a lawyer, which enriches the liveliness of the debate and improve the mutual understanding between the two professions. Four sections characterize this book: Supporting social considerations via public procurement; Green public procurement; Innovation through innovative partnerships; and Lots - The Economic and Legal Challenges of Centralized Procurement. These themes have current relevance of the new European Public Procurement Directives. Written by an impressive array of experts in their respected fields, this volume is of great importance to practitioners who work in the field of EU public procurement in the Member States of the EU, as well as academics and students who study public finance, public policy and regulation.
