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Author: Marshall J. Breger
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199812128
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 578
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Book Description
It is essential for anyone involved in law, politics, and government, as well as students of the governmental process, to comprehend the workings of the federal independent regulatory agencies of the United States. Occasionally referred to as the "headless fourth branch of government," these agencies do not fit neatly within any of the three constitutional branches. Their members are appointed for terms that typically exceed those of the President, and they cannot be removed from office in the absence of some sort of malfeasance or misconduct. They wield enormous power over the private sector, and they have foreign analogues. In Independent Agencies in the United States, Marshall Breger and Gary Edles provide a full-length study of the structure and workings of federal independent regulatory agencies in the US. This book focuses on traditional multi-member agencies that have a significant impact on the American economy, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. This work recognizes that the changing kaleidoscope of modern life has led Congress to create idiosyncratic administrative structures consisting of independent agencies squarely within the Executive Branch, including government corporations and government-sponsored enterprises, to establish a new construct of independence to meet the changing needs of the administrative state. In the process, Breger and Edles analyze the general conflict between political accountability and agency independence. This book also compares US with EU and certain UK independent agencies to offer a unique comparative perspective. Included is a first-of-its-kind appendix describing the powers and procedures of the more than 35 independent US federal agencies, with each supplemented by a selective bibliography of pertinent materials.
Author: Marshall J. Breger
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199812128
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 578
Get Book Here
Book Description
It is essential for anyone involved in law, politics, and government, as well as students of the governmental process, to comprehend the workings of the federal independent regulatory agencies of the United States. Occasionally referred to as the "headless fourth branch of government," these agencies do not fit neatly within any of the three constitutional branches. Their members are appointed for terms that typically exceed those of the President, and they cannot be removed from office in the absence of some sort of malfeasance or misconduct. They wield enormous power over the private sector, and they have foreign analogues. In Independent Agencies in the United States, Marshall Breger and Gary Edles provide a full-length study of the structure and workings of federal independent regulatory agencies in the US. This book focuses on traditional multi-member agencies that have a significant impact on the American economy, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. This work recognizes that the changing kaleidoscope of modern life has led Congress to create idiosyncratic administrative structures consisting of independent agencies squarely within the Executive Branch, including government corporations and government-sponsored enterprises, to establish a new construct of independence to meet the changing needs of the administrative state. In the process, Breger and Edles analyze the general conflict between political accountability and agency independence. This book also compares US with EU and certain UK independent agencies to offer a unique comparative perspective. Included is a first-of-its-kind appendix describing the powers and procedures of the more than 35 independent US federal agencies, with each supplemented by a selective bibliography of pertinent materials.
Author: Louis Leventhal Jaffe
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Industrial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 9
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Author: Brian D. Feinstein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Independent agencies are in the judicial crosshairs. Scholars criticize their efficacy--while still puzzling over how to define the form. By and large, this attention focuses on the top of the agency hierarchy, the extent to which agency heads are insulated from presidential control. What this perspective misses, however, is that power is also exercised by tenure-protected civil servants below. This phenomenon exists not because Congress has delegated them authority, but because executive branch actors have. Consequently, there exists another species of independent agency that requires a reckoning: call them “submerged independent agencies.” These entities are “agencies” because they wield discretionary governmental authority. They are “independent” because they are headed by career staff removable only for cause. And they are “submerged” in that they are relatively unknown to scholars, judges, and sometimes even agency heads themselves. This Article introduces the concept of submerged independent agencies, sheds light on their scope, and reflects upon the resulting normative implications. Using over forty years of data drawn from the Federal Register, the analysis reveals that when political appointees delegate their statutory authority, the majority of these powers go to civil servants rather than fellow appointees. Once granted, they are rarely revoked. This behavior appears to be driven by strategic political considerations. For example, subdelegations to civil servants in executive agencies occur more frequently during the midnight period before a presidential transition -- perhaps indicating an effort to entrench preferences. In addition, subdelegation may be less common during periods of divided party control between the presidency and House. This behavior may reflect an attempt to avoid provoking congressional ire by reassigning powers that Congress had bestowed on others.These findings raise several legal and normative concerns. Many submerged independent agencies are vulnerable to constitutional challenge and raise difficult statutory questions. Whether the phenomenon is ultimately desirable for the administrative state is an open, empirical question. On the one hand, subdelegations raise the prospect of agency burrowing and entrenchment, and thus diminish political accountability. On the other hand, they can foster expertise and reduce ossification by dispersing decision-making authority within an agency. Accordingly, we consider various institutional mechanisms to help political actors navigate these tradeoffs, such as processes for reviewing actions taken pursuant to delegated authority; regular sunsets of such authority; and a more robust process of revisiting subdelegations during presidential transitions.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means. Subcommittee on Social Security
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 204
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Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means. Subcommittee on Social Security
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Social security
Languages : en
Pages : 168
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Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 80
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Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Independent regulatory commissions
Languages : en
Pages : 76
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Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking and Currency
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Author: Kirti Datla
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Volumes have been written -- both by courts and commentators -- about the so-called independent agencies. These agencies are thought of as distinct from executive branch agencies and constitutionally insulated from presidential influence. Yet few have taken the time to ask even the most basic question: What features make an agency “independent” as opposed to “executive?” This Article is the first to systematically survey the administrative agencies for a broad set of indicia of independence -- removal protection, multi-member structure, partisan balance requirements, budget and congressional communication authority, litigation authority, and adjudication authority -- to answer that question. It also examines the functional differences between independent and executive agencies. As it turns out, there is no single feature, structural or functional, that every agency commonly thought of as independent shares, not even the for-cause removal provision commonly associated with independence. We therefore reject the binary distinction between independent and executive agencies. Instead all agencies should be regarded as executive and seen as falling on a spectrum from more independent to less independent. From this new understanding of administrative agencies flows a new and simpler theory of presidential control of agencies: A President can take an action with respect to an agency (assuming it is within his Article II powers) unless Congress has prohibited that action by statute. There is no tenable argument to justify any additional constitutional barrier to presidential interaction with agencies, and the dicta in Humphrey's Executor suggesting otherwise is incorrect and should be abandoned. Most importantly, we believe there is no statutory or constitutional barrier to the extension of the regulatory review executive orders to all administrative agencies. These executive orders have long exempted “independent agencies." As a result those agencies perform shoddy cost-benefit analysis when promulgating regulations, when they do so at all. The Dodd-Frank reform bill requires financial agencies, almost all of which are considered independent, to promulgate over 300 regulations. This upcoming flood of regulations underscores what has been obvious for decades that independent agencies impose massive regulatory costs, just like executive agencies. This Article aims to make it clear there is no legal barrier to the extension of the regulatory review executive orders in the hopes of emboldening a future President to overcome the political barriers to doing so.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Education and Labor
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 214
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Book Description
