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Author: David McAdams
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values.
Author: David McAdams
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values.
Author: David McAdams
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
I study monotonicity of equilibrium strategies in first-price auctions with symmetric bidders, risk-aversion, affiliated types, and interdependent values. I prove that every mixed-strategy equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a monotone pure strategy equilibrium under the priority rule for breaking ties. This provides a missing link to establish uniqueness in Milgrom and Weber (1982)'s general symmetric model. Non-monotone equilibria can exist under the coin-flip rule but they are distinguishable: all non-monotone equilibria have positive probability of ties whereas all monotone equilibria have zero probability of ties. This provides a justification for the standard empirical practice of restricting attention to monotone strategies.
Author: Milan Vojnović
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316472906
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 737
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Book Description
Contests are prevalent in many areas, including sports, rent seeking, patent races, innovation inducement, labor markets, scientific projects, crowdsourcing and other online services, and allocation of computer system resources. This book provides unified, comprehensive coverage of contest theory as developed in economics, computer science, and statistics, with a focus on online services applications, allowing professionals, researchers and students to learn about the underlying theoretical principles and to test them in practice. The book sets contest design in a game-theoretic framework that can be used to model a wide-range of problems and efficiency measures such as total and individual output and social welfare, and offers insight into how the structure of prizes relates to desired contest design objectives. Methods for rating the skills and ranking of players are presented, as are proportional allocation and similar allocation mechanisms, simultaneous contests, sharing utility of productive activities, sequential contests, and tournaments.
Author: Michael Thomas Padilla
Publisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 86
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Book Description
As much as 12% of the daily volume on the New York Stock Exchange, and similar volumes on other major world exchanges, involves the sale of portfolios by institutional investors to brokers through blind portfolio auctions. Such transactions typically take the form of a first-price sealed-bid auction in which the seller engages a few potential brokers and provides limited information about the portfolio being sold. Uncertainty about the portfolio contents reduces bids, effectively increasing the transaction cost paid by the seller. We consider the use of a trusted intermediary or equivalent cryptographic protocol to reduce transaction costs. In particular, we propose a mechanism through which each party provides relevant private information to an intermediary who ultimately reveals only the portfolio contents and price paid, and only to the seller and winning broker. Through analysis of a game-theoretic model, we demonstrate substantial potential benefits to sellers. For example, under reasonable assumptions a seller can reduce expected transaction costs by as much as 10% under a broker valuation model that induces efficient allocations at equilibrium, and as much as 33% under one that does not. We also consider the effects of intermediation on broker payoffs and social welfare as well as its performance in the context of the second-price auction. In addition, we consider the two-stage game in which sellers have the choice of selecting intermediation or not and show that under certain reasonable modeling assumptions that all sellers will select intermediation at equilibrium.
Author: Petyon Young
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444537678
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 1025
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Book Description
The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: John H. Kagel
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691218951
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 419
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Book Description
An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Author: H. Peyton Young
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
ISBN: 0821800949
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 186
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Book Description
Shows how mathematics, particularly the axiomatic method, can be applied to give insight into complex social problems. This collection provides material on the real-world problem of allocating objects among competing claimants. Each article surveys the literature and includes statements and sketches of proofs, as well as unsolved problems.
Author: Sudip Gupta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 148
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Book Description
Author: Pennsylvania
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 854
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Book Description
