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Author: Chong-En Bai
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
The more corrupt a country, the more likely it is to impose capital controls. As a country improves its public institutions over time, it tends to gradually liberalize its capital accounts. Removing capital controls prematurely could reduce rather than improve the country's economic efficiency.The extent of bureaucracy varies extensively across countries, but the quality of bureaucracy within a country changes more slowly than economic policies. Bai and Wei propose that the quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open economy macroeconomic policies - especially the imposition or removal of capital controls.In their model, capital controls are an instrument of financial repression. They entail efficiency loss for the economy but also generate implicit revenue for the government. The results show that bureaucratic corruption translates into the government's reduced ability to collect tax revenues. Even if capital controls and financial repression are otherwise inefficient, the government still has to rely on them to raise revenues to provide public goods.Among the countries for which the authors could get relevant data, they find that the more corrupt ones are indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern consistent with the model's prediction. To deal with possible reverse causality, they use the extent of corruption in a country's judicial system, and the degree of democracy, as the instrumental variables for bureaucratic corruption. The instrumental variable regressions show the same result: more corrupt countries are associated with more severe capital controls.The results suggest that as countries develop and improve their public institutions, reducing bureaucratic corruption over time, they will choose to gradually liberalize their capital accounts. Removing capital controls prematurely when forced by outside institutions to do so could reduce rather than improve their economic efficiency.This paper - a product of the Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the consequences of corruption and public governance.
Author: Chong-En Bai
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
The more corrupt a country, the more likely it is to impose capital controls. As a country improves its public institutions over time, it tends to gradually liberalize its capital accounts. Removing capital controls prematurely could reduce rather than improve the country's economic efficiency.The extent of bureaucracy varies extensively across countries, but the quality of bureaucracy within a country changes more slowly than economic policies. Bai and Wei propose that the quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open economy macroeconomic policies - especially the imposition or removal of capital controls.In their model, capital controls are an instrument of financial repression. They entail efficiency loss for the economy but also generate implicit revenue for the government. The results show that bureaucratic corruption translates into the government's reduced ability to collect tax revenues. Even if capital controls and financial repression are otherwise inefficient, the government still has to rely on them to raise revenues to provide public goods.Among the countries for which the authors could get relevant data, they find that the more corrupt ones are indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern consistent with the model's prediction. To deal with possible reverse causality, they use the extent of corruption in a country's judicial system, and the degree of democracy, as the instrumental variables for bureaucratic corruption. The instrumental variable regressions show the same result: more corrupt countries are associated with more severe capital controls.The results suggest that as countries develop and improve their public institutions, reducing bureaucratic corruption over time, they will choose to gradually liberalize their capital accounts. Removing capital controls prematurely when forced by outside institutions to do so could reduce rather than improve their economic efficiency.This paper - a product of the Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the consequences of corruption and public governance.
Author: Chong-En Bai
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Administracion publica
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
The extent of bureaucracy varies extensively across countries, but the quality of bureaucracy within a country changes more slowly than economic policies. The authors propose that the quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open economy macroeconomic policies - especially the imposition or removal of capital control. In their model, capital controls are an instrument of financial repression. They entail efficiency loss for the economy but also generate implicit revenue for the government. The results show that bureaucratic corruption translates into the government's reduced ability to collect tax revenues. Even if capital controls and financial repression are otherwise inefficient, the government still has to rely on them to raise revenues to provide public goods. Among the countries for which the authors could get relevant data, they find that the more corrupt ones are indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern consistent with the model's prediction. To deal with possible reverse causality, they use the extent of corruption in a country's judicial system, and the degree of democracy, as the instrumental variables for bureaucratic corruption. The instrumental variable regressions show the same result: more corrupt countries are associated with more severe capital controls. The results suggest that as countries develop and improve their public institutions, reducing bureaucratic corruption over time, they will choose to gradually liberalize their capital accounts. Removing capital controls prematurely when forced by outside institutions to do so could reduce rather than improve their economic efficiency.
Author: Wei
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Chong-En Bai
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Administrative agencies
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
Bureaucratic quality in terms of the level of corruption varies widely across countries, and is in general slow to evolve relative to the speed with which many economic polices can be implemented such as the imposition of capital controls. In this paper, we study the possibility that quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open-economy macro-policies, in particular, the imposition/removal of capital controls, and financial repression. We first derive a model that delivers such a result. Bureaucratic corruption translates into reduced ability by the government to collect tax revenue. Even if capital control/financial repression is otherwise inefficient, as long as the government needs the revenue for public goods provision, it would have to rely more on capital control/financial repression. For all countries for which we can obtain relevant data, we find that more corrupt countries are indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern consistent with the model's prediction. The result of this paper suggests that a premature removal of capital controls mandated by outside institutions could reduce rather than enhance economic efficiency.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
The National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. (NBER) presents an abstract of the June 2000 working paper entitled "Quality of Bureaucracy and Open-economy Macro Policies," written by Chong-En Bai and Shang-Jin Wei. The full text of the paper may be purchased online. This paper develops a model that shows the importance of bureaucracy as a structural determinant of open-economy macroeconomic policies. The authors find that a premature removal of capital controls mandated by outside institutions could reduce economic efficiency.
Author: Martin Feldstein
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226241807
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 500
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Book Description
Recent changes in technology, along with the opening up of many regions previously closed to investment, have led to explosive growth in the international movement of capital. Flows from foreign direct investment and debt and equity financing can bring countries substantial gains by augmenting local savings and by improving technology and incentives. Investing companies acquire market access, lower cost inputs, and opportunities for profitable introductions of production methods in the countries where they invest. But, as was underscored recently by the economic and financial crises in several Asian countries, capital flows can also bring risks. Although there is no simple explanation of the currency crisis in Asia, it is clear that fixed exchange rates and chronic deficits increased the likelihood of a breakdown. Similarly, during the 1970s, the United States and other industrial countries loaned OPEC surpluses to borrowers in Latin America. But when the U.S. Federal Reserve raised interest rates to control soaring inflation, the result was a widespread debt moratorium in Latin America as many countries throughout the region struggled to pay the high interest on their foreign loans. International Capital Flows contains recent work by eminent scholars and practitioners on the experience of capital flows to Latin America, Asia, and eastern Europe. These papers discuss the role of banks, equity markets, and foreign direct investment in international capital flows, and the risks that investors and others face with these transactions. By focusing on capital flows' productivity and determinants, and the policy issues they raise, this collection is a valuable resource for economists, policymakers, and financial market participants.
Author:
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 9780195211061
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 370
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Book Description
Refer review of this policy book in 'Journal of International Development, vol. 10, 7, 1998. pp.841-855.
Author: Andreas Bågenholm
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191899003
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 881
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Book Description
Recent research demonstrates that the quality of public institutions is crucial for a number of important environmental, social, economic, and political outcomes, and thereby human well-being. The Quality of Government (QoG) approach directs attention to issues such as impartiality in the exercise of public power, professionalism in public service delivery, effective measures against corruption, and meritocracy instead of patronage and nepotism. This Handbook offers a comprehensive, state-of-the-art overview of this rapidly expanding research field and also identifies viable avenues for future research. The initial chapters focus on theoretical approaches and debates, and the central question of how QoG can be measured. A second set of chapters examines the wealth of empirical research on how QoG relates to democratization, social trust and cohesion, ethnic diversity, happiness and human wellbeing, democratic accountability, economic growth and inequality, political legitimacy, environmental sustainability, gender equality, and the outbreak of civil conflicts. The remaining chapters turn to the perennial issue of which contextual factors and policy approaches—national, local, and international—have proven successful (and not so successful) for increasing QoG. The Quality of Government approach both challenges and complements important strands of inquiry in the social sciences. For research about democratization, QoG adds the importance of taking state capacity into account. For economics, the QoG approach shows that in order to produce economic prosperity, markets need to be embedded in institutions with a certain set of qualities. For development studies, QoG emphasizes that issues relating to corruption are integral to understanding development writ large.
Author: Vanda Felbab-Brown
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 0815731906
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 191
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Book Description
" Conventional political theory holds that the sovereign state is the legitimate source of order and provider of public services in any society, whether democratic or not. But Hezbollah and ISIS in the Middle East, pirate clans in Africa, criminal gangs in South America, and militias in Southeast Asia are examples of nonstate actors that control local territory and render public services that the nation-state cannot or will not provide. This fascinating book takes the reader around the world to areas where national governance has broken down—or never really existed. In these places, the vacuum has been filled by local gangs, militias, and warlords, some with ideological or political agendas and others focused primarily on economic gain. Many of these actors have substantial popularity and support among local populations and have developed their own enduring institutions, often undermining the legitimacy of the national state. The authors show that the rest of the world has more than a passing interest in these situations, in part because transborder crime and terrorism often emerge but also because failed states threaten international interests from trade to security. This book also poses, and offers answers for, the question: How should the international community respond to local orders dominated by armed nonstate actors? In many cases outsiders have taken the short-term route—accepting unsavory local actors out of expediency—but at the price of long-term instability or damage to human rights and other considerations. From Africa and the Middle East to Asia and Latin America, the local situations highlighted in this book are, and will remain, high on today's international agenda. The book makes a unique contribution to global understanding of how those situations developed and what can be done about them. This title is part of the Geopolitics in the 21st Century series. "
Author: Sasha Toperich
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 194766106X
Category : Political Science
Languages : tr
Pages : 284
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Book Description
Turkey’s position in transatlantic alliances goes back in the 1950s. Turkish Foreign Policy “Fresh Look” was launched just prior to the failed coup d’etat last July, and was intended to mend ties with its neighbors with whom Turkey has strained relationships. Turkey’s new pragmatic reconciliation policy strives to build bridges without damaging existing transatlantic alliance. The goal of developing good relations with its neighbors that surround the Mediterranean and the Black sea, presents Turkey with a number of challenges. Turkey is seen as a bridge between West and East due to its geographic location. This volume intends to shed more light into past, present and future Turkey-Transatlantic relations, focusing on a history of Turkey-Transatlantic relations, the impact of current developments in Turkey and its neighbors, and Turkish domestic and foreign policies in Transatlantic relations. Authors include: Hülya Kevser Akdemir, Serdar Altay, Altay Atlı, Enes bayraklı, Münevver Cebeci, Filiz Cicioğlu, Şükrü Cicioğlu, İsmail Çağlar, Beril Dedeoğlu, Mehmet Uğur Ekinci, Emre Erşen, Tea Ivanovic, Donald N. Jensen, Edward P. Joseph, Kılıç Buğra Kanat, Erdal Tanas Karagöl, Christina Lin, Jennifer Miel, Nona Mikhelidze, Çiğdem Nas, Aslı Şirin Öner, Yonca Özer, Nicolò Sartori, Merve Seren, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Melike Janine Sökmen, Sasha Toperich, Aylin Ünver Noi, Alida Vračić, and Murat Yerlitaş
