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Author: Armaghan Rahimi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Armaghan Rahimi
Publisher:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Joanna A. Poyago-Theotoky
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349258148
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 209
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Book Description
Innovation is a major contributory factor to economic growth. How can it be encouraged? One solution favoured especially in highly-competitive high-tech industries is cooperation in research and development. The theoretical issues raised by these joint ventures are examined in these essays which cover all aspects for growth, technology, competition and welfare. Contributions from the UK, Europe, North America and Asia ensure a broad international approach. There is an indepth study of European technology policy.
Author:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: J. Jude Kline
Publisher:
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Category : Joint ventures
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Author: Rod Falvey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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We analyze a simple oligopoly model where firms can engage in cost-reducing Ramp;D. We compare two Ramp;D regimes: Ramp;D competition and Ramp;D cooperation where firms can enter in a Research Joint Venture (RJV). We introduce coordination costs for the RJV and examine how these affect the equilibrium outcomes. Further, we examine the question of the equilibrium versus optimal size of the RJV. For a given size of the RJV, its members decrease their own Ramp;D as the anticipated coordination costs increase. This results in lower output and profits. On the contrary, the non-RJV firms increase their Ramp;D investments in response to the fall in the RJV firms' Ramp;D. We show that the performance of the RJV in terms of Ramp;D investment, profit and welfare in relation to Ramp;D competition is sensitive to the level of coordination costs. Furthermore, we show that, although the RJV as a whole may no longer conduct a unit of Ramp;D at a lower cost compared to the independent firm under the non-cooperative Ramp;D regime, its members can still make savings on their own Ramp;D expense through information sharing. Finally, we find that not only the equilibrium size becomes smaller as coordination costs increase, but the discrepancy between the equilibrium and optimal sizes is widening. One important message from our analysis is that by ignoring the coordination costs of operating the RJV, the anticipated benefits or success of the cooperative project could have been grossly exaggerated.
Author: Gamal Atallah
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a three-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing along with R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms generally don't choose intermediate levels of information sharing: they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects: a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. In response to an increase in leakages, RJV members reduce their R&D spending. In addition, they either increase the RJV size while maintaining information sharing unchanged (when leakages are low), or they reduce both information sharing and RJV size (when leakages are high).
Author: Jeffrey J. Reuer
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1849504946
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 520
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Book Description
Examines the ways in which real options theory can contribute to strategic management. This volume offers conceptual pieces that trace out pathways for the theory to move forward and presents research on the implications of real options for strategic investment, organization, and firm performance.
Author:
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ISBN:
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 814
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Author:
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ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 592
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Book Description
Author: Louis Phlips
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521498715
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 292
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Book Description
This book uses game theory to analyse anti-competitive behaviour among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Part I focuses on 'explicit collusion': the author proves that 'four are few and six are many', and shows how cartels can be enforced under imperfect and incomplete information. Part II on 'tacit collusion' discusses the informational requirements of collusion detection in noncooperative repeated games. In Part III on 'semicollusion', excess capacity is shown to reinforce collusion. Part IV is devoted to the detection of predatory pricing. In this book, Louis Phlips applies the latest economic theory to a discussion of several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies. The presentation of case studies, combined with a clear exposition of the theory, will make this book invaluable to teachers and students of competition policy.
