The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games PDF Download
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Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818472
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
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Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Author: Krittanai Laohakunakorn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We study sequential equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game with local interaction and local monitoring. An undirected network determines both the interaction and the monitoring structure. When players do not discount the future, a sequentially rational Nash threats folk theorem holds without any restrictions on the network structure. To prove this result, we construct strategies that support as a sequential equilibrium any payoff vector which is a convex combination (with rational weights) of stage game payoffs and is such that each player is strictly better off than under a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. No form of communication or coordination device is required. On the other hand, when players discount the future, the folk theorem cannot hold in our setting unless further restrictions are made either on payoffs or the network structure.
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818464
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
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Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Author: Christopher Decker
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1849801967
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 311
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Book Description
The book is well written and readable by non economists. The approaches, questions, methodology, and basis for selection of cases/interviewees are clearly explained and justified. This book is a valuable contribution to the literature. Rhonda Smith, Competition and Consumer Law Journal Recent years have seen a trend toward an economics-based approach to the enforcement of European competition law. But what is meant by economics-based , and how does this approach sit with legal and enforcement practice? This book seeks to place in perspective the growing use of economics in European competition law enforcement by examining precisely how economics contributes to the enforcement activity of the European Commission and Courts. Christopher Decker provides unique empirical insights as to how economic theory, thinking, techniques and data have featured in decision-making in the area of co-ordinated effects. The role of economics is examined throughout the entire enforcement process, from the decision to initiate an investigation to the design and implementation of remedies, and its conclusions are of general relevance to all areas of competition law enforcement where economics is used. Utilising a broad and multifaceted conception of economics, this book is essential reading for academics and students interested in European competition law, EC competition lawyers, applied industrial economists and enforcement officials. It will also be an invaluable tool for academic libraries and institutes, government agencies, law firms and economic consultancies.
Author: Anna R. Karlin
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
ISBN: 1470419823
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 400
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Book Description
We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
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Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: Stephen E. Morris
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
Author: Anatol Rapoport
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 240
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Book Description
Clear, accessible treatment of mathematical models for resolving conflicts in politics, economics, war, business, and social relationships. Topics include strategy, game tree and game matrix, and much more. Minimal math background required. 1970 edition.
