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Author: Barry Watts
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781478352372
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 184
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Book Description
FROM THE AUTHOR: This study revolves around friction, meaning the ubiquitous uncertainties and inescapable difficulties that form the atmosphere of real war. More specifically, it attempts to utilize the Clausewitzian concept of general friction as a basis for assessing-and, if necessary, reshaping-the foundations of US air doctrine. This critical application of friction gives rise to four primary conclusions: (1) The key assumptions underlying mainstream US doctrine for conventional air warfare have not evolved appreciably since Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) theorists elaborated their theory of precision, industrial bombardment during the 1930s. (2) Judged by their essential premises and logic, post-Hiroshima theories of deterrence are little more than an updating for the nuclear age of ACTS bombardment doctrine. (3) Both ACTS bombardment doctrine and deterrence theory appear fundamentally flawed insofar as they omit the frictional considerations that distinguish real war from war on paper. (4) Reflection upon the extent to which friction pervades the elemental processes of actual combat suggests that the range of situations in which greater numbers or superior weapons guarantee victory is relatively limited; even in the age of thermonuclear weapons, the outcomes of battles still turn, more often than not, on the character and intelligence of a few brave individuals. The first step in giving substance to these claims is to explain what the central beliefs of US airmen traditionally have been. The reader should be warned, however, that I have approached the writings on war of airmen like Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., and nuclear strategists like Bernard Brodie-as well as those of Carl von Clausewitz himself-from the perspective of two interrelated questions. What overriding assumptions about war did these individuals embrace? And what image of war as a total phenomenon is bound up in their assumptions? In large part, answering these questions is a matter of historical inquiry and, to be candid, I have been far less concerned with writing history for its own sake than with using the past to illuminate the problems of the present. I, therefore, leave it to the reader to judge whether I have managed to do so without injuring the historical record. Air University Press.
Author: Barry Watts
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781478352372
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 184
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Book Description
FROM THE AUTHOR: This study revolves around friction, meaning the ubiquitous uncertainties and inescapable difficulties that form the atmosphere of real war. More specifically, it attempts to utilize the Clausewitzian concept of general friction as a basis for assessing-and, if necessary, reshaping-the foundations of US air doctrine. This critical application of friction gives rise to four primary conclusions: (1) The key assumptions underlying mainstream US doctrine for conventional air warfare have not evolved appreciably since Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) theorists elaborated their theory of precision, industrial bombardment during the 1930s. (2) Judged by their essential premises and logic, post-Hiroshima theories of deterrence are little more than an updating for the nuclear age of ACTS bombardment doctrine. (3) Both ACTS bombardment doctrine and deterrence theory appear fundamentally flawed insofar as they omit the frictional considerations that distinguish real war from war on paper. (4) Reflection upon the extent to which friction pervades the elemental processes of actual combat suggests that the range of situations in which greater numbers or superior weapons guarantee victory is relatively limited; even in the age of thermonuclear weapons, the outcomes of battles still turn, more often than not, on the character and intelligence of a few brave individuals. The first step in giving substance to these claims is to explain what the central beliefs of US airmen traditionally have been. The reader should be warned, however, that I have approached the writings on war of airmen like Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., and nuclear strategists like Bernard Brodie-as well as those of Carl von Clausewitz himself-from the perspective of two interrelated questions. What overriding assumptions about war did these individuals embrace? And what image of war as a total phenomenon is bound up in their assumptions? In large part, answering these questions is a matter of historical inquiry and, to be candid, I have been far less concerned with writing history for its own sake than with using the past to illuminate the problems of the present. I, therefore, leave it to the reader to judge whether I have managed to do so without injuring the historical record. Air University Press.
Author: Barry D. Watts
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Aeronautics, Military
Languages : en
Pages : 192
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Book Description
This study analyzes airpower doctrine from the viewpoint of Clausewitzian friction. The study concludes that American airpower doctrine has changed very little since the 1930s and that it is fundamentally flawed.
Author: Barry D. Watts
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781585660070
Category : Aeronautics, Military
Languages : en
Pages : 159
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Book Description
Author: Air University Press
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781973517511
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 143
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Book Description
This study revolves around friction, meaning the ubiquitous uncertainties and inescapable difficulties that form the atmosphere of real war. More specifically, it attempts to utilize the Clausewitzian concept of general friction as a basis for assessing--and, if necessary, reshaping--the foundations of US air doctrine. This critical application of friction gives rise to four primary conclusions: (1) The key assumptions underlying mainstream US doctrine for conventional air warfare have not evolved appreciably since Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) theorists elaborated their theory of precision, industrial bombardment during the 1930s. (2) Judged by their essential premises and logic, post-Hiroshima theories of deterrence are little more than an updating for the nuclear age of ACTS bombardment doctrine. (3) Both ACTS bombardment doctrine and deterrence theory appear fundamentally flawed insofar as they omit the frictional considerations that distinguish real war from war on paper. (4) Reflection upon the extent to which friction pervades the elemental processes of actual combat suggests that the range of situations in which greater numbers or superior weapons guarantee victory is relatively limited; even in the age of thermonuclear weapons, the outcomes of battles still turn, more often than not, on the character and intelligence of a few brave individuals. The first step in giving substance to these claims is to explain what the central beliefs of US airmen traditionally have been. The reader should be warned, however, that I have approached the writings on war of airmen like Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., and nuclear strategists like Bernard Brodie--as well as those of Carl von Clausewitz himself--from the perspective of two interrelated questions. What overriding assumptions about war did these individuals embrace? And what image of war as a total phenomenon is bound up in their assumptions? In large part, answering these questions is a matter of historical inquiry and, to be candid, I have been far less concerned with writing history for its own sake than with using the past to illuminate the problems of the present. I, therefore, leave it to the reader to judge whether I have managed to do so without injuring the historical record.Contents: 1 INTRODUCTION * Notes * 2 DOUHET AND MITCHELL * Douhet's Image of War: Unrestrained Offense * Mitchell's "Aerial Knights" * Notes * 3 THE FIRST US STRATEGIC AIR WAR PLAN * Daylight, High Altitude, Precision Bombardment * Doctrine * AWPD-1 * The Image of War in AWPD-1 * Notes * 4 THE POLICY AND STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE * Brodie's Assumptions * Brodie's Image of All-Out War in the Missile Age * A Paradox of Deterrence Theory * Notes * 5 A CLAUSEWITZIAN CRITIQUE * The Core Beliefs of Mainstream US Air Doctrine * Some Ramifications * Friction * Collective Risk * Notes * 6 FRICTION IN 20TH CENTURY WARFARE * Part 1: Friction in the Combined Bomber Offensive, World War II * Weather * October 1943: Information, Doctrinal Rigidity, Enemy Countermeasures * Big Week and the Problem of Industrial Impact Assessments * March and April 1944: Friction as a Weapon * Epilogue in Korea: Railway Interdiction, August 1951-May 1952 * Part 2: Friction in the Missile Age * The Not-So-Delicate Balance of Terror * The Emergence of Friction in Brodie's Thought * The Cuban Missile Crisis * Notes * 7 TOWARD A LESS MECHANISTIC IMAGE OF WAR * US Air Doctrine and Laplacian Determinism * Cartesian Hypotheses, Uncertainty, Undecidability * The Human Cost of War * Combat Psychology as Context * Some Consequences of Embracing a More Organic Image of War * Learning from History * Nurturing Military Genius * Exemplars for Future Wars: Friction as a Weapon and Entropy * Summing Up * Notes * APPENDIX * General Eaker's Presentation of the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff * SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Author: General Giulio Douhet
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1782898522
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 620
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Book Description
In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.
Author: Air University (U.S.). Extension Course Institute
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428915729
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 162
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Book Description
Author: Thomas H. Greer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 166
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Book Description
En redegørelse for doktriner for luftvåbnet i USA i perioden 1917-1941. Den medtager taktiske og strategiske erfaringer opnået under deltagelsen i Den 1. Verdenskrig 1914-1918. Emnerne er doktrinudvikling, anvendelse af luftvåbnet, langdistancebombning og doktrin for 2. Verdenskrig 1939-1941.
Author: Robert A. Doughty
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 68
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Book Description
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
Author: Robert Frank Futrell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 688
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Book Description
In this first of a two-volume study, Dr. Futrell presents a chronological survey of the development of Air Force doctrine and thinking from the beginnings of powered flight to the onset of the space age. He outlines the struggle of early aviation enthusiasts to gain acceptance of the airplane as a weapon and win combat-arm status for the Army Air Service (later the Army Air Corps and Army Air Force). He surveys the development of airpower doctrine during the 1930s and World War II and outlines the emergence of the autonomous US Air Force in the postwar period. Futrell brings this first volume to a close with discussions of the changes in Air Force thinking and doctrine necessitated by the emergence of the intercontinental missile, the beginnings of space exploration and weapon systems, and the growing threat of limited conflicts resulting from the Communist challenge of wars of liberation. In volume two, the author traces the new directions that Air Force strategy, policies, and thinking took during the Kennedy administration, the Vietnam War, and the post-Vietnam period. Futrell outlines how the Air Force struggled with President Kennedy's redefinition of national security policy and Robert S. McNamara's managerial style as secretary of defense. He describes how the Air Force argued that airpower should be used during the war in Southeast Asia. He chronicles the evolution of doctrine and organization regarding strategic, tactical, and airlift capabilities and the impact that the aerospace environment and technology had on Air Force thinking and doctrine.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Airpower is not widely understood. Even though it has come to play an increasingly important role in both peace and war, the basic concepts that define and govern airpower remain obscure to many people, even to professional military officers. This fact is largely due to fundamental differences of opinion as to whether or not the aircraft has altered the strategies of war or merely its tactics. If the former, then one can see airpower as a revolutionary leap along the continuum of war; but if the latter, then airpower is simply another weapon that joins the arsenal along with the rifle, machine gun, tank, submarine, and radio. This book implicitly assumes that airpower has brought about a revolution in war. It has altered virtually all aspects of war: how it is fought, by whom, against whom, and with what weapons. Flowing from those factors have been changes in training, organization, administration, command and control, and doctrine. War has been fundamentally transformed by the advent of the airplane.