Author: Suphachol Suphachalasai
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Get Book Here

Book Description

Author: Sanny Xiao Yang Liao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 180

Get Book Here

Book Description
Chapter 1: In the last two decades, public agencies have started to include performance pay into their compensation structure. Using a survey data of all law enforcement agencies in the Unites States, this chapter investigates: (1) if the adoption of performance pay by agencies affected their ability to fight crime and (2) whether agencies responded to performance pay adoption by shifting their policing strategies to game the change? We find that despite increases in the pay gap, performance pay adoption resulted in no change in the police's ability to fight crime. We find little evidence that adopting agencies attempted to game the incentive structure by shifting efforts away from less profitable tasks. Chapter 2: There has been much debate over whether interest groups act as ideologues or investor when they contribute to candidates. In a seminal work, Snyder (1990) finds that economic interest groups behave as investors and there is a one to one correlation between candidates' share of contribution from economic interest groups and their probability of winning. This chapter expands on Snyder's work by proposing a new strategy to empirically identify investor interest groups, that is, by examining whether an interest group has ever given to competing parties in a race, we call this group "diversifiers". We find that there is indeed a significant correlation between diversifier contribution share and election outcome. Furthermore, the correlation between diversifiers contribution share to date and election outcome remains significant as early as approximately 48 weeks before election day. Chapter 3: Participation of interest groups in public policy making is ubiquitous and unavoidable. In this final chapter, we try to understand the mechanisms through which interest groups attempt to influence the implementation of public policies from an Institutional Economics perspective. We recognize that while it is legislatures that enact and supervise statures, it is often bureaucracies that implement policies. We survey a collection of papers that analyze how the vast power invested in bureaucracies influence the strategic choice of interest group in means to exert influence - buying, lobbying and suing. We further generalize our analysis to understand how differences in the institutional environment impact the role of interest groups in public policy making.

Author: Sheraz Rajput
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Get Book Here

Book Description

Author: Kevin Blaine Grier
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Monetary policy
Languages : en
Pages : 198

Get Book Here

Book Description

Author: Kevin Blaine Grier
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 99

Get Book Here

Book Description

Author: Kwang-ho Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 113

Get Book Here

Book Description

Author: Richard Janney Ball
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economic policy
Languages : en
Pages : 336

Get Book Here

Book Description

Author: Cesar Velazquez
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Campaign funds
Languages : en
Pages : 186

Get Book Here

Book Description

Author: Ugo A. Troiano
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Get Book Here

Book Description
Chapter 1 evaluates the effect of relaxing fiscal rules on policy outcomes applying a quasi-experimental research design. We implement a "difference-in-discontinuities" design by combining the before/after with the discontinuous policy variation generated by the implementation of the Domestic Stability Pact on Italian municipalities between 1999 and 2004. Our estimates show that relaxing fiscal rules triggers a substantial deficit bias, captured by a shift from a balanced budget to a deficit that amounts to 2 percent of the total budget. The deficit comes primarily from reduced revenues as unconstrained municipalities have lower real estate and income tax rates.

Author: Hyeok Ki Min
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780549627722
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 204

Get Book Here

Book Description
Chapter 3 explores whether interest groups can reach a bargaining agreement on the imposition of tariff if we allow the bargaining opportunity. It depends on the presence of the redistribution of tariff revenues. In the absence of the redistribution of tariff revenues, it is impossible for interest groups to reach an agreement. However, a bargaining agreement on tariffs can be reached in the presence of the redistribution of tariff revenues.