The Twelfth US Air Force: Tactical And Operational Innovations In The Mediterranean Theater Of Operations, 1943-1944 PDF Download
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Author: Major Matthew G. St. Clair USMC
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786250837
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 124
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Book Description
This paper analyzes the participation of the US Twelfth Air Force in the Mediterranean theater of operation from 1943 to 1944 and also studies the coalition and joint operations required in the air campaign. Coalition and joint warfare provides numerous command, control, and coordination problems that are not easily de-conflicted. The requirements of the coalition air campaign in the Mediterranean theater provided significant challenges to the leadership of the US Army Air Forces (AAF). Prewar Army Air Corps doctrine focused on strategic bombing and aerial interdiction. Air- men lacked a well thought-out tactical support doctrine and had no doctrine for supporting amphibious operations. The mission of the AAF in the North African and Italian campaigns was the winning of air superiority. The Twelfth Air Force had to adopt new tactics and operational techniques to support the Allied landings at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, Italy, against the formidable German Luftwaffe. The Mediterranean theater was the first theater to encounter the use of precision-guided munitions in the form of radio-controlled glide bombs dropped by the Luftwaffe. The Mediterranean theater was designated a secondary theater of war, resulting in the Twelfth Air Force operating with inadequate resources, as aircraft and crews were periodically reassigned to units supporting the Combined Bomber Offensive in the European theater of operations. While supporting the Mediterranean theater, the Twelfth Air Force operated alongside the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and was routinely tasked with supporting operations of both the US Fifth and British Eighth Armies. This provided significant command, control, and communication (C3) problems that had to be addressed to optimize the effectiveness of Allied airpower.
Author: Major Matthew G. St. Clair USMC
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786250837
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 124
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Book Description
This paper analyzes the participation of the US Twelfth Air Force in the Mediterranean theater of operation from 1943 to 1944 and also studies the coalition and joint operations required in the air campaign. Coalition and joint warfare provides numerous command, control, and coordination problems that are not easily de-conflicted. The requirements of the coalition air campaign in the Mediterranean theater provided significant challenges to the leadership of the US Army Air Forces (AAF). Prewar Army Air Corps doctrine focused on strategic bombing and aerial interdiction. Air- men lacked a well thought-out tactical support doctrine and had no doctrine for supporting amphibious operations. The mission of the AAF in the North African and Italian campaigns was the winning of air superiority. The Twelfth Air Force had to adopt new tactics and operational techniques to support the Allied landings at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, Italy, against the formidable German Luftwaffe. The Mediterranean theater was the first theater to encounter the use of precision-guided munitions in the form of radio-controlled glide bombs dropped by the Luftwaffe. The Mediterranean theater was designated a secondary theater of war, resulting in the Twelfth Air Force operating with inadequate resources, as aircraft and crews were periodically reassigned to units supporting the Combined Bomber Offensive in the European theater of operations. While supporting the Mediterranean theater, the Twelfth Air Force operated alongside the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and was routinely tasked with supporting operations of both the US Fifth and British Eighth Armies. This provided significant command, control, and communication (C3) problems that had to be addressed to optimize the effectiveness of Allied airpower.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 83
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Book Description
This paper analyzes the participation of the US Twelfth Air Force in the Mediterranean theater of operation from 1943 to 1944 and also studies the coalition and joint operations required in the air campaign. Coalition and joint warfare provides numerous command, control, and coordination problems that are not easily de-conflicted. The requirements of the coalition air campaign in the Mediterranean theater provided significant challenges to the leadership of the US Army Air Forces (AAF). Prewar Army Air Corps doctrine focused on strategic bombing and aerial interdiction. Airmen lacked a well thought-out tactical support doctrine and had no doctrine for supporting amphibious operations. The mission of the AAF in the North African and Italian campaigns was the winning of air superiority. The Twelfth Air Force had to adopt new tactics and operational techniques to support the Allied landings at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, Italy, against the formidable German Luftwaffe. The Mediterranean theater was the first theater to encounter the use of precision-guided munitions in the form of radio-controlled glide bombs dropped by the Luftwaffe. The Mediterranean theater was designated a secondary theater of war, resulting in the Twelfth Air Force operating with inadequate resources, as aircraft and crews were periodically reassigned to units supporting the Combined Bomber Offensive in the European theater of operations. While supporting the Mediterranean theater, the Twelfth Air Force operated alongside the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and was routinely tasked with supporting operations of both the US Fifth and British Eighth Armies. This provided significant command, control, and communication (C3) problems that had to be addressed to optimize the effectiveness of Allied airpower. The goal of this paper is to highlight the lessons learned from the selected operations and their applicability to twenty-first-century warfare.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 83
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Book Description
This paper analyzes the participation of the US Twelfth Air Force in the Mediterranean theater of operation from 1943 to 1944 and also studies the coalition and joint operations required in the air campaign. Coalition and joint warfare provides numerous command, control, and coordination problems that are not easily de-conflicted. The requirements of the coalition air campaign in the Mediterranean theater provided significant challenges to the leadership of the US Army Air Forces (AAF). Prewar Army Air Corps doctrine focused on strategic bombing and aerial interdiction. Airmen lacked a well thought-out tactical support doctrine and had no doctrine for supporting amphibious operations. The mission of the AAF in the North African and Italian campaigns was the winning of air superiority. The Twelfth Air Force had to adopt new tactics and operational techniques to support the Allied landings at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, Italy, against the formidable German Luftwaffe. The Mediterranean theater was the first theater to encounter the use of precision-guided munitions in the form of radio-controlled glide bombs dropped by the Luftwaffe. The Mediterranean theater was designated a secondary theater of war, resulting in the Twelfth Air Force operating with inadequate resources, as aircraft and crews were periodically reassigned to units supporting the Combined Bomber Offensive in the European theater of operations. While supporting the Mediterranean theater, the Twelfth Air Force operated alongside the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and was routinely tasked with supporting operations of both the US Fifth and British Eighth Armies. This provided significant command, control, and communication (C3) problems that had to be addressed to optimize the effectiveness of Allied airpower. The goal of this paper is to highlight the lessons learned from the selected operations and their applicability to twenty-first-century warfare.
Author: Matthew G. St. Clair
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Matt Dietz
Publisher: University of North Texas Press
ISBN: 1574418912
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 369
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Book Description
US Air Force Forward Air Controllers (FACs) bridge the gap between air and land power. They operate in the grey area of the battlefield, serving as an aircrew who flies above the battlefield, spots the enemy, and relays targeting information to control close air support attacks by other faster aircraft. When done well, Air Force FACs are the fulcrum for successful employment of air power in support of ground forces. Unfortunately, FACs in recent times have been shunned by both ground and air forces, their mission complicated by inherent difficulty and danger, as well as by the vicissitudes of defense budgets, technology, leadership, bureaucracy, and doctrine. Eagles Overhead is the first complete historical survey of the US Air Force FAC program from its origins in World War I to the modern battlefield. Matt Dietz examines their role, status, and performance in every US Air Force air campaign from the Marne in 1918, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and finally Mosul in 2017. With the remaking of the post-Vietnam US military, and the impact of those changes on FAC, the Air Force began a steady neglect of the FAC mission from Operation Desert Storm, through the force reductions after the Soviet Union’s collapse, and into the post 9-11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Eagles Overhead asks why FACs have not been heavily used on US battlefields since 2001, despite their warfighting importance. Dietz examines the Air Force FAC’s theoretical, doctrinal, institutional, and historical frameworks to assess if the nature of air warfare has changed so significantly that the concept and utility of the FAC has been left behind. From these examinations, Eagles Overhead draws conclusions about the potential future of Air Force FACs.
Author: William J. Daugherty
Publisher: University of North Texas Press
ISBN: 1574419366
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 401
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Book Description
When America entered World War II in 1941, it was first left to the Army Air Forces to take the fight to Germany. In January 1942 the US Eighth Air Force was created and ordered to England, even though it was without men, equipment, or airplanes. This is the story of Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker’s two years with VIII Bomber Command and later as commander of the Eighth, as he worked to grow it into a force capable of striking German targets from above twenty thousand feet. Initially promised one hundred airplanes and the men to fly them, he soon discovered “his” bombers were often diverted to the North Africa and Pacific theaters. Along the way Eaker faced other critical issues, including atrocious weather, heavy casualties, and the absence of escort fighters. Meanwhile, the head of the Army Air Forces, General “Hap” Arnold, clashed with and criticized Eaker for not flying more missions with more airplanes. Ultimately, as the air war unfolded, the war of words behind the scenes continued until the generals reached a point of irreconcilable differences and Arnold relieved Eaker of command. In spite of this, the “Mighty Eighth Air Force” continued to pummel the Germans. Not once, not even in the two absolute worst air battles of the war—the Schweinfurt missions of 1943, each of which cost one of every four bombers and six hundred–plus men for each mission—did the Eighth ever turn back before reaching their target. Not until after the first two years was there a fighter that could escort the heavy bombers, the B-17s and B-24s, even partway into Germany, much less to targets near the Vienna border, and return. The story of the first two years of the “Mighty Eighth Air Force” in many senses presents an even stronger case for heroism, dedication, and simple self-sacrifice than that depicting events in the final seventeen months.
Author: Karen Horn
Publisher: Jonathan Ball Publishers
ISBN: 1776192850
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 343
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Book Description
Equally skilled in a variety of trades other than in the art of love, the Italian prisoners of war (POWs) who were incarcerated in South Africa during the Second World War are a source of great fascination to this day. Who were these men? And what made some of them attempt dramatic escapes, while others wanted to stay behind after the war? The first Italian POWs arrived in the Union of South Africa in early 1941, most of them being held in Zonderwater Camp outside Cullinan or in work camps across the country. The government of Jan Smuts saw them as a source of cheap labour that would contribute to harvesting schemes, road-building projects such as the old Du Toit's Kloof Pass between Paarl and Worcester and even to prickly-pear eradication schemes. Prisoners of Jan Smuts recounts the stories of survival and shenanigans of the Italian POWs in the Union through the eyes of five prisoners who had documented their experiences in memoirs and letters. While many POWs seemed to appreciate the opportunities to gain new skills, others clung to the Fascist ideas they had grown up with and refused to work . Many opted to remain in South Africa once the war had ended, forging quite a legacy. These included sculptor Edoardo Villa, who left an important mark in the local and international art world, and businessman Aurelio Gatti, who built an ice-cream empire whose gelato was to delight generations of South Africans.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic government information
Languages : en
Pages : 920
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Author: Stephen Lee McFarland
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 96
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Except in a few instances, since World War II no American soldier or sailor has been attacked by enemy air power. Conversely, no enemy soldier orsailor has acted in combat without being attacked or at least threatened by American air power. Aviators have brought the air weapon to bear against enemies while denying them the same prerogative. This is the legacy of the U.S. AirForce, purchased at great cost in both human and material resources.More often than not, aerial pioneers had to fight technological ignorance, bureaucratic opposition, public apathy, and disagreement over purpose.Every step in the evolution of air power led into new and untrodden territory, driven by humanitarian impulses; by the search for higher, faster, and farther flight; or by the conviction that the air way was the best way. Warriors have always coveted the high ground. If technology permitted them to reach it, men, women andan air force held and exploited it-from Thomas Selfridge, first among so many who gave that "last full measure of devotion"; to Women's Airforce Service Pilot Ann Baumgartner, who broke social barriers to become the first Americanwoman to pilot a jet; to Benjamin Davis, who broke racial barriers to become the first African American to command a flying group; to Chuck Yeager, a one-time non-commissioned flight officer who was the first to exceed the speed of sound; to John Levitow, who earned the Medal of Honor by throwing himself over a live flare to save his gunship crew; to John Warden, who began a revolution in air power thought and strategy that was put to spectacular use in the Gulf War.Industrialization has brought total war and air power has brought the means to overfly an enemy's defenses and attack its sources of power directly. Americans have perceived air power from the start as a more efficient means of waging war and as a symbol of the nation's commitment to technology to master challenges, minimize casualties, and defeat adversaries.
Author: John F. Kreis
Publisher: Military Bookshop
ISBN: 9781782663812
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 516
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Book Description
From the foreword: WHEN JAPAN ATTACKED PEARL HARBOR on December 7, 1941, and Germany and Italy joined Japan four days later in declaring war against the United States, intelligence essential for the Army Air Forces to conduct effective warfare in the European and Pacific theaters did not exist. Piercing the Fog tells the intriguing story of how airmen built intelligence organizations to collect and process information about the enemy and to produce and disseminate intelligence to decisionmakers and warfighters in the bloody, horrific crucible of war. Because the problems confronting and confounding air intelligence officers, planners, and operators fifty years ago still resonate, Piercing the Fog is particularly valuable for intelligence officers, planners, and operators today and for anyone concerned with acquiring and exploiting intelligence for successful air warfare. More than organizational history, this book reveals the indispensable and necessarily secret role intelligence plays in effectively waging war. It examines how World War II was a watershed period for Air Force Intelligence and for the acquisition and use of signals intelligence, photo reconnaissance intelligence, human resources intelligence, and scientific and technical intelligence. Piercing the Fog discusses the development of new sources and methods of intelligence collection; requirements for intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare; intelligence to support missions for air superiority, interdiction, strategic bombardment, and air defense; the sharing of intelligence in a coalition and joint service environment; the acquisition of intelligence to assess bomb damage on a target-by-target basis and to measure progress in achieving campaign and war objecti ves; and the ability of military leaders to understand the intentions and capabilities of the enemy and to appreciate the pressures on intelligence officers to sometimes tell commanders what they think the commanders want to hear instead of what the intelligence discloses. The complex problems associated with intelligence to support strategic bombardment in the 1940s will strike some readers as uncannily prescient to global Air Force operations in the 1990s.," Illustrated.
