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Author: Franz Schurmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 164
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Book Description
SCOTT (copy 1) From the John Holmes Library collection.
Author: Franz Schurmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 164
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Book Description
SCOTT (copy 1) From the John Holmes Library collection.
Author: Brian VanDeMark
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195357191
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 285
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Book Description
In November of 1964, as Lyndon Johnson celebrated his landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, the government of South Vietnam lay in a shambles. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor described it as a country beset by "chronic factionalism, civilian-military suspicion and distrust, absence of national spirit and motivation, lack of cohesion in the social structure, lack of experience in the conduct of government." Virtually no one in the Johnson Administration believed that Saigon could defeat the communist insurgency--and yet by July of 1965, a mere nine months later, they would lock the United States on a path toward massive military intervention which would ultimately destroy Johnson's presidency and polarize the American people. Into the Quagmire presents a closely rendered, almost day-by-day account of America's deepening involvement in Vietnam during those crucial nine months. Mining a wealth of recently opened material at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and elsewhere, Brian VanDeMark vividly depicts the painful unfolding of a national tragedy. We meet an LBJ forever fearful of a conservative backlash, which he felt would doom his Great Society, an unsure and troubled leader grappling with the unwanted burden of Vietnam; George Ball, a maverick on Vietnam, whose carefully reasoned (and, in retrospect, strikingly prescient) stand against escalation was discounted by Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy; and Clark Clifford, whose last-minute effort at a pivotal meeting at Camp David failed to dissuade Johnson from doubling the number of ground troops in Vietnam. What comes across strongly throughout the book is the deep pessimism of all the major participants as things grew worse--neither LBJ, nor Bundy, nor McNamara, nor Rusk felt confident that things would improve in South Vietnam, that there was any reasonable chance for victory, or that the South had the will or the ability to prevail against the North. And yet deeper into the quagmire they went. Whether describing a tense confrontation between George Ball and Dean Acheson ("You goddamned old bastards," Ball said to Acheson, "you remind me of nothing so much as a bunch of buzzards sitting on a fence and letting the young men die") or corrupt politicians in Saigon, VanDeMark provides readers with the full flavor of national policy in the making. More important, he sheds greater light on why America became entangled in the morass of Vietnam.
Author: Franz Schurmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 174
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Book Description
Author: Franz Schurmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 160
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Book Description
Author: Sophia Freund
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3638457664
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 17
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Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2005 in the subject History of Europe - Newer History, European Unification, grade: 1,7, University Pierre-Mendès-France (Institut des Etudes Politiques), course: Cours spécialisé, language: English, abstract: Since the beginning of the escalation of the Vietnam War politicians and scientists are discussing the reasons for this intensification of military action. One can find as much theories as theorists. In the following I will present the most important and disseminated concepts. To create a foundation for my presentation I will shortly describe the chronology of the events which frame the escalation and the escalation itself. After that I will at first present the official, government explanation for the escalation, which is based on the containment of Communist aggression. Subsequent to that I will portray the two most important theories: the 'Quagmire Theory' and the 'Stalemate Theory'. Furthermore some analysts saw the dilemma in the personality and the authority of the American Presidents. At least there is the idea that the escalation was a result of political and economical interests of the USA. Finally I will finish my work with my own conclusion about the intervention in the Vietnam War and its escalation.
Author: Herbert Franz Schurnamm
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 160
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam
Languages : en
Pages : 160
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Book Description
Author: Edwin E. Moïse
Publisher: Univ of North Carolina Press
ISBN: 0807863483
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 325
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Book Description
Retracing the confused pattern of planning for escalation of the Vietnam War, Moise reconstructs the events of the night of August 4, 1964, when the U.S. Navy destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy reported that they were under attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. Using declassified records and interviews with the participants, Moise demonstrates that there was no North Vietnamese attack; the original report was a genuine mistake.
Author: Fredrik Logevall
Publisher: Univ of California Press
ISBN: 0520927117
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 558
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Book Description
In one of the most detailed and powerfully argued books published on American intervention in Vietnam, Fredrik Logevall examines the last great unanswered question on the war: Could the tragedy have been averted? His answer: a resounding yes. Challenging the prevailing myth that the outbreak of large-scale fighting in 1965 was essentially unavoidable, Choosing War argues that the Vietnam War was unnecessary, not merely in hindsight but in the context of its time. Why, then, did major war break out? Logevall shows it was partly because of the timidity of the key opponents of U.S. involvement, and partly because of the staunch opposition of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to early negotiations. His superlative account shows that U.S. officials chose war over disengagement despite deep doubts about the war's prospects and about Vietnam's importance to U.S. security and over the opposition of important voices in the Congress, in the press, and in the world community. They did so because of concerns about credibility—not so much America's or the Democratic party's credibility, but their own personal credibility. Based on six years of painstaking research, this book is the first to place American policymaking on Vietnam in 1963-65 in its wider international context using multiarchival sources, many of them recently declassified. Here we see for the first time how the war played in the key world capitals—not merely in Washington, Saigon, and Hanoi, but also in Paris and London, in Tokyo and Ottawa, in Moscow and Beijing. Choosing War is a powerful and devastating account of fear, favor, and hypocrisy at the highest echelons of American government, a book that will change forever our understanding of the tragedy that was the Vietnam War.
Author: Fredrik Logevall
Publisher: Univ of California Press
ISBN: 0520229193
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 558
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Book Description
This text examines the great unanswered question on the Vietnam War: could the tragedy have been averted? It challenges prevailing myth that the outbreak of large-scale fighting in 1965 was unavoidable and argues that the war was unnecessary.
