Author: Ilaria Cingottini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 85
Book Description
Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Auctions
Author: Ilaria Cingottini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 85
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 85
Book Description
Three Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Author: Luke Hu
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783844025132
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783844025132
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
Book Description
Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Multi-object Auctions
Author: Veronika Grimm
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783832211387
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 101
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783832211387
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 101
Book Description
Three Essays
Author: Rong Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 368
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 368
Book Description
Three Essays in Public Mechanism Design
Author: Jin Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Book Description
Essays in Mechanism Design
Author: Levent Ulku
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Econometrics
Languages : en
Pages : 71
Book Description
This dissertation consists of three essays in the theory of mechanism design under incomplete information. In the first essay, we analyze an implementation problem in which monetary transfers are feasible, valuations are interdependent and the set of available choices lies in a product space of lattices. This framework is general enough to subsume many interesting examples, including allocation problems with multiple objects. We identify a class of social choice rules which can be implemented in ex post equilibrium. We identify conditions under which ex post efficient social choice rules are implementable using monotone selection theory. The key conditions are extensions of the single crossing property and supermodularity. These conditions can be replaced with more tractable conditions in multiobject allocation problems with either two objects or two agents. I also show that the payments which implement monotone social decision rules coincide with the payments of (1) the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with private values, and (2) the generalized Vickrey auction introduced by Ausubel [1999] in multiunit allocation problems. The second essay generalizes the analysis of optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism design for the seller of a single object introduced by Myerson [1981]. We consider a problem in which the seller has several heterogeneous objects and buyers' valuations depend on each other's private information. We analyze two nonnested environments in which incentive constraints can be replaced with more tractable monotonicity conditions. We establish conditions under which these monotonicity conditions can be ignored, and show that several earlier analyses of the optimal mechanism design problem can be unified and generalized. In particular, problems with two complementary goods in Levin [1997] and multiunit auction problems in Maskin and Riley [1989] and Branco [1996] are special cases. The third essay considers the problem of selling internet advertising slots to advertisers. Under suitable conditions, we solve for the payments imposed by an optimal mechanism and show that it can be decentralized via prices using a linear assignment approach. At every configuration of private information, optimal mechanism can be interpreted as a menu consisting of a price for every slot.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Econometrics
Languages : en
Pages : 71
Book Description
This dissertation consists of three essays in the theory of mechanism design under incomplete information. In the first essay, we analyze an implementation problem in which monetary transfers are feasible, valuations are interdependent and the set of available choices lies in a product space of lattices. This framework is general enough to subsume many interesting examples, including allocation problems with multiple objects. We identify a class of social choice rules which can be implemented in ex post equilibrium. We identify conditions under which ex post efficient social choice rules are implementable using monotone selection theory. The key conditions are extensions of the single crossing property and supermodularity. These conditions can be replaced with more tractable conditions in multiobject allocation problems with either two objects or two agents. I also show that the payments which implement monotone social decision rules coincide with the payments of (1) the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with private values, and (2) the generalized Vickrey auction introduced by Ausubel [1999] in multiunit allocation problems. The second essay generalizes the analysis of optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism design for the seller of a single object introduced by Myerson [1981]. We consider a problem in which the seller has several heterogeneous objects and buyers' valuations depend on each other's private information. We analyze two nonnested environments in which incentive constraints can be replaced with more tractable monotonicity conditions. We establish conditions under which these monotonicity conditions can be ignored, and show that several earlier analyses of the optimal mechanism design problem can be unified and generalized. In particular, problems with two complementary goods in Levin [1997] and multiunit auction problems in Maskin and Riley [1989] and Branco [1996] are special cases. The third essay considers the problem of selling internet advertising slots to advertisers. Under suitable conditions, we solve for the payments imposed by an optimal mechanism and show that it can be decentralized via prices using a linear assignment approach. At every configuration of private information, optimal mechanism can be interpreted as a menu consisting of a price for every slot.
Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Author: Péter Ernő Eső
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 129
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 129
Book Description
Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Institutions
Author: Aristotelis Boukouras
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Essays on Mechanism Design
Author: Gregory Pavlov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 151
Book Description
In this dissertation we address several open problems in the theory of mechanism design: (i) optimal mechanism design when agents collude; (ii) multidimensional mechanism design problem of the multiproduct monopolist; (iii) robust predictions of the relative revenue loss from the bidders' collusion in the optimal auctions.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 151
Book Description
In this dissertation we address several open problems in the theory of mechanism design: (i) optimal mechanism design when agents collude; (ii) multidimensional mechanism design problem of the multiproduct monopolist; (iii) robust predictions of the relative revenue loss from the bidders' collusion in the optimal auctions.
Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description