Author: Hernandez, Manuel A.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Development projects are generally subject to a potential tradeoff between sustainability and poverty reduction. Grants are also commonly assigned without a standardized criterion. This paper proposes an innovative scoring tool that combines both a risk and poverty scorecard to prioritize lending and grant allocation. We implement and test the instrument through a competitive fund for demand-driven projects in Central America intended to better link smallholder farmers to markets and improve their welfare. The evaluation results show that the highest-ranked projects generally have a larger economic impact on their beneficiaries than lower-ranked projects. We observe a larger effect on income, access to credit,and access to local markets, and the relative differences are stronger over time. The proposed scorecard tool is intended to better ensure the accountability and sustainability of development funds and can be easily adapted to different contexts
A poverty-sensitive scorecard to prioritize lending and grant allocation
Author: Hernandez, Manuel A.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Development projects are generally subject to a potential tradeoff between sustainability and poverty reduction. Grants are also commonly assigned without a standardized criterion. This paper proposes an innovative scoring tool that combines both a risk and poverty scorecard to prioritize lending and grant allocation. We implement and test the instrument through a competitive fund for demand-driven projects in Central America intended to better link smallholder farmers to markets and improve their welfare. The evaluation results show that the highest-ranked projects generally have a larger economic impact on their beneficiaries than lower-ranked projects. We observe a larger effect on income, access to credit,and access to local markets, and the relative differences are stronger over time. The proposed scorecard tool is intended to better ensure the accountability and sustainability of development funds and can be easily adapted to different contexts
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Development projects are generally subject to a potential tradeoff between sustainability and poverty reduction. Grants are also commonly assigned without a standardized criterion. This paper proposes an innovative scoring tool that combines both a risk and poverty scorecard to prioritize lending and grant allocation. We implement and test the instrument through a competitive fund for demand-driven projects in Central America intended to better link smallholder farmers to markets and improve their welfare. The evaluation results show that the highest-ranked projects generally have a larger economic impact on their beneficiaries than lower-ranked projects. We observe a larger effect on income, access to credit,and access to local markets, and the relative differences are stronger over time. The proposed scorecard tool is intended to better ensure the accountability and sustainability of development funds and can be easily adapted to different contexts
Does female labor scarcity encourage innovation?
Author: Tan, Zhibo
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
Facing scarcity of a production factor, a firm can develop technologies to either substitute the scarce factor (price effect) or complement the more abundant factors (market size effect). Whether the market size effect or the price effect dominates largely depends on the elasticity of substitution among factors according to the theory of directed technical change. However, it is a great challenge to empirically test the theory because factor prices are often endogenously determined. In this paper, we use imbalanced sex ratios across Chinese provinces as a source of identification strategy to test how female labor scarcity affects corporate innovation based on the matched dataset of annual surveys of industrial firms in China and the national patent database. In regions with a large male population, female-intensive industries face more serious problems finding female workers than their male-intensive counterparts. We find that such female shortages have spurred firms in female-intensive industries to innovate more. The pattern is much more evident in industries with low substitution between female and male workers than in those with high substitution, consistent with the predictions of directed technical change theory.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
Facing scarcity of a production factor, a firm can develop technologies to either substitute the scarce factor (price effect) or complement the more abundant factors (market size effect). Whether the market size effect or the price effect dominates largely depends on the elasticity of substitution among factors according to the theory of directed technical change. However, it is a great challenge to empirically test the theory because factor prices are often endogenously determined. In this paper, we use imbalanced sex ratios across Chinese provinces as a source of identification strategy to test how female labor scarcity affects corporate innovation based on the matched dataset of annual surveys of industrial firms in China and the national patent database. In regions with a large male population, female-intensive industries face more serious problems finding female workers than their male-intensive counterparts. We find that such female shortages have spurred firms in female-intensive industries to innovate more. The pattern is much more evident in industries with low substitution between female and male workers than in those with high substitution, consistent with the predictions of directed technical change theory.
Roads to innovation
Author: Wang, Xu
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Although both infrastructure and innovation play an important role in fostering a country’s economic growth, discussion in the literature about how the two are connected is limited. This paper examines the impact of road density on firm innovation in China using a matched patent database at the firm level and road information at the city level. Regional variation in the difficulty of constructing roads is used as an instrumental variable to address the potential endogeneity problem of the road variable. The empirical results show that a 10 percent improvement in road density increases the average number of approved patents per firm by 0.71 percent. Road development spurs innovation by enlarging market size and facilitating knowledge spillover.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Although both infrastructure and innovation play an important role in fostering a country’s economic growth, discussion in the literature about how the two are connected is limited. This paper examines the impact of road density on firm innovation in China using a matched patent database at the firm level and road information at the city level. Regional variation in the difficulty of constructing roads is used as an instrumental variable to address the potential endogeneity problem of the road variable. The empirical results show that a 10 percent improvement in road density increases the average number of approved patents per firm by 0.71 percent. Road development spurs innovation by enlarging market size and facilitating knowledge spillover.
Understanding compliance in programs promoting conservation agriculture
Author: Ward, Patrick S.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
Land degradation and soil erosion have emerged as serious challenges to smallholder farmers throughout southern Africa. To combat these challenges, conservation agriculture (CA) is widely promoted as a sustainable package of agricultural practices. Despite the many potential benefits of CA, however, adoption remains low. Yet relatively little is known about the decision-making process in choosing to adopt CA. This article attempts to fill this important knowledge gap by studying CA adoption in southern Malawi. Unlike what is implicitly assumed when these packages of practices are introduced, farmers view adoption as a series of independent decisions rather than a single decision. Yet the adoption decisions are not wholly independent. We find strong evidence of interrelated decisions, particularly among mulching crop residues and practicing zero tillage, suggesting that mulching residues and intercropping or rotating with legumes introduces a multiplier effect on the adoption of zero tillage.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
Land degradation and soil erosion have emerged as serious challenges to smallholder farmers throughout southern Africa. To combat these challenges, conservation agriculture (CA) is widely promoted as a sustainable package of agricultural practices. Despite the many potential benefits of CA, however, adoption remains low. Yet relatively little is known about the decision-making process in choosing to adopt CA. This article attempts to fill this important knowledge gap by studying CA adoption in southern Malawi. Unlike what is implicitly assumed when these packages of practices are introduced, farmers view adoption as a series of independent decisions rather than a single decision. Yet the adoption decisions are not wholly independent. We find strong evidence of interrelated decisions, particularly among mulching crop residues and practicing zero tillage, suggesting that mulching residues and intercropping or rotating with legumes introduces a multiplier effect on the adoption of zero tillage.
Finance for Food
Author: Doris Köhn
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3642540341
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 293
Book Description
This book reflects the current state of discussion about agricultural and rural finance in developing and transition countries. It provides insight into specific themes, such as commodity value chains, farm banking and risk management in agricultural banking, structured finance, crop insurance, mobile banking and how to increase effectiveness in rural finance. Case studies illustrate various aspects of agricultural and rural finance in developing economies. The book is based on one of the yearly financial Sector Development Symposia held by the KfW Development Bank.
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3642540341
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 293
Book Description
This book reflects the current state of discussion about agricultural and rural finance in developing and transition countries. It provides insight into specific themes, such as commodity value chains, farm banking and risk management in agricultural banking, structured finance, crop insurance, mobile banking and how to increase effectiveness in rural finance. Case studies illustrate various aspects of agricultural and rural finance in developing economies. The book is based on one of the yearly financial Sector Development Symposia held by the KfW Development Bank.
A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies
Author: Saak, Alexander E.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
When an outbreak of an infectious disease is suspected, a local health agency may notify a state or federal agency and request additional resources to investigate and, if necessary, contain it. However, due to capacity constraints, state and federal health agencies may not be able to grant all such requests, which may give an incentive to local agencies to request help strategically. We study a model of detection and control of an infectious disease by local health agencies in the presence of imperfect information about the likelihood of an outbreak and limited diagnostic capacity. When diagnostic capacity is rationed based on reports of symptoms, the decision to report symptoms or not creates a trade-off. On the one hand, rigorous testing allows one to make an informed disease control decision. On the other hand, it also increases the probability that the disease will spread from an untested area where fewer precautionary measures are taken. Symptoms are overreported (respectively, reported truthfully, or underreported) when the cost of disease control is sufficiently small (respectively, in some intermediate range, or sufficiently large). If the disease incidence decreases or infectiousness increases, symptoms are reported less frequently. If the precision of private signals increases, the extent of overreporting of symptoms may increase. For different values of the parameters it can be socially optimal to subsidize or tax requests for additional investigations and confirmatory testing.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
When an outbreak of an infectious disease is suspected, a local health agency may notify a state or federal agency and request additional resources to investigate and, if necessary, contain it. However, due to capacity constraints, state and federal health agencies may not be able to grant all such requests, which may give an incentive to local agencies to request help strategically. We study a model of detection and control of an infectious disease by local health agencies in the presence of imperfect information about the likelihood of an outbreak and limited diagnostic capacity. When diagnostic capacity is rationed based on reports of symptoms, the decision to report symptoms or not creates a trade-off. On the one hand, rigorous testing allows one to make an informed disease control decision. On the other hand, it also increases the probability that the disease will spread from an untested area where fewer precautionary measures are taken. Symptoms are overreported (respectively, reported truthfully, or underreported) when the cost of disease control is sufficiently small (respectively, in some intermediate range, or sufficiently large). If the disease incidence decreases or infectiousness increases, symptoms are reported less frequently. If the precision of private signals increases, the extent of overreporting of symptoms may increase. For different values of the parameters it can be socially optimal to subsidize or tax requests for additional investigations and confirmatory testing.
Anchoring Bias in Recall Data
Author: Godlonton, Susan
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
Understanding the magnitude and source of measurement biases in self-reported data is critical to effective economic policy research. This paper examines the role of anchoring bias in self-reports of objective and subjective outcomes under recall. The research exploits a unique panel survey data set collected over a three-year period from four countries in Central America. It assesses whether respondents use their reported value of specific measures from the most recent survey period as a cognitive heuristic when recalling the value from a previous period, while controlling for the value they reported earlier. We find strong evidence of sizable anchoring bias in self-reported retrospective indicators for both objective measures (household and per capita income, wages, and hours spent on the household’s main activity) and subjective measures (reports of happiness, health, stress, and well-being). In general, we also observe a larger bias in response to negative changes for objective indicators and a larger bias in response to positive changes for subjective indicators.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
Understanding the magnitude and source of measurement biases in self-reported data is critical to effective economic policy research. This paper examines the role of anchoring bias in self-reports of objective and subjective outcomes under recall. The research exploits a unique panel survey data set collected over a three-year period from four countries in Central America. It assesses whether respondents use their reported value of specific measures from the most recent survey period as a cognitive heuristic when recalling the value from a previous period, while controlling for the value they reported earlier. We find strong evidence of sizable anchoring bias in self-reported retrospective indicators for both objective measures (household and per capita income, wages, and hours spent on the household’s main activity) and subjective measures (reports of happiness, health, stress, and well-being). In general, we also observe a larger bias in response to negative changes for objective indicators and a larger bias in response to positive changes for subjective indicators.
Institutional arrangements to make public spending responsive to the poor—(where) have they worked?
Author: Mogues, Tewodaj
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
There has been some recognition in the development community that building technical capacity of public service providers and increasing resources is not enough to bring about development outcomes. Researchers and practitioners are increasingly appreciating that accounting for the stated needs of communities supports the process of pro-poor public resource allocation. We examine four institutional arrangements that explicitly endeavor to make public spending responsive to the needs of the poor by moving decision-making procedures closer to the population—participatory budgeting, community-driven development (CDD) programs, decentralization, and delegated targeting of transfers. Using the existing literature, we compare experiences across the four arrangements and countries. Regarding responsiveness to needs of the poor, evidence is cautiously optimistic for participatory budgeting, CDD, and decentralization. As for delegating the targeting of transfers to subnational authorities and communities, evidence suggests that the effect may be regressive. However, there are important mediating effects of public spending responsiveness under the various institutional arrangements. Local elite capture is a key factor dampening pro-poor spending where either exogenous circumstances such as prevailing inequality, or inadequate program design, enable capture to materialize. Politics is an important determinant of the success of these arrangements.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
There has been some recognition in the development community that building technical capacity of public service providers and increasing resources is not enough to bring about development outcomes. Researchers and practitioners are increasingly appreciating that accounting for the stated needs of communities supports the process of pro-poor public resource allocation. We examine four institutional arrangements that explicitly endeavor to make public spending responsive to the needs of the poor by moving decision-making procedures closer to the population—participatory budgeting, community-driven development (CDD) programs, decentralization, and delegated targeting of transfers. Using the existing literature, we compare experiences across the four arrangements and countries. Regarding responsiveness to needs of the poor, evidence is cautiously optimistic for participatory budgeting, CDD, and decentralization. As for delegating the targeting of transfers to subnational authorities and communities, evidence suggests that the effect may be regressive. However, there are important mediating effects of public spending responsiveness under the various institutional arrangements. Local elite capture is a key factor dampening pro-poor spending where either exogenous circumstances such as prevailing inequality, or inadequate program design, enable capture to materialize. Politics is an important determinant of the success of these arrangements.
Delegation of quality control in value chains
Author: Saak, Alexander E.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
This paper studies the decision of a firm that sells an experience good to delegate quality control to an independent monitor. In an infinitely repeated game consumers’ trust provides incentives to (1) acquire information about whether the good is defective and (2) withhold the good from sale if it is defective. If third-party reports are observable to consumers, delegation of monitoring lessens the first and dispenses with the second moral hazard concern but also creates agency costs due to either limited liability or lack of commitment. In equilibrium the firm controls quality without an independent monitor only if trades are sufficiently frequent and consumer information about quality is sufficiently precise. This result holds under different assumptions about feasible contracts, collusion, verifiability of reports, joint inspections, and the number of firms that hire the third-party monitor. If third-party reports are not publicly observed, delegation can be optimal only if two or more firms hire the third-party monitor because then both moral hazard concerns are present under delegation.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
This paper studies the decision of a firm that sells an experience good to delegate quality control to an independent monitor. In an infinitely repeated game consumers’ trust provides incentives to (1) acquire information about whether the good is defective and (2) withhold the good from sale if it is defective. If third-party reports are observable to consumers, delegation of monitoring lessens the first and dispenses with the second moral hazard concern but also creates agency costs due to either limited liability or lack of commitment. In equilibrium the firm controls quality without an independent monitor only if trades are sufficiently frequent and consumer information about quality is sufficiently precise. This result holds under different assumptions about feasible contracts, collusion, verifiability of reports, joint inspections, and the number of firms that hire the third-party monitor. If third-party reports are not publicly observed, delegation can be optimal only if two or more firms hire the third-party monitor because then both moral hazard concerns are present under delegation.
Can labor market imperfections explain changes in the inverse farm size-productivity relationship ?
Author: Deininger, Klaus
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
To understand whether and how inverse relationship between farm size and productivity changes when labor market performance improves, we use large national farm panel from India covering a quarter-century (1982, 1999, 2008) to show that the inverserelationship weakened significantly over time, despite an increase in the dispersion of farm sizes. A key reason was the substitution of capital for labor in response to nonagricultural labor demand. In addition, family labor wasmore efficient than hired labor in the 1982–1999 period, but not during the 1999–2008period.In line with labor market imperfections as a key factor, separability of labor supply and demand decisions cannot be rejected in the second period,except in villages with very low nonagricultural labor demand.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
To understand whether and how inverse relationship between farm size and productivity changes when labor market performance improves, we use large national farm panel from India covering a quarter-century (1982, 1999, 2008) to show that the inverserelationship weakened significantly over time, despite an increase in the dispersion of farm sizes. A key reason was the substitution of capital for labor in response to nonagricultural labor demand. In addition, family labor wasmore efficient than hired labor in the 1982–1999 period, but not during the 1999–2008period.In line with labor market imperfections as a key factor, separability of labor supply and demand decisions cannot be rejected in the second period,except in villages with very low nonagricultural labor demand.