U. S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980-1981 PDF Download
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Author: Douglas J. MacEachin
Publisher: Penn State Press
ISBN: 9780271046525
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 268
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Book Description
Despite the U.S. government's sophisticated intelligence capabilities, policy makers repeatedly seemed to be caught off guard when major crises took place during the Cold War. Were these surprises the result of inadequate information, or rather the use made of the information available? In seeking an answer to this question, former CIA analyst Douglas MacEachin carefully examines the crisis in Poland during 1980-81 to determine what information the U.S. government had about Soviet preparations for military intervention and the Polish regime's plans for martial law, and what prevented that information from being effectively employed Drawing on his experience in intelligence reporting at the time, as well as on recently declassified U.S. documents and materials from Soviet, Polish, and other Eastern European archives, MacEachin contrasts what was known then with what is known now, and seeks to explain why, despite the evidence available to them, U.S. policy makers did not take the threat of a crackdown seriously enough to prevent it. It was the mind-set of those who processed the information, not the lack or accuracy of information, that was the fundamental problem, MacEachin argues. By highlighting this cognitive obstacle, his analysis points the way toward developing practices to overcome it in the future.
Author: Douglas J. MacEachin
Publisher: Penn State Press
ISBN: 9780271046525
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 268
Get Book Here
Book Description
Despite the U.S. government's sophisticated intelligence capabilities, policy makers repeatedly seemed to be caught off guard when major crises took place during the Cold War. Were these surprises the result of inadequate information, or rather the use made of the information available? In seeking an answer to this question, former CIA analyst Douglas MacEachin carefully examines the crisis in Poland during 1980-81 to determine what information the U.S. government had about Soviet preparations for military intervention and the Polish regime's plans for martial law, and what prevented that information from being effectively employed Drawing on his experience in intelligence reporting at the time, as well as on recently declassified U.S. documents and materials from Soviet, Polish, and other Eastern European archives, MacEachin contrasts what was known then with what is known now, and seeks to explain why, despite the evidence available to them, U.S. policy makers did not take the threat of a crackdown seriously enough to prevent it. It was the mind-set of those who processed the information, not the lack or accuracy of information, that was the fundamental problem, MacEachin argues. By highlighting this cognitive obstacle, his analysis points the way toward developing practices to overcome it in the future.
Author: Douglas J. MacEachin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Intelligence service
Languages : en
Pages : 228
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Book Description
Author: Douglas J. MacEachin
Publisher: Penn State University Press
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 280
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Book Description
Despite the U.S. government's sophisticated intelligence capabilities, policy makers repeatedly seemed to be caught off guard when major crises took place during the Cold War. Were these surprises the result of inadequate information, or rather the use made of the information available? In seeking an answer to this question, former CIA analyst Douglas MacEachin carefully examines the crisis in Poland during 1980-81 to determine what information the U.S. government had about Soviet preparations for military intervention and the Polish regime's plans for martial law, and what prevented that information from being effectively employed Drawing on his experience in intelligence reporting at the time, as well as on recently declassified U.S. documents and materials from Soviet, Polish, and other Eastern European archives, MacEachin contrasts what was known then with what is known now, and seeks to explain why, despite the evidence available to them, U.S. policy makers did not take the threat of a crackdown seriously enough to prevent it. It was the mind-set of those who processed the information, not the lack or accuracy of information, that was the fundamental problem, MacEachin argues. By highlighting this cognitive obstacle, his analysis points the way toward developing practices to overcome it in the future.
Author: Douglas J. MacEachin
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780160617294
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 223
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Book Description
Author: Douglas J. MacEachin
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781929667062
Category : Intelligence service
Languages : en
Pages : 211
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Book Description
Author: J. Douglas Maceachin
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781839310959
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 224
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Book Description
Author: J. Douglas Maceachin
Publisher: www.Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
ISBN: 9781780393766
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 224
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Book Description
Author: Douglas J. MacEachin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Intelligence service
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Center for the Study of Intelligence presents the full text of the book "U.S. Intelligence and the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981," written by Douglas J. MacEachin. The book, provided online in 2001, describes the 1980-1981 Polish crisis, the assessment by intelligence analysts, and U.S. policy.
Author: Seth G. Jones
Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company
ISBN: 0393247015
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 372
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Book Description
“A tale of victory for peace, for freedom, and for the CIA— a trifecta rare enough to make for required reading.” —Steve Donoghue, Spectator USA In 1981, the Soviet-backed Polish government declared martial law to crush a budding democratic opposition movement. Moscow and Washington were on a collision course. It was the most significant crisis of Ronald Reagan’s fledgling presidency. Reagan authorized a covert CIA operation codenamed QRHELPFUL to support dissident groups, particularly the trade union Solidarity. The CIA provided money that helped Solidarity print newspapers, broadcast radio programs, and conduct an information campaign against the government. This gripping narrative reveals the little-known history of one of America’s most successful covert operations through its most important characters—spymaster Bill Casey, CIA officer Richard Malzahn, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, Pope John Paul II, and the Polish patriots who were instrumental to the success of the program. Based on in- depth interviews and recently declassified evidence, A Covert Action celebrates a decisive victory over tyranny for US intelligence behind the Iron Curtain, one that prefigured the Soviet collapse.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cold War
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
Between July 1980 and December 1981, Poland stumbled through the most serious political crisis faced by a Warsaw Pact member since the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The resolution of this crisis through the declaration of martial law by the Polish authorities provided only a temporary respite. The rise and suppression of the trade union Solidarity, followed by the inability of Polish communist authorities to restore political credibility or economic activity, were key developments that created the conditions that led to the eventual collapse of the Warsaw Pact by the end of the decade. In 1972, Ryszard Kuklinski, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff, volunteered his services to the United States at a time of increased friction between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World. During the Polish crisis, from the initial outbreak of labor unrest in July 1980, until the declaration of martial law in December 1981, Col. Kuklinski provided periodic reporting and commentary on the chaotic progression of events. He focused on the increasing refinement of the plans for introducing martial law, the internal political debates surrounding these preparations, and the almost constant pressure from Moscow for the Poles "to do something" to contain and destroy Solidarity.
