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Author: Diego M. Caramuta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 86
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Book Description
Author: Diego M. Caramuta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 86
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Book Description
Author: Lin Zhou
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 132
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Book Description
Author: Stephen T. F. Ching
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 132
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Author: Byung-Cheol Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer protection
Languages : en
Pages : 250
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Author: Mun-sŏng Kang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 188
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Author: Martin Shubik
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262693110
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 472
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Book Description
This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.
Author: Huaxia Zeng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 163
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"This dissertation studies a standard voting formulation with randomization. Formally, there is a finite set of voters, a finite set of alternatives and a lottery space over the alternative set. Each voter has a strict preference over alternatives. The domain of preferences contains all admissible preferences. Every voter reports a preference in the domain; a preference profile is generated; and the social lottery then is determined by a Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF). This dissertation focuses on RSCFs which provide every voter incentives to truthfully reveal her preference, and hence follows the formulation of strategy proofness in [26] which requires that the lottery under truth telling (first-order) stochastically dominates the lottery under any misrepresentation according to every voter’s true preference independently of others’ behaviors. Moreover, this dissertation restricts attention to the class of unanimous RSCFs, that is, if the alternative is the best for all voters in a preference profile, it receives probability one. A typical class of unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs is random dictatorships. A domain is a random dictatorship domain if every unanimous and strategy proof RSCF is a random dictatorship... "-- Author's abstract.
Author: Bo Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 188
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Author: Ran Shao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 115
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Book Description
This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete information. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms: Any optimal mechanism must be a convex combination of two fixed price mechanisms and two option mechanisms. Secondly, I study the problem of allocating a non-excludable public good between two agents under incomplete information. An equal-cost sharing mechanism which maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms is proved to be optimal. Under the equal-cost sharing mechanism, when the built cost is low, the public good is provided whenever one of the agents is willing to fund it at half cost; when the cost is high, the public good is provided only if both agents are willing to fund it. Thirdly, I analyze the problem of matching two heterogeneous populations. If the payoff from a match exhibits complementarities, it is well known that absent any friction positive assortative matching is optimal. Coarse matching refers to a situation in which the populations into a finite number of classes, then randomly matched within these classes. The focus of this essay is the performance of coarse matching schemes with a finite number of classes. The main results of this essay are the following ones. First, assuming a multiplicative match payoff function, I derive a lower bound on the performance of n-class coarse matching under mild conditions on the distributions of agents' characteristics. Second, I prove that this result generalizes to a large class of match payoff functions. Third, I show that these results are applicable to a broad class of applications, including a monopoly pricing problem with incomplete information, as well as to a cost-sharing problem with incomplete information. In these problems, standard models predict that optimal contracts sort types completely. The third result implies that a monopolist can capture a large fraction of the second-best profits by offering pooling contracts with a small number of qualities.
Author: Mason Malmuth
Publisher: Two Plus Two Publishing LLC
ISBN: 9781880685150
Category : Games & Activities
Languages : en
Pages : 324
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Book Description
This text contains essays written from 1991 through early 1996. Topics covered include: General Concepts, Technical Ideas, Structure, Strategic Ideas, In the Cardrooms, Quizzes, Erroneous Concepts, and Something Silly. In addition, advice is offered on handling rushes, moving up, poker skills, simulations, maximizing your expectation, betting when first to act on the river, whether limit hold 'em, should have two or three betting levels, playing the overs, adjusting to the big ante, how to play well, low-limit hold 'em, how many hands you should play early in a tournament, chopping the blinds, cardroom theory, and much more.
