Author: Huseyin Yildirim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 186

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Author: Der-Yuan Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 110

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Author: Akram Temimi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 118

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This dissertation is divided into three essays. The first essay focuses on the question of enfranchisement of groups of individuals. Existing research work in the area has not adequately addressed this question. Indeed, previous analyses have focused on the value of a vote for a single individual. We considered a totally different approach whereby the central players are groups of individuals rather than single individuals. Within this framework, we have provided an answer to the question as to why groups of individuals struggle to gain the right to vote. We also provided an explanation of why the group in power may voluntarily extend the franchise to groups which have conflicting preferences. The second essay introduces the concept of coalition structure value to differential information economies. This extends the work of Krasa and Yannelis (1994) who introduced the concept of private value allocation to measure the information superiority of agents in an economy with differential information. The coalition structure value allows us to analyze the implications of coalition structures on the value of information. Contrary to our expectations, we found that the bargaining strength of an agent with superior information does not decrease if the rest of the agents collude and bargain as a unit with him. This is in sharp contrast to the one seller and two buyers example in full information economies where the buyers are better off if they bargain as a unit with the seller. The third paper generalizes the crowding types model introduced by Conley and Wooders (1994a) by allowing variable usage of local public goods within jurisdictions. We investigate the possibility of anonymous decentralizations of core allocations. It turns out that it is possible to decentralize core allocations with anonymous admission prices. However these prices are infinite dimensional. This leads us to investigate Lindahl decentralization. While it is possible to get nonanonymous Lindahl decentralization, the core is generally larger than the set of anonymous Lindahl equilibria.

Author: Kwok H. Cheung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Collective bargaining
Languages : en
Pages : 232

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Author: Martin Shubik
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262693110
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 472

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This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.

Author: Cheng Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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This dissertation consists of three essays in the field of political economics and public policy. The first essay provides a novel theory as to why campaign finance regulation, in the form of campaign contribution limits, may improve constituent welfare. The argument is developed in a game theoretic model of policymaking and lobbying. The model involves a three stage game played between a politician and two special interest groups. First, a policymaker can collect information or acquire expertise, which enables her to better compare the merits of alternative policy choices. Second, interest groups observe the policymaker's level of expertise and can offer political contributions in exchange for their preferred policy. Third, the policymaker chooses one of the policies. In equilibrium, expected political contributions are strictly decreasing in the policymaker's information. The analysis shows that the more information the policymaker acquires, the lower the expected payments from interest groups. A fully uninformed policymaker is unable to distinguish between policies and therefore makes her decision based only on contributions, maximizing competition between and payments from interest groups. The monetary benefits of remaining uninformed can dominate the costs associated with worse policy, and the policymaker prefers to remain fully uninformed about a range of issues, even when acquiring information is costless. The analysis also highlights a novel benefit of contribution limits, showing that they can improve policy by decreasing incentives for a policymaker to remain uninformed. The second essay studies the optimal law enforcement policy at borders and airports. At borders and airports, law enforcement targets major, planned crime such as smuggling and terrorism. Such crime tends to be planned by a strategic criminal organization that can recruit agents to attempt crime on its behalf. In this essay, we model major criminal activity as a game in which a law enforcement officer chooses the rate at which to screen different population groups, and a criminal organization (e.g. drug cartel, terrorist cell) chooses the observable characteristics of its recruits. The analysis shows that the most effective law enforcement policy imposes only moderate restrictions on the officer's ability to profile. In contrast to models of decentralized crime, requiring equal treatment never improves the effectiveness of law enforcement. The third essay examines the deterrence effects of higher pleading standards in litigation. In a recent decision, the U.S. Supreme Court increases pre-discovery pleading standards, which increase the standard of plausibility that a lawsuit must meet before proceeding to discovery and trial. In this essay, we develop a game theoretic model of litigant behavior to study the impact of higher pleading standards on choices to engage in illegal or negligent activity. The analysis shows how increasing pleading standards tends to increase illegal activity, and can increase litigation costs. These results provide a counterpoint to the Supreme Court's argument that increased plausibility requirements will decrease the costs of litigation.

Author: Niko Noeske
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertation abstracts
Languages : en
Pages : 848

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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 688

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Author: Markus Konrad Brunnermeier
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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