Voluntary Disclosure in Corporate Control Contests--evidence of Management Earnings Forecast Characteristics and Consequences PDF Download
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Author: Jinqiu Yan
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Languages : en
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Book Description
This dissertation examines how managerial incentives in contested takeovers affect voluntary disclosure strategies. I study characteristics of voluntary disclosure around contested takeovers, based on the conjecture that good news in earnings forecasts serves as a defensive strategy to resist a takeover and/or to negotiate a higher offer price. To gauge the relation of voluntary disclosure on takeover consequences, I examine the association between voluntary disclosure and target premiums as well as the length of time to resolve the acquisition. Using a difference-in-differences research design, I find that relative to friendly targets, target management in contested target firms alters the timing of normal information flows by forecasting more good news during the takeover. Managers also manipulate the content of information by releasing optimistically biased forecasts during the takeover to favorably influence the market. Further investigations indicate that target firms adopt voluntary disclosure and alter strategies at the time of contested takeover as a means to convey favorable inside information. The stock market responds positively to optimistic forecasts issued during the contested takeover. Moreover, voluntary disclosure influences contested takeovers by helping target firms negotiate better offers and postpone the M&A process. As a whole, this study demonstrates that target firms adopt voluntary disclosure and alter their strategies under the threat of contested takeover to reveal their true worth and enhance their bargaining power. Unlike prior literature that documents value-destroying managerial entrenchment resistance, voluntary disclosure by targets with favorable information induces information leakage and is one of the resistance tactics that potentially benefits target shareholders.
Author: Jinqiu Yan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This dissertation examines how managerial incentives in contested takeovers affect voluntary disclosure strategies. I study characteristics of voluntary disclosure around contested takeovers, based on the conjecture that good news in earnings forecasts serves as a defensive strategy to resist a takeover and/or to negotiate a higher offer price. To gauge the relation of voluntary disclosure on takeover consequences, I examine the association between voluntary disclosure and target premiums as well as the length of time to resolve the acquisition. Using a difference-in-differences research design, I find that relative to friendly targets, target management in contested target firms alters the timing of normal information flows by forecasting more good news during the takeover. Managers also manipulate the content of information by releasing optimistically biased forecasts during the takeover to favorably influence the market. Further investigations indicate that target firms adopt voluntary disclosure and alter strategies at the time of contested takeover as a means to convey favorable inside information. The stock market responds positively to optimistic forecasts issued during the contested takeover. Moreover, voluntary disclosure influences contested takeovers by helping target firms negotiate better offers and postpone the M&A process. As a whole, this study demonstrates that target firms adopt voluntary disclosure and alter their strategies under the threat of contested takeover to reveal their true worth and enhance their bargaining power. Unlike prior literature that documents value-destroying managerial entrenchment resistance, voluntary disclosure by targets with favorable information induces information leakage and is one of the resistance tactics that potentially benefits target shareholders.
Author: Ziyao San
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This research consists of two parts. In the first part, I examine whether a firm whose chief executive officer (CEO) is more future-oriented (as measured by commitment to voluntary disclosure practices, i.e., issuing more frequent and more disaggregated earnings forecasts) is likely to be more successful in corporate innovation investment. Using a global sample of 26,364 firms from 27 countries and a single-country sample of 8,980 firms (domiciled in the US), I find that firms with more future-oriented CEO are granted more patents and receive more citations per patent. The results of additional cross-sectional analyses indicate that the relationship between commitments to voluntary disclosure and corporate innovation varies with various CEO-, firm-, and country-level factors. In the second part of this research, I investigate the role of CEOs personality traits in corporate innovation and in the association between commitment to voluntary disclosure and corporate innovation. I find that firms with more extraverted CEOs tend to be more successful in their innovation investment in the future and that the signaling role of commitment to voluntary disclosure in corporate innovation success is more pronounced in firms with more extraverted CEOs. My findings also indicate that voluntary disclosure by more extraverted CEOs attracts more investor attention. Collectively, the results of this research support the conjecture that future-oriented CEOs are likely to commit to voluntary disclosure practices to signal their ability to manage uncertainties associated with innovation investment and thereby achieve innovation success. Additionally, such signaling tends to be driven by more extraverted CEOs. This research should be important for the investors and other stakeholders, as it shows how the likelihood of firms future innovation success can be inferred from CEOs observable earnings forecasting behavior. The findings may also be of interest to firms, as they highlight the importance of considering candidates level of extraversion when hiring a CEO. Finally, the findings of this research should be helpful to policymakers who develop initiatives to enhance firms voluntary financial disclosure, because this research highlights how the effectiveness of management earnings forecasts in signaling corporate innovation success varies with country-level institutional characteristics.
Author: Carol Liu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
This study investigates whether effective audit committees influence the association between management earnings forecasts and the properties of analysts" forecasts. We posit that this influence on the part of an audit committee would likely result from increased responsibility for monitoring voluntary disclosure. Using the four attributes that the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and prior research suggest as being indicative of audit committee effectiveness, we find that analysts" forecasts exhibit higher accuracy and lower dispersion with the issuance of management forecasts for those firms employing audit committees that are composed exclusively of independent directors, include an accounting expert, and act with due diligence. We also find that effective audit committees strengthen the association between management and analyst forecast accuracy. Our evidence, therefore, supports the notion that effective corporate governance influences the reliability of voluntary disclosure, and thereby benefits the users of financial information.
Author: Luminita Enache
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Using a sample of US biotech firms, this paper examines the joint impact of product-related voluntary disclosure and corporate governance on a firms' information environment, specifically on analysts forecast accuracy, dispersion, precision of public and private information. Moreover, we investigate whether voluntary disclosure was consistently disclosed over time. Our findings, shows that the quality of corporate governance affects information transparency and play a role in reducing the uncertainty associated with future firms' performance by increasing the precision of analysts' common information and forecast accuracy, only when voluntary disclosure is constant over time. Analysts forecast dispersion decreases when more independent directors sit on the board. Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance quality are two mechanisms that act as complement to improve the quality of information available to financial analysts.
Author: Ron Kasznik
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Computer software industry
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Author: Ron Kasznik
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 262
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Author: Stephen P. Baginski
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Citing fear of legal liability as a partial explanation, prior research documents (1) managers' reluctance to voluntarily disclose management earnings forecasts, and (2) higher forecast disclosure frequencies in periods of bad news. We provide evidence on how management earnings forecast disclosure differs between the United States (U.S.) and Canada, two otherwise similar business environments with different legal regimes. Canadian securities laws and judicial interpretations create a far less litigious environment than exists in the U.S. We find a greater frequency of management earnings forecast disclosure in Canada relative to the U.S. Further, although U.S. managers are relatively more likely to issue forecasts during interim periods in which earnings decrease, Canadian managers do not exhibit that tendency. Instead, Canadian managers issue more forecasts when earnings are increasing, and their forecasts are of annual rather than interim earnings. Also consistent with a less litigious environment, Canadian managers issue more precise and longer-term forecasts. These findings hold after controlling for other determinants of management earnings forecast disclosure that might differ between the two countries: firm size, earnings volatility, information asymmetry, growth, capitalization rates, and membership in high-technology and regulated industries.
Author: Ron Kasznik
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 49
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Book Description
This paper investigates the association between corporate voluntary disclosure and management's discretion over accounting choices. In particular, it examines the role of earnings management in mitigating costs associated with management earnings forecast errors. The empirical results are consistent with the prediction that managers, fearing costly legal actions by shareholders and loss of reputation for credibility, use discretionary accruals to reduce their forecasting errors. Specifically, the paper documents that managers who overestimate the earnings number manage reported earnings upward, and that the extent of discretionary accruals is associated with various securities litigation cost factors and the amount of management's accounting flexibility. Having identified the role of accounting discretion in mitigating costs associated with management earnings forecast errors, the study raises the possibility that the degree of accounting discretion affects corporate voluntary disclosure policies.
Author: Francis A. Lees
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
Author: Jennifer Francis
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601981147
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 97
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Book Description
This review lays out a research perspective on earnings quality. We provide an overview of alternative definitions and measures of earnings quality and a discussion of research design choices encountered in earnings quality research. Throughout, we focus on a capital markets setting, as opposed, for example, to a contracting or stewardship setting. Our reason for this choice stems from the view that the capital market uses of accounting information are fundamental, in the sense of providing a basis for other uses, such as stewardship. Because resource allocations are ex ante decisions while contracting/stewardship assessments are ex post evaluations of outcomes, evidence on whether, how and to what degree earnings quality influences capital market resource allocation decisions is fundamental to understanding why and how accounting matters to investors and others, including those charged with stewardship responsibilities. Demonstrating a link between earnings quality and, for example, the costs of equity and debt capital implies a basic economic role in capital allocation decisions for accounting information; this role has only recently been documented in the accounting literature. We focus on how the precision of financial information in capturing one or more underlying valuation-relevant constructs affects the assessment and use of that information by capital market participants. We emphasize that the choice of constructs to be measured is typically contextual. Our main focus is on the precision of earnings, which we view as a summary indicator of the overall quality of financial reporting. Our intent in discussing research that evaluates the capital market effects of earnings quality is both to stimulate further research in this area and to encourage research on related topics, including, for example, the role of earnings quality in contracting and stewardship.
