Why Don't Analysts Use Their Earnings Forecasts in Generating Stock Recommendations? PDF Download
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Author: Bin Ke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
While a large literature has examined analysts' earnings forecasts or stock recommendations in isolation, there is little research on the effectiveness with which analysts translate their earnings forecasts into recommendations (referred to as translational effectiveness). This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of analysts' translational effectiveness, including the investment banking pressure considered in prior research and four new factors (i.e., insider trading, trading commissions, institutional ownership and investor sentiment). Consistent with prior research, the influence of investment banking on translational effectiveness is reduced in the period subsequent to the 2002/2003 regulatory changes. However, the effect of insider trading, institutional ownership and investor sentiment on translational effectiveness remains as significant or becomes even stronger. In addition, the combined influence of these four new factors on translational effectiveness is as equally important as the influence of the investment banking pressure.
Author: Bin Ke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
While a large literature has examined analysts' earnings forecasts or stock recommendations in isolation, there is little research on the effectiveness with which analysts translate their earnings forecasts into recommendations (referred to as translational effectiveness). This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of analysts' translational effectiveness, including the investment banking pressure considered in prior research and four new factors (i.e., insider trading, trading commissions, institutional ownership and investor sentiment). Consistent with prior research, the influence of investment banking on translational effectiveness is reduced in the period subsequent to the 2002/2003 regulatory changes. However, the effect of insider trading, institutional ownership and investor sentiment on translational effectiveness remains as significant or becomes even stronger. In addition, the combined influence of these four new factors on translational effectiveness is as equally important as the influence of the investment banking pressure.
Author: Mark T. Bradshaw
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
Sell-side analysts summarize their opinions about stocks with earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. Because earnings forecasts reflect future fundamentals, and future fundamentals determine value, forecasts and recommendations should be related. In this paper, I test for evidence of such a relation. Using analysts' earnings forecasts in conjunction with the residual income valuation model, I generate intrinsic value estimates for a comprehensive range of plausible calibrations of the model parameters. I find that analysts' stock recommendations are generally unrelated to the deviation of intrinsic value estimates from trading prices. Extending this analysis to consider value estimates generated by a valuation heuristic documented in prior research, I find the heuristic valuations to be strongly related to analysts' stock recommendations. Taken together, the evidence suggests that analysts incorporate their earnings forecasts into their recommendations in a manner consistent with earnings-based heuristics rather than a discounted present value valuation model. The evidence presented here for the behavior of analysts is consistent with prior evidence showing over-extrapolation of growth and earnings persistence in stock prices.
Author: Ran Barniv
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41
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Book Description
From 1994 to 1998, Bradshaw (2004) finds that analysts' stock recommendations relate negatively to residual income valuation estimates but positively to valuation heuristics based on the price-to-earnings-to-growth ratio and long-term growth. These results are surprising, especially considering that future returns relate positively to residual income valuation estimates and negatively to heuristics. Using a large sample of analysts for the 1993-2005 period, we consider whether recent regulatory reforms affect this apparent inconsistent analyst behavior. Consistent with the intent of these reforms, we find that the negative relation between analysts' stock recommendations and residual income valuations is diminishing following regulations. We also show that residual income valuations, developed using analysts' earnings forecasts, relate more positively with future returns. However, we document that stock recommendations continue to relate negatively with future returns. We conclude that recent regulations have affected analysts' outputs - forecasted earnings and stock recommendations - but investors should be aware that factors other than identifying mispriced stocks continue to influence how analysts recommend stocks.
Author: Sati P. Bandyopadhyay
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 17
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Book Description
Little attention has been paid to a principal decision context in which analysts' earnings forecasts are prepared, namely, as an input to their recommendations. We use two data sets, Value Line, USA, and Research Evaluation Service, Canada, and examine the importance of analysts' earnings forecasts for their stock price forecasts via three hypotheses: (1) analysts' earnings forecasts are important for their stock price forecasts; (2) analysts' long-term earnings forecasts are more important than their short-term earnings forecasts for their predictions of stock prices over a particular stock price forecast horizon; (3) the importance of analysts' earnings forecasts for their stock price forecasts rises as the joint earnings and stock price forecast horizon increases. We show that: (1) when the earnings forecast horizon is the next fiscal year, forecasted earnings explain only 30% of the variation in forecasted price; (2) the importance of forecasted earnings for forecasted price rises as the earnings forecast horizon increases; (3) in the long run, (i.e. three to five years hence), forecasted earnings explain about 60% of the variation in forecasted price. Decision usefulness is an ex ante concept, but tests regarding the usefulness of earnings for stock price generally have used actual (not expectational) data. Our evidence suggests that earnings expectations are decision useful, where the decision context is sell-side analysts' stock price forecasts. Our results are potentially important to users of sell-side analyst research reports. When a stock recommendation is accompanied only by short-run earnings forecasts, investors need to closely examine estimates of non-earnings variables to assess the quality of stock recommendations. In contrast, when stock recommendations are accompanied by both short-run and long-run earnings forecasts, investors need to examine estimates of non-earnings information variables less closely.
Author: R. Glenn Hubbard
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226355942
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 354
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Book Description
In this volume, specialists from traditionally separate areas in economics and finance investigate issues at the conjunction of their fields. They argue that financial decisions of the firm can affect real economic activity—and this is true for enough firms and consumers to have significant aggregate economic effects. They demonstrate that important differences—asymmetries—in access to information between "borrowers" and "lenders" ("insiders" and "outsiders") in financial transactions affect investment decisions of firms and the organization of financial markets. The original research emphasizes the role of information problems in explaining empirically important links between internal finance and investment, as well as their role in accounting for observed variations in mechanisms for corporate control.
Author: James Valentine
Publisher: McGraw Hill Professional
ISBN: 0071736395
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 465
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Book Description
The first real-world guide for training equity research analysts—from a Morgan Stanley veteran Addresses the dearth of practical training materials for research analysts in the U.S. and globally Valentine managed a department of 70 analysts and 100 associates at Morgan Stanley and developed new programs for over 500 employees around the globe He will promote the book through his company's extensive outreach capabilities
Author: Andreas Simon
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
We examine how analysts' incentives to build their reputation through accurate forecasting changes the relative association between analyst recommendations and rigorous valuation models versus valuation heuristics. Controlling for the firm-specific difficulty of valuation, we show that the recommendations of the most accurate forecasters within each industry have a significantly higher correlation with rigorous valuation models and a significantly lower correlation with valuation heuristics than their less accurate peers. Our results are robust to potentially confounding firm-specific effects using a within-firm sample design, a changes analysis, and for short-term, long-term and combined measures of forecast accuracy. Consistent with reputation building, we find that the recommendations of ldquo;All-Starrdquo; analysts and accurate forecasters have similar associations on rigorous and heuristic valuation approaches. Our results are consistent with the incentive to build a good reputation mitigating the influence of factors other than identifying mispriced securities, using fundamental analysis, on stock recommendations.
Author: Jan-Philipp Matthewes
Publisher: BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN: 3945021073
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 185
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Book Description
Financial analysts play an ambivalent role on financial markets: On the one hand investors and the media frequently follow their advice, on the other hand they are regularly discredited when their forecasts or recommendations prove to be erroneous. This cumulative thesis explores the informational content of financial analysts’ forecasts for investors by addressing three specific topics: Consensus size as a rudimentary investment signal, the association of analysts’ target prices with business sentiment, and the consistency of analysts’ different investment signals in the context of the 2008 financial crisis. Overall, the thesis provides additional evidence that investors can profit from analysts’ forecasts and recommendations. However, it is also shown that investors need to be very selective about which signal to rely on and in which context to use these because analysts’ investment signals can also be heavily biased and erroneous. About the author: Jan-Philipp Matthewes studied ‘Economics’ at the University of Cologne, Germany, and holds a Dean’s Award from the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences. His research focus on financial analysts evolved while working in equity research at a leading German bank. The PhD-thesis was supervised by Prof. Dr. Martin Wallmeier, Finance and Accounting, at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. Since 2013 Jan-Philipp Matthewes is the managing director of the boutique private equity firm ‘Matthewes Capital Invest GmbH’.
Author: Yasuyuki Fuchita
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 0815729820
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 216
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Book Description
A Brookings Institution Press and Nomura Institute of Capital Markets Research publication Developed country capital markets have devised a set of institutions and actors to help provide investors with timely and accurate information they need to make informed investment decisions. These actors have become known as "financial gatekeepers" and include auditors, financial analysts, and credit rating agencies. Corporate financial reporting scandals in the United States and elsewhere in recent years, however, have called into question the sufficiency of the legal framework governing these gatekeepers. Policymakers have since responded by imposing a series of new obligations, restrictions, and punishments—all with the purpose of strengthening investor confidence in these important actors. Financial Gatekeepers provides an in-depth look at these new frameworks, especially in the United States and Japan. How have they worked? Are further refinements appropriate? These are among the questions addressed in this timely and important volume. Contributors include Leslie Boni (University of New Mexico), Barry Bosworth (Brookings Institution), Tomoo Inoue (Seikei University), Zoe-Vonna Palmrose (University of Southern California), Frank Partnoy (University of San Diego School of Law), George Perry (Brookings Institution), Justin Pettit (UBS), Paul Stevens (Investment Company Institute), Peter Wallison (American Enterprise Institute).
Author: Lawrence D. Brown
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Managerial behavior differs considerably when managers report quarterly profits versus losses. When they report profits, managers seek to just meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. When they report losses, managers do not attempt to meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. Instead, managers often do not forewarn analysts of impending losses, and the analyst's signed error is likely to be negative and extreme (i.e., a measured optimistic bias). Brown (1997 Financial Analysts Journal) shows that the optimistic bias in analyst earnings forecasts has been mitigated over time, and that it is less pronounced for larger firms and firms followed by many analysts. In the present study, I offer three explanations for these temporal and cross-sectional phenomena. First, the frequency of profits versus losses may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. Since an optimistic bias in analyst forecasts is less likely to occur when firms report profits, an optimistic bias is less likely to be observed in samples possessing a relatively greater frequency of profits. Second, the tendency to report profits that just meet or slightly beat analyst estimates may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. A greater tendency to 'manage profits' (and analyst estimates) in this manner reduces the measured optimistic bias in analyst forecasts. Third, the tendency to forewarn analysts of impending losses may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. A greater tendency to 'manage losses' in this manner also reduces the measured optimistic bias in analyst forecasts. I provide the following temporal evidence. The optimistic bias in analyst forecasts pertains to both the entire sample and the losses sub-sample. In contrast, a pessimistic bias exists for the 85.3% of the sample that consists of reported profits. The temporal decrease in the optimistic bias documented by Brown (1997) pertains to both losses and profits. Analysts have gotten better at predicting the sign of a loss (i.e., they are much more likely to predict that a loss will occur than they used to), and they have reduced the number of extreme negative errors they make by two-thirds. Managers are much more likely to report profits that exactly meet or slightly beat analyst estimates than they used to. In contrast, they are less likely to report profits that fall a little short of analyst estimates than they used to. I conclude that the temporal reduction in optimistic bias is attributable to an increased tendency to manage both profits and losses. I find no evidence that there exists a temporal change in the profits-losses mix (using the I/B/E/S definition of reported quarterly profits and losses). I document the following cross-sectional evidence. The principle reason that larger firms have relatively less optimistic bias is that they are far less likely to report losses. A secondary reason that larger firms have relatively less optimistic bias is that their managers are relatively more likely to report profits that slightly beat analyst estimates. The principle reason that firms followed by more analysts have relatively less optimistic bias is that they are far less likely to report losses. A secondary reason that firms followed by more analysts have relatively less optimistic bias is that their managers are relatively more likely to report profits that exactly meet analyst estimates or beat them by one penny. I find no evidence that managers of larger firms or firms followed by more analysts are relatively more likely to forewarn analysts of impending losses. I conclude that cross-sectional differences in bias arise primarily from differential 'loss frequencies,' and secondarily from differential 'profits management.' The paper discusses implications of the results for studies of analysts forecast bias, earnings management, and capital markets. It concludes with caveats and directions for future research.
