Agency Theory, Firm Performance and Top Executive Compensation PDF Download
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Author: Joon Suk Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 284
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Book Description
Author: Joon Suk Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 284
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Book Description
Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
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Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Author: Luis R. Gomez-Mejia
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317473965
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 405
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Book Description
This up-to-date, research-oriented textbook focuses on the relationship between compensation systems and firm overall performance. In contrast to more traditional compensation texts, it provides a strategic perspective to compensation administration rather than a functional viewpoint. The text emphasizes the role of managerial pay, its importance, determinants, and impact on organizations. It analyzes recent topics in executive compensation, such as pay in high technology firms, managerial risk taking, rewards in family companies, and the link between compensation and social responsibility and ethical issues, among others. The authors provide a thorough and comprehensive review of the vast literatures relevant to compensation and revisit debates grounded in different theoretical perspectives. They provide insights from disciplines as diverse as management, economics, sociology, and psychology, and amplify previous discussions with the latest empirical findings on compensation, its dynamics, and its contribution to firm overall performance.
Author: Stefania Albanesi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Discrimination in employment
Languages : en
Pages : 41
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Book Description
We document three new facts about gender differences in executive compensation. First, female executives receive lower share of incentive pay in total compensation relative to males. This difference accounts for 93% of the gender gap in total pay. Second, the compensation of female executives displays lower pay-performance sensitivity. A $1 million dollar increase in firm value generates a $17,150 increase in firm specific wealth for male executives and a $1,670 increase for females. Third, female executives' compensation is more sensitive to bad firm performance and less sensitive to good firm performance. We find no link between firm performance and the gender of top executives. We discuss evidence on differences in preferences and the cost of managerial effort by gender and examine the resulting predictions for the structure of compensation. We consider two paradigms for the pay-setting process, the efficient contracting model and the "managerial power"' or skimming view. The efficient contracting model can explain the first two facts. Only the skimming view is consistent with the third fact. This suggests that the gender differentials in executive compensation may be inefficient.
Author: Alexander Pepper
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319999699
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 133
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Book Description
This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavioral science can help in the design of optimal incentive arrangements. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency.
Author: Bonnie R. Rabin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 304
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Book Description
Author: Bonnie R. Rabin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 240
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Book Description
Author: Taye Mengistae
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
This paper examines the extent to which agency theory may explain CEO compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China during the 1980s. We find that the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance decreases with the variance of performance. This is consistent with the prediction of a tradeoff between incentives and insurance in agency theory. On the other hand, the data lend little support to the relative performance evaluation hypothesis. We also find that the performance sensitivity of CEO pay increases with the marginal return to executive action, that is, pay sensitivity increases with managerial control rights, worker incentives, profit retention rates of firms, and the degree of product market competition faced by the firm. While the elasticity of pay to sales is slightly smaller than that found in the literature on conventional firms in the West generally, our estimate of the semi-elasticity of pay with respect to profitability is comparable to estimates for regulated industries in the United States.
Author: Luis R. Gomez-Mejia
Publisher: Thomson South-Western
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 444
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Book Description
Author: Jeongil Seo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 180
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Book Description
