The Existence of Self-enforcing Implicit Contracts

The Existence of Self-enforcing Implicit Contracts PDF Author: Clive Bull
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Employment (Economic theory)
Languages : en
Pages : 37

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Book Description

The Existence of Self-enforcing Implicit Contracts

The Existence of Self-enforcing Implicit Contracts PDF Author: Clive Bull
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Employment (Economic theory)
Languages : en
Pages : 37

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Book Description


Allocation, Information and Markets

Allocation, Information and Markets PDF Author: John Eatwell
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349202150
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 321

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Book Description
This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.

A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements

A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements PDF Author: Robert E. Scott
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
All contracts are incomplete. But incomplete contracts differ along several key dimensions. Many contracts are incomplete because parties decline to condition performance on future states that they cannot observe or verify to courts. In these cases, the incompleteness is exogenous to the contract. Other agreements, however, appear to be "deliberately" incomplete in the sense that parties decline to condition performance on available, verifiable measures that could be specified in the contract at relatively low cost. Thus, incompleteness is endogenous to these agreements suggesting that the parties had other reasons for leaving the terms in question unspecified. Traditional contract law doctrine appears to track this distinction. One of the core principles of contact law is the requirement of definiteness. An agreement will not be enforced as a contract if it is uncertain and indefinite in its material terms. It is widely believed, however, that the indefiniteness doctrine is largely ignored by contemporary courts. But a study of the contemporary case law on indefinite contracts reveals some striking facts. In literally dozens of cases, American courts dismiss claims for breach of contract on the grounds of indefiniteness, often without granting any relief to the disappointed promisee. This evidence raises a fundamental question: Why do parties write deliberately incomplete agreements in the shadow of a robust indefiniteness doctrine? One hypothesis is that these agreements may be self-enforcing. But most of the recently litigated cases do not appear to be self-enforcing in the traditional sense. Rather, most are isolated transactions between strangers trading at arms length. Recent work in experimental economics suggests, however, that the domain of self-enforcing contracts may be considerably larger than has been conventionally understood. A robust result of these experiments is that a significant fraction of individuals behave as if reciprocity were an important motivation (even in isolated interactions with strangers) while a comparable fraction react as if motivated entirely by self interest. These experiments support a theory that predicts that deliberately incomplete contracts that rely on self-enforcement through reciprocal fairness are more efficient than the alternative of more complete, legally enforceable agreements. The potency of reciprocal fairness as a method of self-enforcement explains (and justifies) the resiliency of the common law indefiniteness doctrine in the face of a contemporary academic consensus in favor of expanding the scope of legal regulation.

Advances in Economic Theory

Advances in Economic Theory PDF Author: Truman Fassett Bewley
Publisher: CUP Archive
ISBN: 9780521389259
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 452

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Book Description
These articles should be helpful to anyone with training in economics.

Contract Law and the Legislature

Contract Law and the Legislature PDF Author: TT Arvind
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1509926119
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 533

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Book Description
This volume revisits some of the key debates about the nature and shape of contract law, in light of the impact that statutes have had on its development. With contributions from leading contract law scholars, it fills a significant gap in existing theoretical and doctrinal analyses of contract law, which rely primarily on cases to put forward accounts of the general principles and structure of contract law. Statutory rules are, typically, seen as being specific instances of legal regulation that carve out exceptions to these general principles for specific reasons of policy. This treatment of these rules has resulted in an incomplete understanding of the nature of contract law and the principles that underpin it. By drawing specifically on contract statutes, the volume produces a more complete picture of modern contract law. A companion to the ground-breaking Tort Law and the Legislature: Common Law, Statute and the Dynamics of Legal Change (Hart Publishing, 2012) this collection will have a significant impact on the study of contract law.

Prices and Quantities

Prices and Quantities PDF Author: Rakesh V. Vohra
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108806317
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 225

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Book Description
Rakesh V. Vohra offers a unique approach to studying and understanding intermediate microeconomics by reversing the conventional order of treatment, starting with topics that are mathematically simpler and progressing to the more complex. The book begins with monopoly, which requires single variable rather than multivariable calculus and allows students to focus clearly on the fundamental trade-off at the heart of economics: margin versus volume. Imperfect competition and the contrast with monopoly follows, introducing the notion of Nash equilibrium. Perfect competition is addressed toward the end of the book, and framed as a model of non-strategic behavior by firms and agents. The last chapter is devoted to externalities, with an emphasis on how one might design competitive markets to price externalities and linking the difficulties to the problem of efficient provision of public goods. Real-life examples engage the reader while encouraging them to think critically about the interplay between model and reality.

The Handbook of Organizational Economics

The Handbook of Organizational Economics PDF Author: Robert S. Gibbons
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691132798
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1248

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Book Description
(E-book available via MyiLibrary) In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. The Handbook of Organizational Economics surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field. It displays the breadth of topics in organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.

The Structure of Implicit Contracts with Word-of-mouth Reputational Enforcement

The Structure of Implicit Contracts with Word-of-mouth Reputational Enforcement PDF Author: Jon Strand
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788257082536
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35

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Book Description


Exploring the Grand Challenges for Next Generation E-Business

Exploring the Grand Challenges for Next Generation E-Business PDF Author: Raj Sharman
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3642174493
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 323

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Book Description
This book is based on a selection of thoroughly revised and extended best papers from the 8th Workshop on E-Business (WEB 2009) held in Phoenix, AZ, USA, on December 15th, 2009. The 29 papers, which were selected from 70 presentations at the workshop, highlight the enormous developments and potential of e-business at a time when new technologies like cloud computing, collective intelligence, and multi-sided platforms are burgeoning. Among the topics covered are Web-based information systems, RFID and supply chain management, process modeling and standardization, security and privacy issues, social networking and mobility, e-services and market mechanisms, IT portfolio management, and other special topics in e-business such as electronic invoicing.

Contract Theory

Contract Theory PDF Author: Patrick Bolton
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262025768
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 746

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Book Description
A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.