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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Executives
Languages : en
Pages : 117
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Executives
Languages : en
Pages : 117
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Book Description
Author: David I. Walker
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 64
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Book Description
The corporate stock option backdating scandal has dominated business page headlines since the summer of 2006. The SEC has launched investigations of more than one hundred companies with respect to the timing and pricing of stock options granted during the boom years of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the number of firms caught up in the scandal continues to increase. This Article contributes to our understanding of the backdating phenomenon by analyzing the economics of backdating and the characteristics of the firms under investigation. Its main points are the following: First, given the high volatilities of the stocks of the technology companies that dominate the list of firms under investigation and the fact that options granted to executives and employees typically may not be exercised for several years, press reports that focus on the size of the strike price quot;discountsquot; achieved by backdating significantly overstate the impact on the value per share of backdated options. In some cases, reducing the strike price by a dollar per share by backdating increased the Black-Scholes value of the option by less than twenty cents per share. Second, backdating dramatically reduced the apparent value of options, which reduced the total level of executive compensation reported to shareholders. However, because the size of executive stock option grants often is determined by first establishing the value to be delivered and then quot;backing intoquot; the number of shares to be covered by the option, reducing the apparent value of option shares may have substantially increased the size and economic value of some backdated executive option grants. Third, comparison of semiconductor firms under investigation for backdating with peer companies that are not suggests an association between backdating and the use of options in compensating non-executive employees. This Article considers the effects of and several possible explanations for backdating non-executive options, including reducing apparent rank and file compensation. Finally, this Article argues that the backdating phenomenon is not an accounting scandal. Backdating has accounting consequences, but it is unlikely to have been accounting driven.
Author: David I. Walker
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
The corporate stock option backdating scandal has dominated business page headlines during the summer of 2006. The SEC is currently investigating more than seventy-five companies with respect to the timing and pricing of stock options granted during the boom years of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the number of firms caught up in the scandal seems to increase every day. This essay contributes to our understanding of the backdating phenomenon by analyzing the economics of backdating and the characteristics of the firms under investigation. Its main points are the following: First, given the high volatilities of the stocks of the technology companies that dominate the list of firms under investigation and the fact that options granted to executives and employees typically may not be exercised for several years, press reports that focus on the size of the strike price quot;discountsquot; achieved by backdating significantly overstate the value of backdating. In some cases, reducing the strike price by a dollar per share by backdating increased the Black-Scholes value of the option by less than twenty cents per share. Second, completely unnoticed in the discussion so far is the fact that in many cases backdating dramatically reduced the apparent value of options. Because the size of executive stock option grants often is determined first by establishing the value to be delivered and then by calculating the number of shares to be covered by the option, reducing the apparent value of option shares may have substantially increased the size and true economic value of backdated executive option grants. Third, comparison of semiconductor firms under investigation for backdating with peer companies that are not suggests an association between backdating and the use of options in compensating non-executive employees. This essay considers several explanations for backdating non-executive options, including share limitations, minimizing apparent rank and file compensation, and cognitive biases. Finally, this essay argues that the backdating phenomenon is really not an accounting scandal. Backdating has accounting consequences, but it is unlikely to have been accounting driven.
Author: John Nolan McWilliams
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
This paper summarizes the recent stock options backdating scandal from the perspective of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The paper begins with a brief history of the stock options expensing debate. The paper continues with a discussion of the academic research that propelled the phenomenon of options backdating into the media and regulatory spotlight. The paper then examines three case studies of companies and executives charged by the Commission. The paper concludes with a brief analysis of the Commission's recent policy regarding company fines.
Author:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 19
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Book Description
Since academic scholars and the Wall Street Journal reported widespread evidence indicating that option grants to executives were backdated, an avalanche of news stories followed documenting this ever-widening corporate scandal. In this study we ask: quot;How do disclosures of backdating affect shareholder value?quot; We closely examine 110 companies listed in the Wall Street Journal's Perfect Payday webpage, collecting all news stories related to options backdating. We find that shareholders of these 110 companies suffer on average significant stock-price declines, ranging between 20% and 50%. Moreover, these losses do not seem to be due to temporary overreactions (at least so far). The negative 20% abnormal return translates into total dollar losses of well over $100 billion. The negative 50% abnormal return translates to approximately one-quarter trillion dollars of lost shareholder value. There is no evidence that this decline is driven by temporary overreaction, judging by the average performance of these 110 companies over a nearly 2 year period. We are aware of no analysts, scholars or commentators predicting that such massive losses in shareholder value would result from options backdating problems.
Author:
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 57
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Book Description
The revelation that scores of firms engaged in the illegal manipulation of stock options' grant dates (i.e. quot;backdatingquot;) captured much public attention. The evidence indicates that the consequences stemming from management misconduct and misrepresentation are of first-order importance in this context as shareholders of firms accused of backdating experience large negative, statistically significant abnormal returns. Furthermore, shareholders' losses are directly related to firms' likely culpability and the magnitude of the resulting restatements, despite the limited cash flow implications. And, tellingly, the losses are attenuated when tainted management of less successful firms is more likely to be replaced, whereas relatively many firms become takeover targets. We believe this evidence is relevant to the ongoing debate about the economic relevance of seemingly inconsequential corporate misdeeds, in general, and option grants manipulation, in particular.
Author: Stephen Becker
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 17
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Book Description
Previous literature on the effects of disclosing options backdating problems focused mainly on estimating the cumulative and aggregate losses. This paper takes a different approach and investigates the effect of regulatory intervention on companies accused of backdating stock options. An event study approach is employed to analyze the announcements of backdating problems made by 83 companies. Our analysis shows that the companies under regulatory investigation suffered greater declines in value than companies who are not. However, the magnitude of the decline in value associated with outside investigation does not appear to be dependent on the timing of the regulatory intervention. In other words, no extra loss was incurred to those companies whose backdating problems were first exposed or triggered by regulatory action. Further analysis indicates that total loss in market value suffered by companies may reflect both the severity of the backdating problems and an extra cost imposed by regulatory investigations per se. Our preliminary estimate is that as much as one-third of the total loss may be attributable to regulatory involvement.
Author: Mark LaMonte
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 4
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Book Description
In recent weeks, U.S. government agencies have made inquiries of at least 22 companies on the integrity of past stock option grants, including six companies rated by Moody's. The inquiries concern whether the companies backdated awards, providing undisclosed benefit to executives, and we anticipate that additional companies may face investigations. Moody's believes the controversy raises questions at the rated issuers among this group on:ʼn Leadership going forward, with the possibility of executive resignations (as has occurred at some non-rated issuers).ʼn Quality of corporate governance and financial controls, and aggressiveness of corporate culture.ʼn Potential for reputational damage. The controversy also poses some financial risk in the potential for fines and shareholder litigation, although we believe the probability of material restatements affecting our view of current financial health of the companies is minimal.
Author: John M. Bizjak
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
We examine the role of board connections in explaining how the controversial practice of backdating employee stock options spread to a large number of firms across a wide range of industries. The increase in the likelihood that a firm begins to backdate stock options that can be explained by having a board member who is interlocked to a previously identified backdating firm is approximately one third of the unconditional probability of backdating in our sample. Our analysis provides new insight into how boards function and the role that they play in providing managerial oversight and determining corporate strategy.
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 96
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Book Description
